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Abstract 
State Aid policy has been an integral part of competition policy and 
the European Commission is responsible for controlling aid, which distorts 
competition in the internal market to be granted by Member States. State 
Aid is usually defined as advantages given by the State to undertakings in 
the form of financial contributions, support, or other forms of special 
treatment. This thesis will examine state aid policy and regulation in the 
European Union. The research aims at critically analysing the 
implementation of the rules that compose the European state aid framework 
and conclude on whether the system for the control of state aid is set in an 
effective way to achieve the objectives of protecting competition and 
therefore the internal market by limiting aid levels and streaming aid 
towards more beneficial aid. This research is important because it can reveal 
the particular benefits and problems caused by state aid and help by making 
recommendations for the future application of the rules. 
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‘1. Financial assistance, no matter in what 
form it is granted, is incompatible with the 
common market if it distorts competition and 
the distribution of economic activities by 
favoring certain enterprises or certain types 
of production. 
The following exceptions are allowed: 
a. Subsidies to individual consumers and to 
disinterested institutions (schools and 
hospitals) used as instruments of social 
policy. 
b. Subsidies for the development of certain 
regions.’ 
‘Spaak Report’,(unofficial translation of the 
Information Service of the High Authority of 
the European Community on Coal and Steel from 
French) June 1956. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The TFEU, in general, prohibits the granting of aid by Member 
States to undertakings, because state aid has the effect of distorting 
competition and affects trade between Member States.
1
 The TFEU sets the 
objective of state aid control to be the protection of competition in the 
internal market along with the other instruments of the European Union’s 
competition policy, namely antitrust, merger control and abuse of 
dominance. 
                                                 
1
 Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] OJ 
C326/47. 
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The research aims at assessing the implementation of state aid 
control, by critically examining the powers and responsibilities of different 
actors at different levels of implementation in the legal order of the 
European Union and its Member States, without focusing on any individual 
State. Positive and negative characteristics will be highlighted through the 
analysis of the relevant state aid legislation, soft law and case law and 
conclusions are drawn about the shortcomings and suggestions to improve 
the implementation of the EU state aid policy.  
 Firstly, it is necessary to present the main and secondary research 
questions that will drive this thesis and then present the methodology, used 
by the researcher to conclude on the examination of the main problem. 
Apart from that, it is necessary to define the basic notions that will be used 
throughout this thesis, and the more specific legal framework of state aid 
control that is part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
 
1.2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 1.2.1 Main research question 
 The Commission has been awarded by the Treaty
2
 exclusive 
competence to assess the compatibility of aid measures with the internal 
market. The Commission has also been given the competence to adopt 
legislation, based on Article 108(3) TFEU. The history of the 
implementation of the state aid policy shows that there is incoherence that 
affects all other aspects of the state aid policy. To be more precise, there are 
two choices when it comes to implementing state aid policy. Firstly, there is 
                                                 
2
 Article 107(1) TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47. 
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a choice of rules versus discretion and a choice of form against the effects of 
aid.
3
 The Commission’s choices seem not to be persistent with a clear 
choice of one versus the other always. This leads to problems in the 
implementation of state aid. The main research question asks whether there 
is optimum implementation of the state aid policy and if not what are the 
problems and solutions. Some initial thoughts on the choices available for 
the control of state aid follow. 
For the first issue of rules versus discretion:  In the early years of 
state aid control there were no regulations in force and the control of 
subsidies
4
 was primarily performed according to the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (henceforth the Court).  
Then, in the late 1990’s after a proposal by the Commission the 
Council adopted the Procedural Regulation,
5
 which formalised the 
Commission’s assessments. There was a clear choice of rules against 
discretion. Also, the Commission decided to implement a vast amount of 
soft law because of the Council’s unwillingness to adopt secondary 
legislation for the control of subsidies.
6
  
                                                 
3
 Allison Oldade and Henri Piffaut, ‘Introduction to State aid law and policy’ in Kelyn Bacon 
(ed), European Community Law of State aid (OUP, Oxford 2009) 16. More analysis on the 
benefits of the effects based assessment versus a form based one in paragraph 7.4 of the 
seventh chapter of the thesis. 
4
 This thesis will use the term subsidy to mean state aid as a convention. The difference 
between subsidies and state aid is very laconically stated by J Almunia in speech ‘Time for 
the Single Market to come of age’ date 20/03/2013, SPEECH/13/243: ‘State aid is only a 
province of all government interventions. A subsidy or other measure becomes State aid 
only when it gives an advantage to companies on a selective basis. 
In addition, some interventions are exempted from our control because we know that 
government action is sometimes essential for a well-functioning and equitable economy.’  
5
 Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [2013] OJ L-204/15 
6
 M Blauberger, ‘Of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subsidies: European state aid control through soft and 
hard law’ [2004] 32(4) West European Politics 719, 725 
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Next, for the issue of the choice of the effects versus the form of the 
measure as a better assessment method of aid measures: the Commission 
adopted the State Aid Action Plan of 2005
7
 that introduced the more refined 
economic approach and tried to shift the focus from rules to the effects of 
the aid, which should be the basis for the compatibility analysis. If there is 
going to be an analysis of measures based on their effects on economic 
terms, surely the numerous soft law instruments for state aid control that 
have been introduced over the years would not be applicable any more.
8
  
The thesis aims to identify the other problems that can be observed 
during the implementation of state aid control by all of its actors, national 
and supranational, in the following chapters.  
  In the first chapter, this thesis will present further research 
questions, will analyse how state aid policy is implemented through 
secondary legislation and soft law and define the legal framework which 
provides for the basic principles of state aid that are in force within the 28 
Member States of the European Union. The European Union is the legal 
territory that is the subject of the analysis of the research. 
1.2.2 Outline of the chapters and further research questions 
The first research question arises from the fact that Member States 
grant aid to their undertakings, even though there is a general prohibition 
                                                 
7
 State Aid action Plan: Less and better targeted State Aid: a roadmap for State Aid reform 
2005-2009, COM(2005) 107 final 
8
 M Blauberger, ‘Of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subsidies: European state aid control through soft and 
hard law’ [2004] 32(4) West European Politics 719, 725. 
One can certainly argue against that point: that the rules do not necessarily contradict the 
effects based approach, if the rules contain details on the assessment based on the effects 
of the aid. However, the various soft law documents are not necessarily based on the 
assessment of economic criteria. Rather, the Commission tries through them to guide the 
Member States into the specific aid measures that it has decided do not harm 
competition, such as the approach to the less and better targeted aid. 
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since 1957. The question can be very laconically stated as why Member 
States grant state aid. Of course, the derogations from the prohibition are 
also in effect along with the prohibition, but the research shows that state 
aid is appealing to Member States for certain reasons. The answer to this 
question will be given in the second chapter, where this research will 
examine the economic factors that influence the need for state aid and the 
purpose of each kind of aid. Another reason why Member States grant aid is 
the financial crisis of 2008, which has transformed into a sovereign debt 
crisis more recently. Consequently, the second chapter critically examines 
the effects of the financial crisis on state aid regulation, which was chosen 
to be the basic vehicle of the Union’s response to the crisis, and thus 
affected the rules temporarily, but substantially.  
The examination of the Commission’s procedures for the control of 
state aid will be the main topic of the third chapter. The research will be 
performed between two legal regimes: first is the supranational; this is 
comprised by the EU Treaty and the secondary legislation that generates the 
European Commission’s competence to adopt decisions, implementing the 
Union’s state aid policy. Also included in the supranational regime is the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to review the 
control of state aid implemented by the Commission. The research question 
that is dominating the supranational aspect of state aid rules and 
enforcement procedures is to try to identify the limits of the supranational 
regime that make the enforcement of state aid control inadequate to protect 
competition and allow the internal market to remain intact. This will be an 
analysis of positive and negative effects of the Commission’s competences 
17 
 
in state aid control, and also, the Commission’s power to order the recovery 
of unlawful aid will be examined.  
Part of the third chapter will include analysis of the developments in 
the Commission’s state aid control mechanisms and the changes that the 
Modernisation has brought forward, in relation to the handling of 
complaints and the Commission’s powers to initiate investigations on its 
own initiative, which aim to refocus its resources to capturing distortive 
types of aid. Also, an analysis of the Commissions power to order recovery 
forms part of chapter three. The Commission has found that ‘there is 
practically not a single case in which recovery was completed within the 
deadline set out in the recovery decision’,9 a statement that exposes the 
problems in its procedures. Furthermore, the Commission considers that the 
fact that ‘45% of all recovery decisions adopted in 2000-2001 had still not 
been implemented by June 2006’10 demonstrates the problems and 
inadequacies of this procedure, which undermines the whole state aid 
Framework. Those figures triggered the adoption of the Notice on recovery, 
which provided more guidance to Member States and improved the 
implementation of recovery decisions.
11
 The Commission’s Decisions can 
be reviewed by the Court, whose powers will be analysed next. 
 The fourth chapter will conclude the supranational aspect of the 
implementation of state aid control by critically analysing the enforcement 
                                                 
9
 Notice from the Commission - Towards an effective implementation of Commission 
decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid 
[2007]OJ C272/04 para 3. 
10
 Ibid . 
11
 The most recent data published on 21/12/2012 show that there is still a lot to be 
accomplished in the implementation of recovery decisions: the percentage of illegal and 
incompatible aid that remains to be recovered has risen to 14.4% of all recovery decision 
on 30 June 2012, up from 11.1% in 2010. Data available on the latest edition of the State 
Aid Scoreboard – Autumn 2012 update, COM(2012) 778 final, para 5.2.  
18 
 
of state aid control in the Court of Justice of the EU. There can be both 
private and public enforcement of state aid rules in the Court. Private 
enforcement has been given significant attention by the Commission, 
recently, in every aspect of Competition law, whether it is state aid, or 
antitrust. In the future, private enforcement might become even more 
important but there are still many obstacles for private claims to be well 
founded and thus successful. Private enforcement can be pursued both 
before national and European Courts. The focus of the sixth chapter is the 
private and public enforcement of state aid rules, before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (Court). The research will examine the reasons 
behind the problems of enforcement of state aid law in the Court. It is true 
though, that the Court’s case law has provided state aid law with various 
solutions to problems over the years. However, there are still some problems 
that mainly have to do with the standing of third parties in the Court, other 
than the Member States, and with the obligation to prove causation in 
damages cases. Next, the thesis will critically analyse the powers and 
procedures of the national actors of state aid control. 
The fifth chapter aims to examine how the Member States can 
increase compliance with correct application of state aid control, especially 
after the Commission’s statement in the State Aid Modernisation that the 
‘responsibilities of Member States for ensuring the correct enforcement of 
state aid rules would increase’.12 The Commission has highlighted a 
problem of compliance with state aid rules either at the stage of designing or 
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implementing state aid measures: Commissioner Almunia has said that 
‘over 40% of the cases we have monitored are potentially problematic’.13  
The reasons for non-compliance can be categorised as either lack of 
knowledge of state aid rules, or faulty analysis of the rules that leads to the 
decision that a measure is compatible with the TFEU, or lastly, deliberate 
infringement of state aid rules from Member States authorities that design 
and implement measures.
14
 The Commission has sought compliance in the 
past with many ways: mainly by simplifying procedures, adopting guidance 
through soft law and the imposition of fines for non-compliance with its 
Decisions.  
This fifth chapter will suggest the introduction of independent 
national authorities in the state aid control as an institutional change to 
achieve better compliance with state aid rules. After examining the benefits 
and inadequacies of the supranational level of subsidy control the focus will 
be shifted to the national level. The relevant research question is whether 
there is a need for a partial decentralisation of state aid control, and which 
competencies can the national authorities, involved in state aid control, 
ultimately have? Consequently, the focus of this chapter will be on the 
national mechanisms on state aid control. The analysis is based on the 
finding that there is a discrepancy at the level of involvement between 
different Member States, and that is something that should be resolved, in 
order to make state aid control implementation more effective.
15
 The 
differences that exist will be analysed, and possible solutions for the future 
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modernisation of state aid control at the national level are being examined in 
the fifth chapter. The analysis will be in the form of an examination of the 
positive and negative effects of a decentralised system of enforcement.  
Another important step towards improvement of state aid control is 
the Commission’s Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national 
courts,
16
 which aims ‘to inform national courts and third parties of the 
remedies available and to provide them with guidance’.17 The problem that 
has been identified is that enforcement at the national courts is still not 
effective enough, and the reasons behind that failure will be the main focus 
of the sixth chapter. An examination of a sample of national case law is 
included to determine how the national courts enforce state aid law. It is 
argued that engaging national courts in the enforcement of state aid rules 
can be beneficial to the Union’s aim for less and better targeted state aid, 
because it provides an opportunity for private parties to secure their rights 
against illegal aid measures at a more familiar level to them.  The Court has 
accepted that due to the absence of Union-wide rules to govern private 
claims for breach of Union rules on competition, it is up to the national legal 
systems of Member States to regulate these procedures. The only conditions 
applied by the Court in this are the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness.
18
  
Having analysed the competences and problems that appear in the 
implementation of state aid control by its different actors the seventh 
chapter critically examines the major reforms and modernisation of the state 
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aid policy: namely the SAAP, the reform of state aid rules for services of 
general economic interest, and the comprehensive modernisation of state aid 
policy that is underway. The final, seventh chapter aims to discover the 
benefits that each one of those reforms has brought to the implementation of 
state aid control. Also, it aims to find what should be the directions of the 
future modernisation, based on the findings of the research from the 
previous chapters of the thesis. The thesis will conclude that there is a need 
for a reform of state aid that will include fewer, simpler rules that apply 
horizontally to all state aid measures, irrespective of economic sectors and 
better targeted enforcement, both at the supranational and the national level, 
where there are discrepancies that need to be corrected.   
The results of the analysis of this research show that the application 
of state aid rules in the European Union has to be performed by two groups 
of actors that need to work together for it to be more effective. The first 
being the European Union’s institutions, namely the Commission and the 
Court; the second are the national governments of Member States, their 
independent competition authorities and the national courts. The 
collaboration of all those actors is needed, and the examination of past 
practises has proved that there is dysfunction.    
This research attempts to provide possible suggestions for the 
optimisation of this collaboration. Especially, the research highlights the 
shortcomings of the different rules and procedures and suggests possible 
improvements. Next, the methodology of the research is presented.  
1.2.3 Methodology  
22 
 
This research is a legal analysis of the effectiveness of state aid 
control in the European Union. This research follows a qualitative technique 
to provide its results. However, quantitative data are used throughout the 
thesis to support the arguments with evidence. The researcher’s tools for 
this purpose will be the critical examination of the state aid framework; this 
includes primary and secondary EU legislation, soft law, national 
procedures and case law, produced by the Court of Justice of the EU in both 
of its compositions that have jurisdiction to rule on state aid cases, which 
are the Court Of Justice and the General Court, as well as the case law of 
national courts of Member States.  
To establish whether the current state aid control implementation is 
effective, the research finds appropriate criteria in the Commission’s 
documents that launch major modernisations of state aid control; namely, 
the State Aid Action Plan and the Speech of Vice-President Almunia at the 
2012 European Competition Forum.
19
 Those criteria are: firstly, the speed 
and applicability of the procedures that are in place to assess state aid 
measures
20
 were tested. Secondly, the coherence
21
 and transparency
22
 of the 
legislation in force that implements state aid control was questioned. Third 
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criterion is the need to accompany the state aid rules with strong 
enforcement mechanisms
23
 and procedures, in both the supranational and 
the national levels.
24
  Those criteria will guide the analysis of the 
implementation of state aid control by its various actors and their relevant 
procedures. The first criterion is mainly applied in the first, third and fifth 
chapters, where the administrative procedure of the Commission and the 
administrative national procedures are being critically analysed. The second 
criterion is being applied throughout the thesis, on the relevant legislation 
that each chapter analyses. The last criterion is mainly applied in the fourth 
and sixth chapters where enforcement mechanisms both at the national and 
supranational level are being critically examined. These criteria will be 
applied to the implementation of state aid performed by the actors of the 
state aid policy, which are the Commission, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the Member States’ governments and national authorities, 
and national courts.    
 However, due to the nature of Competition law, whose one part is 
state aid law, this legal research must include other aspects of scientific 
knowledge that contribute to the implementation of Competition law, which 
is the foundation of this research. The basic aim of European Union 
Competition law is that it ‘exists to protect competition in a free market 
economy’.25 Therefore, competition law affects the regulation of markets 
and the economy. This fact brings forward the need for an interaction of the 
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law with economics. The European Commission notably, has declared its 
eagerness to ‘strengthen its economic approach to state aid analysis’.26 This, 
in particular, has, in practice, come to mean that economic theories, which 
are incorporated into Competition law by secondary legislation,
27
 have a 
role to play in the assessment of state aid cases by the Commission. 
Consequently, to some extent the scope of this research requires some 
economic analysis that will be performed in relation to the definition of state 
aid by the Treaty and the application of the enforcement procedures by the 
Commission and the Courts. Even so, this economic evaluation of state aid 
law will be as limited, as it is necessary, for the scope of this legal research.   
Another interaction with the legal analysis will come from the fact 
that state aid control deals with the actions of supranational institutions, 
states, administrative competition authorities and private companies. Each 
group has its own rights to protect and its own policies to put into effect. 
Most of the times, those policies do not converge with one another, but 
rather they conflict, due to the different objectives each group aspires to 
achieve. Consequently, the analysis must involve aspects of political theory 
as far as State action is concerned and administrative law as far as 
institution’s and national authorities’ action is concerned. All of those 
compose the critical analysis of state aid control, which, for the purpose of 
this research, will be a legal analysis of all aspects of state aid law 
implementation.     
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1.2.4 Defining the implementation, modernisation and 
decentralisation of the state aid policy  
The hypothesis of the thesis is that apart from the current rules 
organising the European system of state aid control, there also needs to be 
effective implementation of those rules, in the sense that the public 
intervention in the form of state aid should be promoting the most effective 
measures, which are the ones that do not distort competition in a great 
degree.
28
 The objective of evaluating the efficiency of the implementation of 
state aid rules is to establish, whether it achieves the aim of ‘less and better 
targeted aid’.29 If the law and procedure proves to be ineffective, there needs 
to be modernisation of the state aid control policy. 
Implementation means realisation of a policy. In the specific context 
of state aid, this research is important, because it can reveal the specific 
benefits and problems caused by state aid and help by making 
recommendations for the future application of the rules. The implementation 
of state aid policy is performed in two levels: first at a supranational level 
by the institutions of the European Union; secondly, at a national level by 
the various authorities of the Member States. This dual model will be 
followed as a method for performing the analysis.  
Modernisation of the state aid policy is a term that the Commission 
has used, whenever it plans to reform the state aid rules, in a more 
horizontal approach that affects the implementation of all state aid 
measures, regardless of economic sectors and special state aid rules that 
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apply only to specific sectors. One significant modernisation package has 
been the 2005 state aid Action Plan
30
 and the reforms that it initiated will be 
analysed in the final chapter of the thesis. In more recent times, the 
Commission used the term modernisation in its announcement of the 
comprehensive modernisation of the EU’s state aid policy in the speeches 
during the European Competition Forum.
31
 Both times the term has been 
used without providing some form of definition; instead, the basic elements 
of the modernisation are given. The rationale behind the need for 
modernisation according to the Commission is the need to refocus on the 
cases that impact on the internal market most. This objective will be reached 
by modernising rules and procedures in a simpler, more targeted way.  
One possible specific form of the modernisation could be the 
decentralisation of the state aid policy. This term has been used before in 
Competition law, when Regulation 1/2003
32
 modernised Competition law 
enforcement, by abolishing the system of notifications and replacing it with 
a system of shared enforcement between the Commission and Member 
States’ authorities. For better coordination, a system of coordination was 
introduced, in the form of a European Competition Network. This type of 
modernisation could be introduced in state aid as well as the indication has 
been given by the Commission in its SAAP consultation documents and 
more recently at the European Competition Forum. This type of 
modernisation for state aid policy has been opposed, so far, because of the 
                                                 
30
 State Aid action Plan: Less and better targeted State Aid: a roadmap for State Aid reform 
2005-2009, COM(2005) 107 final 
31
 Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy J 
Almunia, ‘Priming Europe for Growth’, speech at the European Competition Forum, 
Brussels, 2 February 2012 SPEECH/12/59.  
32
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 
27 
 
specific character of the state aid investigations, which are limited between 
the Commission and the Member States, whereas, antitrust and merger 
enforcement is performed against the undertakings and not the Member 
States.
33
 Based on that reality, some feel that it is highly unlikely that a 
decentralisation, where the Commission will share the competence of 
evaluating the compatibility of measures with the Member State authorities 
will ever be the main event in a modernisation.
34
 However, this research 
will conclude that there is some level of enforcement that could be 
performed by the Member States authorities, and the thesis will further 
discuss the benefits that could come from partial decentralisation of state aid 
control in the fifth chapter.   
 
1.3 HOW STATE AID POLICY IS FORMED AND IMPLEMENTED 
The European Council met in Lisbon in March 2000 and agreed a 
new strategy for the European Union to promote employment and social 
cohesion in what it was hoped to be a ‘knowledge-based economy’.35 The 
Presidency conclusions of that summit included goals for the state aid policy 
of the Union: state aid and competition were needed to secure a level 
playing field for all in the internal market. More particularly the summit 
called for the Union to reduce the level of state aid and to promote 
horizontal aid instead of benefiting individual companies or sectors.
36
 This 
was opening a new dimension in the implementation of the state aid policy 
and certainly the Commission promoted those goals by adopting relevant 
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soft law measures aimed at limiting aid levels and that directed state aid to 
horizontal objectives.  
In March 2001 the Stockholm European Council asked the Member 
States to reduce state aid as percentage of GDP by 2003 and thus set a 
standard by which the trend would be examined in the future through the 
publication of a Scoreboard.
37
 The Lisbon Strategy, as those policies agreed 
in Lisbon were known as, had to be re-launched in mid-2000 because of 
disappointing results.
38
  The 2001 Scoreboard
39
 reports a decline of 30% in 
total aid between 1997 and 1999; however, four Member States had 
increased the levels. The 2002 Scoreboard reports that although total aid 
levels for the EU are falling there are disparities among Member States: 
total aid per Member State ranges between 0.46% of GDP in the UK to 
1.44% in Finland.
40
 Apart from the disparities, the 2005 Scoreboard which 
takes into account the Commission’s mid-term review of the Lisbon 
Strategy reports that despite a slight decrease in aid levels the trend in total 
aid as a percentage of GDP is stable and not clearly downward.
41
 The latest 
Scoreboard reports that the total aid levels for 2011 are 0.5% of GDP, 
although it concedes that this decline is probably due to strict budgets and 
not the will of the Member States to reduce aid levels. This number of 
course excludes aid to the financial sector, for which outstanding guarantees 
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and other liquidity measures accounts to 5.7% of EU GDP,
42
 which is still 
state aid after all.  
The Commission’s tools in order to push the objectives of the Lisbon 
Strategy in state aid have been, apart from the Scoreboard and an e-
newsletter as governance instruments,
43
 soft law instruments that contain 
rules on horizontal objectives. It is clear that neither the Treaty nor the 
Lisbon summit ask or allow the Commission to judge Member States’ use 
of public funds.
44
 The Commission has been given exclusive competence to 
assess measures that distort competition and trade between Member States 
and therefore ‘needs to exercise caution’45 when it is adopting soft law 
instruments that affect other policies of the Member States.   
The Commission adopts Frameworks, Codes, Communications, 
Guidelines and Notices, which contain the rules that it will apply when it 
decides on the compatibility of aim measures with the Treaty.  Those 
instruments are usually referred to as ‘soft law’, as opposed to a 
Commission Decision, which is legislation and a Commission Opinion or 
Recommendation that are legal acts. Soft law is part of the new governance 
procedures that were introduced into the EU legal order in the 1990’s as an 
alternative to harder EU rules or as others have seen it as a ‘half - way house 
between the Commission’s discretion and EU legislation.46 Governance has 
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been defined as ‘collectively binding decisions [...] taken by elected 
representatives within parliaments and implemented by bureaucrats within 
public administrations’.47  
Soft law acts do not contain legally binding rules and are published 
in the C section
48
 of the Official Journal not the L, which publishes 
legislation. They do entail, though, ‘practical effects’49 in the sense that they 
do bind the Commission in abiding with the interpretation of the law that 
they contain. The Commission has not been given power to issue ‘general 
rules of conduct’, such as the Guidelines in state aid control but some 
writers believe that over the years it will have acquired regulatory powers in 
its own name to limit itself by issuing soft law instruments.
50
 The legal basis 
of secondary Union acts has been requested to be included explicitly by the 
Court;
51
 the legal basis for the Commission’s soft law has been Article 
108(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
allows the Commission to take ‘appropriate measures’ for the control of 
state aid.
52
 Even though soft law instruments are not legally binding the 
Commission seeks the widest possible approval from the Member States 
before the adoption of a new instrument. The procedure of adoption 
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includes informal consultation at multilateral meetings and the circulation of 
written drafts.
53
 If the majority of Member States accept the soft law 
instrument, then the Commission threatens the Member States that opposes 
with opening up the formal investigation procedure for all of the existing 
state aid measures that the said Member State implements in the sector or 
area that the new instrument refers to.
54
 This is the legal status of state aid 
soft law, where the Commission and Member States are concerned. 
 From the point of view of the Court of Justice of the EU there is a 
difference between hard law and notices and guidelines; the Court 
differentiates between rules of law and rules of practice.
55
 The Court though 
has undertaken the review of guidelines to establish whether they comply 
with the Treaty.
56
 In fact, a quantitative study,
57
 conducted in the case from 
1953 to 2011, has revealed that soft law is referred to in 291 state aid 
judgments and that this case law refers to 73 different state aid soft law 
instruments. According to the findings of the study soft law is 
acknowledged by the Court as complementing and detailing hard law.
58
 The 
Court examines soft law instruments and grants them limited legal effects 
by denouncing that soft law instruments cannot contrast general principles 
of law that are protected in the Treaty, such as the principle of legitimate 
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expectations.
59
  Thus, soft law instruments are not considered legislation 
and there can be both positive and negative effects from the use of soft law 
instruments as a means of policy implementation. 
Soft law can be adopted more easily, since there are no complex 
parliamentary procedures involved in its adoption process; it allows for 
rules to be adopted when the legislative procedure has failed to produce 
traditional legal instruments. That was certainly the case for state aid policy, 
when the Member States failed to agree on a Council Regulation for the 
implementation of state aid.
60
 Another positive characteristic of soft law 
instruments is that they can be helpful as a guide for enforcers of policies, 
such as the Commission in state aid matters and the public.
61
    
On the contrary, soft law can be criticised for often being vague, 
inconsistent with current legislation and not easily available to the public, 
especially since the formal legislative procedures have been by passed in its 
adoption process. Furthermore, policy implementation by soft law can lead 
to soft compliance,
62
 which can undermine the whole policy goals. Finally, 
due to the informal character of its adoption procedure some smaller 
Member States consider themselves neglected,
63
 since the normal voting 
rights in the Council do not apply.   
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In state aid, in particular, soft law is the main instrument of the 
Commission’s policy implementation. It has been said that state aid policy 
was ‘rule-based’,64 at least until the introduction of the effects-based 
approach with the 2005 State Aid Action Plan.
65
 Soft law has many forms in 
state aid. Soft law has been distinguished into three categories: a) 
preparatory instruments, b) interpretative and decisional instruments and c) 
steering instruments.
66
 In state aid control the second category applies the 
most and it contains Communications, Frameworks, Notices, Guidelines and 
Codes.  Frameworks only apply to the industry sector that is clearly defined 
in them. They codify state aid rules applicable to that sector, they set the aid 
intensity limits and they define notions that are important for the 
Commission’s control. Notices, Guidelines and Communications, are also 
not legislative documents and may not be immediately published. The Court 
has specifically stated that an informal policy framework ‘constitutes 
guidelines setting out the course of conduct which the Commission intends 
to follow and with which it asks the Member States to comply’.67 Moreover, 
when Guidelines codify previous case law it is the case law that is binding.
68
 
It has been argued whether the legal form of the instrument, by 
which the policy is being implemented, reduces the Commission’s 
discretion to decide on the compatibility of state aid measures, granted to it 
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by the Treaty. The form of the instrument should not have any effect on the 
matter; rather it is the content of the soft law that could minimise the 
Commission’s ‘margin of discretion’.69 
Rawlinson
70
 has indicated that the numbers tell the truth about state 
aid: at the end of 1989 the state aid Compilation of rules applicable to state 
aid, was 323 pages long, with a supplement of 172 pages.
71
 His conclusion 
was that the Commission’s state aid policy is rule based.72 The alternative to 
state aid soft law acts would be more ‘hard law’; legislative acts that would 
have been adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure of the European 
Union, possibly having the form of Council or Commission Regulations. 
The Commission feels that it would be ‘inappropriate’73 to have more 
Regulations for state aid matters, because it has been ‘given responsibility to 
apply state aid rules’74 by the Treaty.  
To conclude, the effects of the use of soft law in such a large degree 
in state aid policy implementation has been that the Commission was able to 
lever an increasing amount of case load more effectively with limited 
resources. More importantly, though, implementation through secondary 
legislation and soft law has become a strong point for the Commission in its 
quest to control aid. Through the various soft law instruments and their 
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interpretations of legislation the Commission has been able to lead Member 
States to granting less aid and aid that falls within what it is considered good 
aid. Through soft law the Commission has been able to resist political 
pressure from the Member States and has strengthened its dominant role in 
state aid policy-making.
75
 
 
1.4 EUROPEAN UNION RULES ON STATE AID 
 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 by the 
Member States of the European Union and entered into force on 1 
December 2009. It is the latest Treaty to come into effect, which provides 
the legal basis for the existence of the European Union in the legal world. 
The Lisbon Treaty amended the existing Treaties, namely the Treaty of the 
European Union
76
 (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.
77
 Under the old Treaties the European Union and the European 
Community were two separate legal personalities and Competition law was 
regulated within the EC Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty this system of dual 
legal personality has ended, and the European Union was given a single 
legal personality. Since 1 December 2009, the European rules on 
Competition are included in the amended Treaty establishing the European 
Community (EC Treaty), which is since then called Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
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State aid is part of the rules on Competition, together with anti-trust 
and merger control. It should be mentioned that, similarly to the EC Treaty, 
Article 4(c) of the European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECST) prohibited state 
aid to industries, and aid was exceptionally permitted under secondary 
legislation adopted according to Article 95 ECST, due to the nature of the 
coal and steel industry, and its importance as the driving force of the 
European countries, and the need to control it completely.
78
 The ECST has 
expired on 23 July 2002 and aid to the coal and steel industry is currently 
regulated by the provisions of the TFEU.
79
  
The basic provisions for state aid in the European Union are 
currently contained in Articles 107, 108 and 109 of the TFEU (former 
Articles 87, 88 and 89 of the EC Treaty and 92, 93 and 94 before the 
amendment of the Treaty of Maastricht). The basic substantive provision is 
included in Article 107, which does not provide an explicit definition of aid; 
instead, it declares any aid from the state that distorts competition as 
‘incompatible with the common market’.80 The Court has accepted that the 
purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU contains a prohibition of aid, which ‘seeks 
in principal, as a rule of competition, to prevent aid granted by Member 
States from distorting competition or affecting intra- Community trade’.81 
Incompatible state aid with the internal market is prohibited, as long 
as the aid measure cannot be categorised within the derogations and 
exceptions contained in Article 107 (2) TFEU and 107 (3) TFEU. Next, in 
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the EU state aid rules, is Article 108 TFEU, which provides for the Member 
States’ obligation to notify new aid measures to the Commission82 and the 
enforcement powers of the Commission relating to state aid control. Apart 
from those general provisions, there is Article 109 TFEU, which enables the 
Council to adopt secondary regulation instruments that will enforce and 
implement the substantive and procedural rules contained in the Articles 
107 and 108 TFEU. Those Council Regulations, together with the 
Commission’s Notices and Communications, make up the secondary 
legislation that also forms part of the European Union’s state aid rules.   
In this chapter, this thesis will first present the different types of aid. 
Secondly, the research will analyse the elements of the notion of state aid, as 
they derive from Article 107(1) TFEU. Those elements in fact make up the 
four cumulative conditions that the Court requires to be fulfilled, in order to 
classify a measure as aid incompatible with the internal market in most state 
aid judgments.
83
  
As it follows from Article 107(1) TFEU, those conditions are the 
following:
84
the first element requires that the state aid measure should be 
specific and not of a general nature. The second element clarifies that the 
aid must grant an advantage to the beneficiary of the aid. The third element 
instructs that the aid must come from the state or from state resources, and 
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the fourth element requests that the aid must affect trade between Member 
States and distort competition. Firstly, it is beneficial to examine what types 
of measures have been classified in the past as state aid, in order to clarify 
the substantial meaning of state aid. 
 
1.5 TYPES OF STATE AID MEASURES AND THE DEFINITION OF 
AID 
 The Scoreboards published annually by the Commission refer to aid 
granted to industry and services. Then state aid is distinguished into types of 
aid for specific sectors and aid to horizontal objectives.
85
 Sectoral aid is 
granted to the following sectors according to the Scoreboard: Aid to 
shipbuilding, which has decreased by more than 60%.
86
 Aid to this sector is 
governed by the Framework on state aid for shipbuilding.
87
 Another type is 
aid to the coal and steel industry, which since the expiration of the European 
Coal and Steel Community Treaty in 2002 is subjected to the general state 
aid rules. Also, relevant to this type is aid to the energy sector, which is 
traditionally influenced by government intervention. Thus, state aid in this 
type of aid is influenced by privatisations and also the environmental policy. 
Next, is aid to the Transport sector, which is governed by specific Treaty 
provisions and secondary legislation and soft law, only the purpose of which 
will be examined in chapter two of the thesis. Another type is aid to the 
agriculture sector and to fisheries, which are governed by the general Treaty 
Articles on state aid 107 and 108 TFEU and secondary legislation and 
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guidelines. Finally, rescue and restructuring aid is governed by the 2004 
Guidelines
88
 that are under review to be replaced under the Modernisation 
initiative.  
 Aid to horizontal objectives includes primarily aid to regional 
development, which accounts for 26.4% of aid to industry and services. 
Next follows aid to environmental aid with 23.4% of all aid to industry and 
services. Third horizontal objective that is examined in the Scoreboards is 
aid to research, development and innovation, which account for 18.9% of 
aid to industry and services. Then follow aid to SMEs, aid to risk capital, 
training and development. Finally, block-exempted aid under several block 
exemption regulations is horizontal aid.
89
   
Article 107(1) TFEU may not contain a definition for what is aid in the 
European Union; instead, it contains a list of what an aid measure must 
consist of in order to be considered incompatible with the internal market. 
The issue of a definition for aid has been an issue for the Court, since the 
early stages of state aid control. In a case, which involved aid under the 
ECST Treaty, the Court has accepted that: ‘the Treaty contains no express 
definition of the concept of subsidy or aid’.90 Even today this perception for 
the absence of a specific definition is still valid for the Treaty establishing 
the European Community or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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Union as it was lately renamed, and which contain the basic state aid rules, 
after the expiration of the ECST. The European Treaties have used the term 
state aid, whereas other International Treaties refer to subsidies. It is 
important for the Court, even without a definition from the Treaty to 
establish whether a state measure constitutes aid in the meaning of the 
Treaty. In the same case, (Steenkolenmijnen) the Court has declared that:   
‘the concept of aid is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces 
not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also 
interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are 
normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without 
therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in 
character and have the same effect’.91 
From the above extract one can observe that the Court compared the two 
notions of state aid and subsidies and came to the conclusion that they are 
not identical, but rather that state aid has a wider meaning than subsidies.
92
 
Subsidies are direct contributions from the public finances and are 
considered straightforward aid cases. However, aid is connected by the 
Court with its purpose: ‘an aid is a very similar concept which, however, 
places emphasis on its purpose and seems especially devised for a particular 
object which cannot normally be achieved without outside help’.93   
This is an objective interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU and leads to 
the interpretation of a measure as incompatible with the internal market 
regardless of its aims, or the reasons for granting the aid. What is important 
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for the characterisation of a measure as aid is the effects of the measure. 
94
 
Consequently, a measure, which has a social character, or has environmental 
objectives, is not automatically excluded from being incompatible state aid, 
if all the other conditions are satisfied; however, it should be noted that the 
causes of the measure are taken into consideration by the Commission when 
it analyses its compatibility with the internal market. At that stage of 
examination, the cause is the factor that categorises the measure in one of 
the derogations of Article 107(1) TFEU.
95
  
Accordingly, the mainstream view of the Court and most of the writers 
is that ‘there is no ‘rule of reason’ or concept of ‘objective justification’ in 
the interpretation of Article 87(1)’96, now 107 (1) TFEU. On the contrary, 
other authors question whether the rule of reason has been applied in the 
recent state aid decisions taken in the context of the Financial Crisis 
Framework. They believe that some elements of a reasonability test, which 
would balance the negative effects of rescue aid to financial institutions with 
positive effects on consumers and the economy might be applicable, 
depending on the ‘degree and structure of the state of necessity’.97 
At this point it should be mentioned that the Treaty accepts that the aid 
measure can be ‘in any form whatsoever’.98 A measure can be aid, if it is a 
payment of sums of money, or any other positive advantage, as well as the 
write-off of a debt, or any negative burden. The case law provides a wide 
range of measures that have been characterised as aid due to the fact that the 
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notion of aid is interpreted broadly. Examples from the case law include 
direct financial transfers, such as recapitalisation, investments in the capital 
of the benefiting undertaking,
99
 and loans in preferential interest rates.
100
  
There are also indirect measures that have been assessed as state aid, 
such as state guarantees,
101
 tax exemptions which give the beneficiary an 
advantage contrary to the others who do not satisfy the conditions of the 
measure, write-off of debts and exemptions from paying fines and taxes.
102
 
After having examined the meaning of the notion of aid in the Treaty, it is 
now constructive to analyse the elements of the aid that is incompatible with 
the Treaty according to Article 107(1) TFEU.  
 
1.6 ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 107(1) EC 
1.6.1 Selectivity or specificity of the measure 
 Before this thesis critically analyses the Commission’s procedures 
when assessing the compatibility of aid measures it is necessary to start the 
application of the research criterion, which questions the coherence of the 
legislation. Consequently, in this part, the thesis will scrutinise the state aid 
rules that are in force in the Union, which need to be proven in order for the 
Commission’s administrative procedure to conclude on the compatibility of 
the aid measure in question with the internal market. According to Article 
107(1) TFEU the first condition for the characterisation of a state aid 
measure as incompatible with the internal market is that the aid measure is 
distorting competition ‘by favouring certain undertakings or the production 
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of certain goods’.103 This condition is the most important one of the four 
found in the Article and it derives from the word ‘certain’. The case law has 
distinguished between selective measures, which are incompatible with the 
internal market, as long as the other three conditions are also fulfilled, and 
general measures that are not state aid.  
The reason for this distinction is a practical one; it is supposed to 
leave out of the state aid control only the general measures, which do not 
distort competition.
104
 As with the definition for state aid, again, there is no 
definition for either a selective or a general measure.  The only relevant 
explanation for a general measure is to be found in a Notice on Taxation, 
where it is said that ‘tax measures which are open to all economic agents 
operating within a Member State are in principle general measures’.105 
Problems arise when there are preferential tax systems in one 
Member State and not in others. Currently, taxation remains a policy for the 
Member States to implement, with the Commission having no competence 
over it. However, through state aid regulation the Commission aims at 
harmonising tax systems, so that no aid can be passed through such channels 
in one Member State that would distort competition in the internal 
market.
106
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One defining case that dealt exclusively with the selectivity criterion 
is the Adria-Wien
107
 case, where the Court was asked by a national court to 
give its ruling on whether a tax measure was selective or general, and thus 
not state aid. The Court formed a simple test for establishing the selective 
character of the measure. The State measure favours certain undertakings, or 
the production of certain goods, and thus is selective, if the comparison is 
made ‘with other undertakings, which are in a legal and factual situation that 
is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in 
question’.108  
The Court, in its judgment, went against the Opinion of the 
Advocate General which was to consider the tax measure general and not 
selective. He based his Opinion on a case law of the Court which accepts 
that a measure which is ‘justified by the nature or general scheme of the 
system of which it is part does not fulfil that condition of selectivity’.109 
This condition has been interpreted strictly in the case law,
110
  and what 
needs to be proven is that there is a social, regional or environmental 
objective within the measure.  
However, the Court decided in the specific case that ‘the criterion 
applied by the national legislation at issue’ was not justified by the nature or 
the general scheme of the particular legislation and categorised it as aid 
within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty (now 107(1) TFEU).
111
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Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the selectivity test formed in the 
Adria-Wien case, the comparison of the situation of the beneficiary before 
and after the relevant law, which granted the aid is not relevant; the 
comparison is only made between the undertakings in a similar and factual 
situation. 
 From the foregoing, it is clear that selectivity is easily established in 
measures where the aid is granted to individual undertakings. In contrast, it 
is established case law that the large number of undertakings eligible for the 
aid and the size of the sector to which the aid is granted do not automatically 
classify a measure as general.
112
 Tax measures have proved difficult to be 
categorised as general measures or not. The Court has accepted that tax 
measures which give an advantage on certain undertakings at a national 
level are subject to the state aid control, and all the conditions of Article 
107(1) TFEU must apply.
113
 Consequently, ever since then, measures have 
been deemed selective, even in cases that the benefit was given to a whole 
sector of the economy, such as the ‘manufacturing of goods companies’ or 
‘the service providers companies’ in Adria-Wien, or ‘large undertakings’ in 
Ecotrade
114
, or all companies involved in export trade in Commission v 
France.
115
  
Selectivity can be both material, when the measure grants an 
advantage to companies based on their subject material characteristics and 
regional, when the advantage is granted to companies domiciled in certain 
regions. Even more problems arise out of measures that grant tax reductions 
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in autonomous regions of Member States. In a series of cases the Court has 
examined whether such measures can be considered state aid within Article 
107(1) TFEU. In particular, in the case Portugal v Commission (Azores),
116
 
where the examination concerned a tax reduction for all natural and legal 
persons in the Azores region of Portugal, the Court held that the crucial 
criterion for establishing selectivity in a measure granted by an authority of 
a regional autonomous region of a Member State was whether the authority 
enjoyed ‘sufficient’ fiscal, procedural and regional autonomy from the 
central government. The measure was found to be regionally selective, 
because it was found to be aid subsidised by the central Portuguese 
government.
117
  
Until the Azores judgment, regional aid was usually considered 
selective, because the reference point for establishing selectivity of the 
relevant measure was the whole of a Member State’s territory.118 After the 
Azores, the reference point could be a region of a Member State as the Court 
has reconfirmed in Gibraltar
119
 and UGT- Rioja.
120
 
The tax system of Gibraltar has been examined by the Commission 
in other occasions for being selective not only because of regional 
selectivity, which has been decided in the Azores
121
 case: in 2004 the 
Commission found that a corporate tax reform for companies operating in 
Gibraltar was selective because it favourite certain undertakings, the off-
shore companies, even though it appeared to be applicable to all 
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undertakings domiciled in Gibraltar.
122
 The measure thus was materially 
selective because it favourite certain companies based on their property and 
employees.
123
 The General Court (then Court of First Instance) decided 
against the Commission for both the regional selectivity and material 
selectivity: regional selectivity was rejected because Gibraltar was 
autonomous from the UK and thus no comparison could be made to the 
normal system of the UK. Material selectivity of the measure was also 
rejected by the General Court because the Commission failed to define the 
normal regime based on which the derogation would be judged.
124
 Under 
appeal in 2011 the Court of Justice
125
 set aside the General Court’s 
judgment of 2008.
126
 The Court of Justice upheld the Commission’s 
Decision that the corporate tax reform of Gibraltar would create a selective 
advantage for off-shore companies that do not occupy business properties of 
employees in Gibraltar.
127
 Recently, the Commission
128
 decided to open the 
formal investigation procedure for the Gibraltar Tax system, which was 
amended in 2013, to establish whether the exemption from paying corporate 
taxation in Gibraltar of profits from passive income such as royalties and 
interest from corporate tax is selective to those exempted companies or not. 
Thus, the Gibraltar case law is not completely over yet.  
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 On the contrary, there are general measures, where the beneficiaries 
can potentially be all undertakings active in the national market, and thus 
are not selective, and are not considered aid according to 107(1) TFEU. 
Such measures are applicable to all, regardless of sector, or location that the 
undertaking is active. Some examples of general measures are economic 
policy measures such as uniform tax reductions, in particular a VAT 
reduction; such measures are not considered selective, if they are applicable 
without discrimination.
129
   
 The matter of material selectivity has been the issue of many 
judgments in tax cases where there was differential treatment. The Court 
repeats the criterion it constructed in AdriaWien,
130
 which it applies to find 
if there is selectivity: a scheme that applies only to certain undertakings may 
not be state aid if it is based on legal and factual conditions, which 
distinguish the beneficiaries from the general scheme. In BNP Paribas and 
BNL v Commission
131
 judging on appeal the Court of Justice held that the 
appraisal of the legal and factual conditions should be more rigorous by the 
General Court and that it should not rely on the Commission’s justification. 
The Court of Justice reached the same conclusion as the General Court that 
the different treatment was not justified by the logic of the system, although 
it did so by not accepting the justifications of the double taxation system: 
the risk of avoiding double taxation was not properly confirmed by the 
Italian government and thus led the Court to reject it in this case as a viable 
justification for concluding that the measure is not selective.    
                                                 
129
Editorial, ‘Weathering through the credit crisis: is the Community equipped to deal with 
it?’, 46 CMLR, 2009, 3, 9 
130
 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365 
131
 Case C-452/10 P BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission [2012] ECR 0 not yet reported. 
49 
 
 In NOx
132
 the Court of Justice held that the justification of the 
differentiation is up to the member state to prove that it is justified.
133
 It held 
that the General Court in its previous judgment erred in law to put the 
burden of proof on the Commission to prove that the differentiation is 
justified by the nature and general scheme of the system. In this case the 
Court of Justice found the measure to be selective because the member state 
failed to justify it properly. Both of those judgments have been criticised for 
not bringing any clarity in the issue of selectivity in differential taxation.
134
  
 Furthermore, in British Aggregates
135
 the issue was a Commission 
Decision which found that an environmental levy imposed by the UK 
government on aggregates produced from naturally occurring deposits on 
the soil did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU, because its scope was justified by the logic and nature of the tax 
system. The problem was that certain aggregates were exempted, such as 
aggregates of clay, slate, china clay, ball clay and shale aggregate, because 
the purpose of the levy was to encourage the use of those and to discourage 
the use of the others. This could be considered differential taxation if the 
normal taxation was the imposition to the levy and the question was whether 
there was selectivity and therefore state aid; the Court of First Instance (as 
the General Court was known in 2006) held that this levy was not an 
exemption from normal taxation and there was no selectivity or advantage; 
furthermore, it was a different case than that in AdriaWien in that the latter 
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involved partial exemption from payment of the levy  not complete lack of 
it. The case was referred by the Court of Justice back to the General Court 
after appeals
136
 and the General Court held that there was different selective 
taxation for the exempted materials and that the purpose of the measure 
could not justify the differentiation. The General Court thus annulled the 
Commission decision.
137
 The British Aggregates judgment creates an effect-
oriented approach to finding selectivity in differential treatment. It does so 
by creating a competitive test: it places all competitors in a comparable 
situation and takes into account market conditions and costs to create it and 
thus concludes on the justification of the differentiation.
138
    
1.6.2 Advantage granted by the aid measure 
I) The elements of the legal meaning of advantage or benefit 
The second criterion for establishing that a measure is incompatible 
aid, according to Article 107(1) TFEU, is that it is ‘favouring certain 
undertakings’, with the key word this time being ‘favouring’.139 The 
straightforward case would be a direct subsidy given to a firm in difficulty, 
which would undoubtedly benefit, or gain an advantage from that subsidy, 
against its competitors in the relevant market. In this classic aid case, and in 
every other type of aid, the Court examines the advantage granted in 
‘normal market conditions’,140 which is the first element of the notion of 
advantage. However, market conditions cannot be established every time, 
especially in cases where the State exercises its public powers in the field of 
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social security for example, among others, where there are no competitors. 
Consequently, in such cases, the advantage to the beneficiary of the aid can 
be found if one examines the effects of the State’s Act that is granting the 
aid.
141
  
The next problem in concluding if there is an advantage or not is that 
of the definition of the geographical area that comprises the market in which 
the advantage is going to be tested at. The Court has accepted that the 
advantage can be found even when the comparison is between competitors 
in other Member States.
142
  Finally, it should be mentioned that the Court 
has held that the advantage does not have to be certain and quantifiable for 
the measure to be classified as aid. Insolvency proceedings that cannot be 
quantified, or their outcome predicted, have been deemed to grant an 
advantage, against non-beneficiaries.
143
   
II) The legal meaning of an undertaking in state aid regulation 
Next, it is necessary to analyse the concept of undertakings in state 
aid law. The meaning of undertakings in Article 107(1) TFEU is similar to 
that contained in other Article of the TFEU on Competition law. 
Consequently, an undertaking is considered every legal entity that carries an 
economic activity.
144
 The first observation that must be made is that 
undertakings can be either of the private law, or public corporations. 
Secondly, the meaning of economic activity includes both the sale of goods 
and the supply of services, regardless of whether the purpose of the 
undertaking is profit, or non – profit making. One characteristic example, 
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from the Court’s case law, of a non – profit making undertaking was the Job 
Centre case,
145
 where it was held that the employment agency was within 
the meaning of an Article 107 TFEU undertaking.  
Also, the Court has clarified that aid to individuals cannot be 
considered state aid as long as the benefit is not transferred to an 
undertaking. From the Court’s analysis in relevant cases it has been 
accepted that aid given to consumers for the purchase of environmentally 
friendly products, or digital television equipment was state aid incompatible 
with the internal market because there was indirect benefit for the providers 
of those products and services.
146
 
Contrary to the economic activities of undertaking, which can ignite 
the application of state aid rules, non- economic activities are outside the 
scope of the state aid control system. Such activities include those that are 
left in the exclusive competence of the state, and which cannot be offered by 
non – public bodies. Those activities usually have to do with national 
security, such as the armed forces, or the police and traffic police, customs 
services, or the education system which is exclusively financed by state 
resources, including vocational training, and finally the administration of 
justice. State aid rules do not apply to those non-economic activities.
147
 
 Having examined so far, the meaning of an advantage or benefit and 
the meaning of an undertaking according to Article 107 TFEU, next, this 
thesis will analyse the method that is used by the Commission and the Court 
in order to establish and prove that the second element of the definition of 
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state aid is also fulfilled; for the purpose of determining that an advantage 
has been enjoyed by the undertaking that has received the aid, the Court has 
set up a Test, which is usually called the Market Economy Investor 
Principle (MEIP), or Test. 
III) The market economy investor principle 
The Commission has developed the MEIP and applies it in the form 
of a test for the aim of finding whether a transaction between the State and 
an undertaking involves state aid. Thus, the purpose of the MEIP is to 
safeguard effective competition within the internal market, as it establishes 
that state aid exists in a particular transaction, with terms that would be 
unacceptable to a private undertaking in normal market conditions. The 
definition of the MEIP is found in the case law:  
‘the test is, in particular, whether in similar circumstances a private 
shareholder, having regard to the foresee ability of obtaining a return and 
leaving aside all social, regional – policy and sectoral considerations, would 
have subscribed to the capital in question’.148 
Subsequently, according to the Court, the state is providing the 
undertaking with state aid when the undertaking would have been unable to 
obtain the same benefit from the market, under normal market conditions. It 
is easy to apply the test in a case of a direct subsidy, but the test applies to 
all other types of aid, such as guarantees, loans, sale of assets and share 
acquisition by the state and privatisation
149
. In such cases, it is more difficult 
to establish the existence of aid. Especially, for cases of state guarantees, the 
Commission’s early approach was that they always involved state aid, and 
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the application of the MEIP was not necessary. However, this approach has 
changed and the MEIP is applied in guarantee cases.
150
   One of the first 
cases that the Court has applied the MEIP is in Tubemeuse,
151
 where it 
declared that:  
‘in order to determine whether such measures are in the nature of 
state aid, the relevant criterion is that indicated in the Commission’s 
decision, and not contested by the Belgian government, namely whether 
the undertaking could have obtained the amounts in question on the 
capital market’ 
Afterwards, it was applied in a large number of cases.
 152
  
The Test has been included in a number of Commission documents, 
such as the Notice on Cooperation between National Courts and the 
Commission. In the Notice it is said that investments from public funds 
constitute aid, when they are made in circumstances in which a private 
investor would have withheld support
153
. 
The Commission and the Court do not need to apply the MEIP in a 
transaction between the State and an undertaking, whenever a private 
investor participates in the transaction with the State and under the same 
conditions.
154
 However, when the contribution of the private participant is 
not equal to that of the state or not significant enough or whenever there is 
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no private participation at all, the MEIP takes into account other parameters, 
such as the stock market prices and the percentage of the undertaking’s debt 
with its gains. Finally, the MEIP is also applied for the quantification of 
illegally granted state aid,
155
 which will eventually provide the amounts that 
the Commission will request to be repaid.  
The Commission has been criticised by the General Court for not 
applying the test in one critical judgment. In EDF V Commission,
156
 the 
General Court annulled the Commission’s decision, which had previously 
declared aid by the French State to EDF incompatible with the internal 
market. The Court decided that the Commission erred in law and infringed 
state aid rules, by not applying the test. The Commission’s view was the 
Test could not be applied in this case, because of the nature of the aid 
measures, which were fiscal and tax measures. The state, which was the 
single shareholder of EDF at the time, could never operate in a private 
manner, according to the Commission, when it is granting fiscal measures; 
consequently, the test is inapplicable in such cases. Some writers have 
criticised the Commission for having that opinion. The problem according 
to them is that the non-application of the test would potentially allow states 
to grant amounts of aid to the state owned companies, without control. The 
criticism focuses on the fact that the form of the aid should not be important 
in the decision of compatibility; what should matter are the effects and 
objectives of the measure.
157
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The General Court
158
 has said that granting fiscal benefits to 
undertakings is not possible for a private investor to do. So, there is 
difficulty in applying the MEIP in this case, because usually the comparison 
would be between a private undertaking and the state.
159
 The Ryanair
160
 
case is relevant because there too the Court held that determining landing 
fees were an economic activity and not exercise of regulatory powers,
161
 
even though the advantage was granted by a contract, the nature of which 
was not examined by the Court and it assumed that is conferred an 
advantage through regulatory powers.
162
  The General Court held that the 
MEIP can still be used.
163
  
The Commission appealed the judgment claiming that the General 
Court erred in law in interpreting Article 107(1) TFEU. The Court of Justice 
upheld the General Court’s ruling: according to the Court of Justice the 
General Court did not err in law and that the  
‘application of the private investor test would have made it possible 
to determine whether, in similar circumstances, a private shareholder would 
have subscribed, to an undertaking in a situation comparable with that of 
EDF, an amount equal to the tax due.’164 Therefore, the conclusion should 
be that the EDF judgments have confirmed that the form of aid is irrelevant 
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in applying Article 107(1) TFEU and in doing so the Commission should 
apply the MEIP even in investments that have a form of a fiscal measure.
165
  
 
1.6.3 Aid granted by the state or through state resources 
 I) The dispute between aid granted by the state or state resources 
 The third element found in Article 107(1) TFEU requests that the aid 
has to be granted by the Member State, or through State resources. The 
disjunctive conjunction in the wording of the Treaty’s Article caused a 
debate on whether the two conditions (by the state and through state 
resources) were alternative criteria, or both of them had to apply 
cumulatively. According to the first opinion and the early case law,
166
 the 
two conditions were not considered cumulative, and it was sufficient for the 
Court to prove that there was an advantage granted by the Member State to 
an undertaking, against its competitors. This effect was enough for the Court 
to accept that the measure constituted state aid according to Article 107(1) 
TFEU. The Poor Farmers
167
 case is characteristic of this early approach. In 
this case the Commission did not find that the measure granting support to 
poor farmers was state aid. The Court however, came to the opposite 
conclusion and it held that: ‘aid need not necessarily be financed from State 
resources to be classified as state aid’.168 The opposing view was that the 
two conditions were cumulative and the most important one of the two was 
that the financing of the aid measure was made through State resources.
169
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This dispute was finally resolved in favour of the second and more 
restrictive opinion, in the judgment made by the Court in 
PreussenElektra.
170
  The court held that ‘the obligation imposed on private 
electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources at fixed minimum prices does not involve any 
direct or indirect transfer of state resources’.171 The words direct or indirect 
transfer of state resources relate to the words through the state or state 
resources and the fact that the Court examined both simultaneously  
clarified that the transfer of state resources was a cumulative condition for 
the aid to be classified as state aid in the view of Article 107(1) TFEU. The 
wording of the Article simply signifies that the Treaty applies to aid 
measures granting both advantages given by the state directly and indirectly 
‘by a public or private body designated or established by the state’.172 This 
involves analysis of the notion of imputability of the aid measure to the 
State, which will be the next topic of this discussion. 
 One more point however, is that funds made from private 
contributions have been found to be aid through State resources. The Court 
has accepted that derogation in Air France.
173
 The criterion for this 
derogation was the fact that the fund was at the disposal of the state.
174
 
Finally, the last type of aid that could be state aid through State resources is 
Community money; those resources are not considered state aid as long as 
they are not controlled by the Member State. 
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II) The measure must be imputable to the State 
 Whenever the aid is transferred by the state’s bodies that belong in 
the hard core of administration, such as ministries and if it is easy to 
establish that those bodies decided to grant aid, there is no problem of 
attributing the aid to the state. However, it is not clear if a decision can be 
attributed to the state, when it is taken by a public undertaking designated 
by the State. This attributability of the decision to grant aid to the State is 
called imputability, and it is a separate condition that the Court has 
incorporated in the elements of Article 107(1) TFEU through its case law. 
The imputability criterion was established in the Stardust Marine
175
 case, 
which involved aid to a boat company given by a publicly owned bank. The 
Commission considered the aid to be granted through state resources, 
because the Bank was controlled by the State.  
The Court however, introduced the imputability criterion, by 
examining if there were state resources involved, and decided that there was 
no state aid involved, because the aid could not be attributed to the state, 
simply by taking into account the legal personality of the public 
undertaking. The same approach was taken by the Court in the Pearle case, 
where it held that: ‘for advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid 
within the meaning of Article [107(1)] of the Treaty they must, first,be 
granted directly or indirectly through state resources and second, be 
imputable to the state’.176 Next, this thesis will analyse the last condition of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. 
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1.6.4 Distortion of competition and effect on trade 
 The last element of Article 107(1) TFEU has to do with the effects 
of the aid on the internal market; effects which will deem the measure 
incompatible with the internal market, if they come about. The first effect 
that aid should have is that the measure must distort competition and the 
second effect is that it must affect trade between Member states. Those two 
conditions are two distinct ones; this means that both have to appear in an 
analysis of an aid measure according to Article 107(1) TFEU. If one of them 
is not established, then Article 107(1) does not apply and aid is not 
incompatible. Usually, though, in the case law those two conditions are 
examined together, since both effects need to occur for Article 107(1) TFEU 
to apply to the measure in question.  
 I) Distortion of competition 
 The Court has established the test for finding distortion of 
competition in the case Philip Morris.
177
 According to its findings, the Court 
has accepted that there is distortion of competition when the aid 
strengthened the undertaking’s position in the market.178 However, the 
Court does not require that there has to be an analysis of the relevant 
market, such as the analysis needed whenever Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
are applied.
179
Furthermore, there is no need to prove the actual distortive 
effects on competition because this is practically impossible for aid 
measures that have been notified but not yet implemented by the Member 
States. It is sufficient that the measure is capable to threaten to distort 
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competition.
180
 The reference point for finding distortion in the application 
of the test is the competitive position in the market before the adoption of 
the measure, and whether it has improved afterwards,
 181
 similar to the test 
for finding the advantage granted by the measure. 
 II) The effect on trade between Member States 
 The Court has examined the distortion of competition and the effects 
on intra-community trade together in the previously mentioned case of 
Philip Morris.
182
 Consequently, this practice in the Court’s case law might 
make the condition for an effect on intra-community trade to be rendered 
not very important. However, it exists to verify the jurisdiction of the 
Commission and the Court over the national authorities.
183
 The national 
authorities would have jurisdiction, if the measure did not have an effect on 
trade between Member States and not the Commission, because it would be 
a completely internal matter.  
This condition is self-proven, whenever the beneficiary undertaking 
is involved in inter-border trade across many Member States. However, it is 
not necessary to prove the actual effects on inter-community trade. In 
Altmark, the Court found that the Community trade had been affected even 
though the aid was granted to companies, which operate locally in one 
Member State and not in others,
184
 because undertakings from other 
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Member States, operating in the same kind of business, would not be able to 
operate in that market easily.
185
  
On the other hand, it has also been held by the Court that aid, which 
has effects on entirely local terms, does not affect trade between Member 
States and therefore is not incompatible with the internal market.
186
 Lastly, 
it should be noted that the Court has established in its case-law that the 
existence of relatively small amounts of aid, or relatively small sizes of 
undertakings, which receive aid, does not ex ante exclude the likelihood of 
intra- Community trade being indeed affected, or competition distorted.
187
 
 
1.7 DEROGATIONS FROM ARTICLE 107(1) TFEU  
1.7.1 Synopsis  
 The prohibition contained in Article 107(1) TFEU does not mean 
that all state aid measures granted by Member States to undertakings in the 
European Union are incompatible with the internal market, in any case. The 
Treaty contains some exemptions, or derogations from the prohibition. 
Types of aid measures that can be categorised in one of the provisions in 
subparagraphs 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU are, or can be exempted from the 
prohibition. The legal basis for those derogations can be found in Article 
107(1) TFEU: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty...’ This sentence 
allows the Commission to interpret the notion of state aid in Article 107(1) 
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widely,
188
 by applying its discretionary power. However, the exemptions 
contained in paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 107 TFEU should be 
interpreted narrowly.
189
 First of all, there are the categories of aid contained 
in Article 107(2) TFEU.  
1.7.2 Derogations in Article 107(2) TFEU 
 The three subparagraphs of Article 107(2) TFEU contain three 
categories of aid measures that are automatically considered compatible 
with the internal market, as long as the preconditions set out in the Article, 
for each one of them, are satisfied. The first category in subparagraph (a) of 
the Article considers aid having a social character to be compatible.
190
 
According to the first condition of subparagraph (a) the aid must benefit 
final consumers. This exception has been applied to subsidisation of air 
routes to and from remote regions of a Member State.
191
 Secondly, the aid 
measure must secure indiscrimination as to the origin of the service 
providers.
192
 In this type of aid to individual consumers, the specificity 
criterion of Article 107(1) TFEU is always satisfied, so the exception is 
necessary for aid having a social character.
193
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 The second subparagraph of Article 107(2) TFEU in its first part 
considers disaster aid to be compatible with the internal market.
194
 The 
Commission and the Court have interpreted strictly
195
 the meaning of 
‘natural disasters’, and the provision has been applied mainly to agricultural 
products damaged by natural disasters; the meaning of those can be found in 
the Guidelines on state aid to the agricultural sector, and can include 
earthquakes, avalanches, landslides and floods,
196
 and in general 
unforeseeable situations. The second part of the provision, refers to aid 
which is granted for making good damage caused by exceptional 
occurrences,
197
 and according to the Commission is very difficult to 
establish what can be included in the notion ‘exceptional occurrence’, and 
what should be left out of the exception. In the same Guidelines for the 
agricultural sector it is said that:  
‘exceptional occurrences which have hitherto been accepted by the 
Commission include war, internal disturbances or strikes, and with 
certain reservations and depending on their extent, major nuclear or 
industrial accidents and fires which result in widespread loss’.198  
Contrary, a fire in an individual establishment, or animal diseases have 
not been characterised as exceptional circumstances, unless they are very 
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widespread.
199
 Another extremely important case that had Article 107(2)(b) 
TFEU as its legal basis was the cases concerning the compensations for 
losses that European airlines suffered from the events of the terrorist attacks 
of 11/09/2001 in New York.
200
 In its relevant Communication,
201
 the 
Commission accepted that the aid measures would be justified as 
compensation for the damage suffered by European airlines, because of the 
cancellation of flights between the period of 11 to 14 September 2001 only. 
However, in one case
202
 the Court accepted that aid could be given to 
compensate for damages suffered beyond those dates; if a direct link 
between the damages and the 9/11 events could be proven.
203
 In fact, there 
is established case law from the Court requesting Member states and the 
Commission to prove that there is a direct link between the ‘disaster or 
exceptional occurrence and the damage to be compensated’.204 Moreover, 
this condition for the existence of a direct link is now also found in EU 
secondary legislation.
205
 Finally, the case law does not request that the 
exceptional occurrences and the damage have to occur at the same time for 
Article 107(2)(b) TFEU to apply.
206
 
At this instance, it should be mentioned that the financial crisis that 
started in 2008 could be considered as an ‘exceptional instance’, and aid to 
financial institutions that suffered injuries due to the occurrence of the crisis 
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could be authorised under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU. The Commission, 
though, has implicitly accepted Article 107(3)(c) TFEU as the legal basis 
for the implementation of the aid schemes in the context of the 2008 
financial crisis; this discussion will be further developed in the second 
chapter of this thesis. 
 Lastly, the last subparagraph of Article 107(2) TFEU concerns aid 
measures for the compensation of areas in Germany that were affected by 
the division after the Second World War, such as West Berlin. This 
provision was used in the past, but has lost its ground of application after the 
unification of Germany.
207
  
1.7.3 Article 107(3) TFEU 
 The derogations under Article 107(2) TFEU are automatic, meaning 
that if the conditions laid down in the relevant subparagraphs are satisfied, 
then the Commission has no discretion but to find the aid measure 
compatible with the internal market. Contrary, the types of aid contained in 
Article 107(3) TFEU are discretionary derogations. This is derived from the 
word ‘may’, contained in the first sentence of Article 107(3) TFEU, and 
Article 88 TFEU. The legal consequence is that the Commission is allowed 
to apply its discretionary powers in the assessment of the compatibility of 
the aid measure with the internal market. According to the case law this 
broad discretionary power, which is conferred upon the Commission in 
relation to Article 107(3) TFEU assessments, includes ‘complex economic, 
social, regional and sectoral assessments’.208 Those Commission 
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assessments are made ‘in a community context’, and can be reviewed by the 
Court, only for estimating the legality of the exercise of that freedom. This 
means that the Court cannot substitute the Commission’s reasoning, but can 
only examine that the Commission has not erred ‘by a manifest error or by a 
misuse of powers’ in its decision. 209 
 First of all of the discretionary derogations is Article 107(3)(a) 
which allows aid ‘to promote the economic development of areas’. This 
derogation is used for the regional development of Union regions that suffer 
from serious underemployment or are underdeveloped.  The standard for 
establishing which Union regions can be considered underdeveloped is the 
Union’s average, according to the Guidelines on National Regional aid.210  
Secondly, there is subparagraph (b) of Article 107(3) TFEU, which 
contains two types of aid. The first one allows the Commission to justify aid 
given ‘to promote the execution of an important project of common 
European interest’, and the second aid ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State’. For the first type, the case law and the 
Commission’s practice request that the ‘project’ should be part of a 
transnational European programme, in which a number of governments of 
Member States are jointly involved, or is part of joint action by a number of 
Member States to fight a common threat, such as environmental pollution.
 
211
 As for the condition that the project must be of importance, it has been 
held that it is not sufficient for the measures to benefit a project that enables 
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the use of new technology;
212
 there has to be advancement in Community 
Research and Development.
213
  
 The derogation contained in the second part of Article 107(3) (b) 
TFEU
214
 has had limited application in the past and was used to restore a 
serious disturbance in a Member State’s economy.215 The precondition is 
that the disturbance must affect the whole of the economy of a Member 
State.
216
 Article 107(3)(a) should apply in any other case that only a 
Member State’s region economy is disturbed. From reviewing the case law 
that authorised state aid with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU one can conclude that 
situations that have been accepted as a serious disturbance have been the 
following: firstly, aid measures granted by Member States to rise above the 
recession of the 70’s, following the oil crisis.217 Also, due to the inherent 
structural problems in the whole of the Greek economy, Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU has been considered a suitable legal basis for aid to contend with  
those problems. Thus, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU has been used to authorise a 
Greek rescue programme in the 80’s,218 for ‘viable companies’, ‘which have 
run into difficulties’.219 Furthermore, this Article was used in another Greek 
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scheme for privatisation of a number of companies
220
. However, this 
subparagraph has seen unprecedented application in the context of aid 
measures that Member States have adopted to tackle the financial crisis that 
started in 2008. The Commission declared that Article 107 (3)(b) will be the 
basis for authorisation of aid granted to financial institutions until 
31/12/2010, or as long as the crisis is present.
221
 This will be further 
analysed in the next chapter.   
 Next, there is the derogation of subparagraph 107(3)(c) TFEU, 
which authorises ‘aid to promote the development of certain activities, or of 
certain economic areas’. This allows regional and sectoral aid to be 
compatible with the internal market as long as the ‘common interest’ 
criterion is satisfied.
222
 This common interest condition may include 
objectives of ‘growth, employment, cohesion, and environmental 
protection’223 and it can be established in each particular case through the 
assessment of the aid measure’s proportionality and its ‘adverse effects on 
trading conditions’.224  
 The last derogations in Article 107(3) TFEU are the ones of 
subparagraphs (d) and (e). The first subparagraph of the two authorises aid 
that aims to promote cultural heritage. This subparagraph entered into force 
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on 1 November 1993
225
 and the Court has held that it cannot be used to 
authorise aid that has been implemented before that date.
226
 Since the entry 
into force, this derogation has been used for aid in the publications and 
audio-visual sectors and the film industry.
227
 Finally, Article 107(3)(e) 
TFEU allows the Council to declare categories of aid as compatible with the 
internal market. By following this procedure, the Council has adopted a 
Regulation authorising aid to shipbuilding
228
 and another Regulation for the 
coal sector.
229
 This provision has different application scope than the one in 
Article 108(2) TFEU, which allows the Council to consider specific aid 
measures as being compatible with the internal market, instead of categories 
of aid in Article 107(3)(e) TFEU. 
 Finally, it should be noted that other provisions of the Treaty, or 
rules contained in secondary EU legislation can be considered derogations 
from the general prohibition contained in Article 107(1) TFEU, because 
they have a similar effect: they provide for ways of exempting aid measures 
from the prohibition, by considering them compatible with the internal 
market, according to the conditions included in each one of them. The 
reference here is on the rules contained in Article 106(2) TFEU, which is 
used to authorise aid to Services of General Economic Interest within the 
internal market, Article 108(2) TFEU, subparagraphs 2 and 3, which allows 
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the Council to authorise specific aid measures that the Commission has 
found to be incompatible with the internal market, De Minimis aid
230
 for 
relative small amounts that do not distort competition, and the exceptions 
contained in the Block Exemption Regulation,
231
 which provides for 
conditions on excluding aid in whole sectors of the economy. All those will 
be examined in the next chapter of this thesis, because they have been 
connected with the development of the state aid rules, which will be the 
topic of the next chapter.  
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 The broad problem that this thesis bases its critical assessment on is 
the implementation of state aid rules in the European Union. In particular, 
the research investigates the implementation of state aid rules in the 
European Union by applying the criteria that are set. In this first chapter the 
researcher has defined the aims of this thesis and clarified the reasons 
behind the choice of the specific research. Next, the researcher presented an 
outline of the following chapters of the study, which are connected with the 
relative problems and sub questions that follow from the initial topic. This 
chapter of the study also analysed the methodology used to drive 
conclusions and the techniques that the researcher utilised to reach those 
conclusions.  
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Furthermore, the research analysed the way that the state aid policy 
is implemented and in particular the characteristics of state aid soft law, 
which plays an important part in state aid policy implementation. Finally, 
there was an analysis of the basic provision for the control of state aid that 
forms part of the Union’s Competition rules. Those rules are included in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The TFEU provides for 
the elements of state aid and also the derogations from the prohibition of 
aid, which are being applied for the assessment of compatibility of an aid 
measure with the Treaty.   
 Subsequently, the Treaty Articles on state aid are the legal basis that 
generates the present research. In the next chapter of this study, the research 
will scrutinise the rationale behind the existence of state aid, even though it 
is generally prohibited, and the political and economic factors that affect its 
implementation by the Member States’ perspective. Special reference will 
be made to the financial crisis and the impact it had on EU state aid rules.       
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CHAPTER 2 
WHY MEMBER STATES GRANT STATE AID 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is necessary to examine the reasons behind the existence of state 
aid, before the research can really examine in detail the more specific 
aspects of state aid policy implementation. This chapter attempts to identify 
the reasons that make state aid so attractive to national governments of the 
Member States of the European Union. As any policy, it is possible for state 
aid to have both positive and negative effects. This chapter of the thesis will 
focus on the different kinds of aid measures and their purpose and analyse 
the positive effects that derive from the implementation of state aid 
measures by the Member States. Those positive effects are the main reason 
that drives Member States’ governments to grant aid. The positive effects of 
aid will then be contrasted to the negative effects of subsidies. This analysis 
of the effects and the reasons behind the granting of aid is important because 
the Commission itself is balancing positive and negative effects when it is 
assessing the compatibility of measures with the internal market. 
 Furthermore, it is clear that no policy is independent of interactions 
with others, and for it to be effectively implemented, it needs to consider the 
current conditions, whether those are political, social or economic, and to 
interact with the other policies so that it will be efficient enough to face the 
challenges of the current market conditions. Otherwise, if the rules of state 
aid policy were to be implemented in a strictly legal way it would prove 
impossible to catch all illegal aid. This is why the interaction of the state aid 
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policy with other policies and factors will be examined, in order to make 
clear the effects of those policies and factors in the decision making process 
of Member States governments when granting aid.  
In times of crisis though, the implementation of rules is under threat 
due to the need to provide solutions as quickly as possible. This hastiness 
might create more problems than it is supposed to solve. Member states 
have resorted to subsidies to tackle the financial crisis, and the crisis is 
another reason why governments grant aid. This is why an examination of 
the crisis framework for the implementation of state aid measures is also 
critical at this point of the research. It will help to better understand the 
nature of state aid policy and its implementation by the Member States.  
2.2 THE TREND AND PATTERN OF MEMBER STATES’ 
STATE AID EXPENDITURE 
The Member States’ expenditure on state aid is reported twice 
annually in the Commission’s state aid Scoreboard. Analysis of the data 
contained in the Scoreboard reveals that the trend of state aid spending is in 
decline since the 1980s and it currently stands at 0.5% of EU GDP.
1
 This 
decline is in line with the call of the Lisbon Council
2
 for a reduction of state 
aid expenditure by the Member States’ governments. The data also reveal 
that the decline over the years was not very steep and that there were peaks 
in 1997, 2002 and 2006,
3
 which shows that Member States’ governments 
find subsidies attractive and they cannot resist disobeying their commitment 
to keep levels of aid low. Also, the Scoreboard connects the recent low 
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levels of non crisis aid to the budget constraints,
4
 which means that the level 
of aid could be circumstantial and not based on real commitment. It remains 
to be seen from future reports if the trend has leveled out.  
The Scoreboard data reports that Member States grant aid to industry 
and services, which includes horizontal and sectoral aid, excluding aid to 
agriculture, fisheries and transport, which have special rules. The data reveal 
another pattern in state aid expenditure: that the Member States grant aid to 
horizontal objectives more than to sectors of the economy. Specifically, aid 
to horizontal objectives has increased since 2006 by approximately 0.2% of 
GDP.
5
  Horizontal aid, which can benefit all undertakings operating covered 
by the measure, regardless of sector, seems to be more attractive to Member 
States; although, there are disparities.  
Only a few Member States grant large amounts of sectoral aid: 
Portugal with 69.4% is followed by Malta with 55.18%, which is due to the 
fact that large schemes that expired have not been renewed because of 
budget constraints.
6
 There are disparities, however, to the level of aid that 
each member state grants to different horizontal objective, which can be 
justified by the individual economic conditions that each member state has 
and the fact that there are more underdeveloped regions in those countries. 
For example regional aid accounts to 50% of total aid to services and 
industry for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Lithuania and Slovakia.
7
 
Since Member States’ governments grant aid to those objectives this chapter 
of the thesis focuses on different kinds of aid and their purpose but first, it 
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would be fruitful to examine the interaction of political economy with state 
aid control.           
  
2.3 THE INTERACTION OF COMPETITION LAW AND STATE AID 
CONTROL IN PARTICULAR WITH POLITICAL ECONOMY 
THEORIES 
 Competition law and economics are currently supplementing each 
other in the assessment of anti-competitive behaviour, within the European 
Union’s Competition Framework. Nevertheless, it has not always been so 
obvious that economic theories could help competition authorities identify 
anticompetitive behaviour more efficiently, at least for the Commission. The 
theoreticians of economics were always more positive in competition law 
learning from economics. Also, state aid in particular has links with both the 
development of competition law in Europe and the development of Member 
State’s economic and social policies.8 Those two aspects explain the 
character of state aid from a political economy point of view. The analysis 
of specific economic instruments that have been incorporated into state aid 
control is in the seventh chapter of the thesis, because it forms part of the 
reform of the state aid policy.      
2.3.1 The origins of European competition law and the novel goals 
of efficiency and consumer protection  
 In the first years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome the 
application of competition rules and mainly antitrust rules were influenced 
by the German Ordo-liberalism theory that was created in the Freiburg 
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school. However, others believe that neither the Treaty of Rome, nor the 
transformation of the EEC to the EU have an ordo-liberal base.
9
    Germany 
was the first country, Member of the European Communities to establish 
national competition law, at the time of the adoption of the Treaty of Rome. 
The German model continued to influence European Competition law in 
Europe for almost until the 1990’s. Ordo-liberalism theory believed that law 
and economics should collaborate. Excessive market power concentrated in 
one undertaking in the market was anti-competitive for the ordo-liberals, 
because it could lead to less innovation and therefore, cause prices to rise.
10
 
The ordo-liberals sought to improve the rules, rather than improving the 
outcome of economic intervention. They believed that a higher system of 
law had the potential to protect individual freedom from being abused by 
either private and/or public economic powers.
11
 Therefore, Competition was 
in the centre of their thought for the free social market, with the emphasis 
given to having appropriate rules for competition policy, which helped the 
market economy to function effectively.
12
 State intervention should be used, 
according to this school, to sustain competition in the market.
13
   
Later in the 1990’s, the influences of the American Chicago School 
of thought were introduced in Europe, putting more emphasis on consumer 
welfare, as an objective of competition, rather than rules. The Chicago 
school places the achievement of market efficiency in the heart of 
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Competition control,
14
 and has mainly influenced American antirust control. 
For the neo-classicals, as the followers of this theory are known, the market 
creates efficient competitive results only when it is left without government 
intervention.
15
 This transformation of European competition law started 
with the application of the Merger Regulation, but did not materialise by 
any legislative document, at first.
16
 However, lately, it has been introduced 
into the European Union’s antitrust system, by various Commission 
documents. 
 It is important to say that the TFEU itself does not include any 
indication that consumer welfare is a legitimate goal for Competition law 
and state aid more specifically. After all, the goal of total welfare, where 
every player in the market achieves efficiency is too costly to run. Hence, 
the Competition policy should protect competition and consumers and not 
competitors,
17
 because by focusing on the effects of a conduct on consumers 
it is easier to establish a breach of competition law provisions.
18
 For state 
aid in particular, it was only with the adoption of the S.A.A.P in 2005 that 
the Commission introduced consumer welfare, as a state aid objective.
19
   
2.3.2 The character of state aid control 
 According to the theory of protectionism, the state actually 
intervenes in the operation of the market with various measures, such as 
tariffs, import quotas, anti-dumping measures and state aid.  State aid 
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measures, as government intervention in the market, is a protectionist policy 
measure
20
 but the TFEU prohibition of state aid is not absolute because it 
has both positive and negative effects. The effects of granting aid to 
undertakings are balanced in order to decide if the measure is compatible 
with the internal market according to Article 107(1) TFEU. State aid in 
economics is usually seen as a protectionist measure and therefore it leads to 
reluctance to use aid and a need to control it.
21
   
For its part, the European Commission has made clear its view on 
the relation of state aid to protectionism. In the Annual Report on 
Competition of 1978
22
 the Commission clearly connects the granting of 
State assistance with protectionism, which must be avoided. Protectionism, 
as an economic policy was rejected for what were then called the 
Communities, because it causes internal problems of unity between Member 
States, and it can also create anti-measures from non-members of the 
Communities.
23
 This pattern follows in other Report on Competition Policy 
as well. In the XVIIth Report on competition policy the Commission states 
that it ‘must take even greater care to ensure that national aid policies do not 
become a new version of old protectionist measures.’24  State aid control can 
be used by Member States to resist protectionism, if governments adopt 
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measures that not only benefit individual companies and failing firms, but 
measures for horizontal objectives.
25
  
In the XXIIIrd Report on competition policy European firms are 
urged to reduce costs that will increase productivity. Liberalisation of the 
European Union’s industry is the way forward that will help the industry to 
achieve the goals of productivity and growth. The report encourages the use 
of private capital to participate in European projects.
26
 This approach is 
clearly in favour of a liberalised economy, where government interventions, 
such as state aid must be controlled. It has been said that the current form of 
state aid control, after the shift from the form to the effects based approach 
and the inclusion of instruments, such as the balancing test and the Market 
Economy Investor Principle has implemented the basic ‘demands of the 
neoclassical theory.’27 The pre-formulated state aid rules (in a form based 
assessment of state aid measures) could not distinguish the pro and anti-
competitive effects of a measure; now the priority is for the Commission to 
assess the economic efficiency of the measure.
28
 From the analysis above it 
is evident that the choice to prohibit state aid in the European Union is not 
independent of economic and political considerations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Ibid  
26
 XXIIIrd Report on competition policy, 23. 
27
 Clemens Kaupa, ‘The More Economic Approach - A Reform Based on Ideology’ [2009] 
8(3) EStAL 311, 312 
28
 An. Renckens, ‘Welfare standards, substantive tests, and efficiency considerations in 
merger policy: defining the efficiency defence’ (2007) 3(2) Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics, 149, 165. 
81 
 
2.3.3 The state and the market 
State aid is an instrument of government intervention in the 
market.
29
 State aid is only one kind of government interventions. A subsidy 
or other measure ‘becomes state aid only when it gives an advantage to 
companies on a selective basis.’30 Additionally, interventions other than 
state aid are exempted from the Commission’s control because government 
action can be necessary for a well-functioning and fair economy.
31
 State aid 
is particularly used by Member States as a tool to change certain or expected 
market behaviour, to change prices and encourage or discourage certain 
activity.
32
 The European Union’s economic constitution, part of which is 
state aid is more liberal in nature than protectionist, because it aims to create 
an internal market with free movement, in other words open up national 
markets to liberalism.
33
 The economies of Member States rely on the market 
to decide on what goods and services should be produced an at what prices, 
what projects need to funded by how much capital and what research and 
innovation is needed at any given sector. However, markets do not always 
produce efficient outcomes.  
The main economic rationale for granting state aid is to correct 
market failures, the situation that occurs when the market does not achieve 
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efficient outcome.
34
 Economic literature identifies five factors that cause 
market failures: firstly, external effects (externalities); secondly, public 
goods; thirdly, imperfect competition and monopolies as an extreme case of 
imperfect competition; fourthly, asymmetric information distribution and 
finally, coordination deficiencies.
35
 In these cases, government intervention 
in the market can lead to economic improvements. State aid can correct a 
market failure by changing the market’s or sector’s behaviour: it changes 
the prices that consumers, producers and suppliers are prepared to pay. 
The problem with government intervention in the market is that 
those that take the decisions to intervene (politicians, administrators) are not 
neutral; instead they are part of a political process, in which different actors 
can influence the decision making for their own benefit.
36
 Therefore, state 
aid as a government intervention in the market, a protectionist instrument 
may cause more harm than good and it is for the Commission to make sure 
that that overall state aid measures do not distort competition or trade 
between Member States. However, from the Member States’ perspective 
state aid control is seen as a limitation of their sovereign powers and their 
economic policies.
37
 This view is based on the fact that state assistance has 
traditionally been one of a few policy instruments that governments use to 
‘protect national industries in an integrated market.’38 Therefore, having 
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examined the general rationale behind state aid the thesis now moves to the 
specific and examines the different kinds of state aid that Member States use 
and their purpose.  
    
2.4 DIFFERENT KINDS OF STATE AID, THEIR PURPOSE AND 
EFFECTS 
In the "State Aid Action Plan — Less and better targeted state aid: A 
roadmap for state aid reform 2005-2009"
39
 the Commission accepts that 
state aid measures have two types of positive effects. The first is that it can 
become an effective tool for achieving objectives of common interest, which 
will be analysed in this part of the research. The second type of positive 
effects is that in general, state aid can correct market failures, by improving 
the functioning of the market and improve competitiveness.
40
 The first type 
of positive effects will be analysed here; the correction of market failures 
will be analysed in following chapters.
41
 Accordingly, the first and most 
important factor that drives the granting of aid is that it can be used as a tool 
to promote certain policies, which provide benefits for the national 
economy. There have been in the past many sectors of the economy that 
have been under state control almost totally, such as the air transport sector 
or the postal services. Those sectors were later liberalised and this section 
will also analyse the role of state aid in market liberalisation.   
                                                 
39
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2.4.1. Positive effects from sectoral aid  
Aid given to specific industry sectors has been used in the past, and 
more recently, as a tool to help advance the development of weak European 
industrial divisions. The scoreboard reveals that aid to individual sectors is 
in decline and in 2011 represented 10.3% of total aid to industry and 
services.
42
 The support from the State in specific economic fields can help 
the Union’s Market achieve the goals that have been set for a secure future 
development. This is especially true when the market on its own cannot 
reach the set goals in the desired timeframe, or with limited effects on the 
social structure of the community. Or even, at times that the market creates 
obstacles in the process of reaching the set goals.
43
 As a result, State support 
is seen as a tool to speed up the necessary changes that need to be effected, 
in order to reach the goals, or to counterbalance the obstacles and negative 
effects on the social profile of the economy. The Commission has also set 
the criteria based on which Member States may grant aid to specific 
industry sectors that can be most beneficial. According to the Commission, 
the aid should be limited in intensity and time, and should be gradually 
phased-out altogether; after all, aid should help resolve problems and not 
maintain an undesirable market climate. Finally, it should not spill problems 
that exist in one country to other Member States.
44
  
The Union frequently sets goals for its future development. Such a 
process was the Lisbon Strategy, whose goals were supposed to be reached 
by the year 2010. However, the completion of its targets was interrupted by 
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the Economic crisis of 2008. The process of overriding obstacles for the 
completion of the internal market and the creation of new jobs was too 
slow.
45
 Afterwards, the Union set another timeframe and new goals in the 
Commission’s Europe 2020 document,46 which aspires to create smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth for the Union. Within this context of tight 
timeframes and emerging crises, state aid policy has been used as a tool to 
correct the shortcomings and provide positive effects for the completion of 
the set aims. 
Over the years, the Commission has introduced sector specific 
guidelines, concerning the conditions under which aid will be perceived 
justified and compatible with the internal market. It should be made clear 
though, that the Treaty itself provides for the legal basis for the justification 
of the granting of sectoral aid: the first part of Article 107(3) TFEU 
considers compatible with the internal market ‘aid to promote the 
development of certain economic activities’.47 However, the Article is not 
detailed enough, to provide specific criteria, according to which measures 
for specific sectors will be evaluated. It is this gap, or better yet, this 
shortfall of the primary EU law that the soft law can fill, or correct.  
2.4.1.1 Aid to agriculture and fisheries 
The first sector to benefit from state aid is the agriculture sector.
48
 
The adoption of guidelines for state aid in the agriculture sector was 
                                                 
45
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necessary because of the possible collusion caused by the interaction 
between national aid measures with state funding, and the Union’s common 
agricultural and rural development policy, which is funded by the Union’s 
budget.
49
 The positive effects for this sector that the Guidelines recognise 
have to do with improving production, preserving the natural environment, 
increasing quality of agricultural products and to promote diversification of 
farm activities.
50
  
In particular, the Member States’ agriculture policy has been granted 
special status and aid in this sector is assessed by DG for Agriculture and 
Rural Development, because of the various roles that it can have: according 
to the Guidelines, aid to agriculture can assist the rural development of 
Member States. Member states can implement specific aid measures, and 
Articles 107, 108 TFEU should be applied to the assessment of aid.
51
 Rural 
development aid can have the form of measures such as aid to agricultural 
holdings, aid to the processing of agricultural products, aid for the 
promotion of environmental and animal welfare and compensation from 
handicaps in certain regions.
52
 In Holland Malt the Court of Justice upheld 
the General Court’s judgment that the Commission was right to assess 
whether the measure constituted aid according to the 2000 Agriculture 
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Guidelines that were in force then, and after finding that there was aid to 
assess the compatibility of the measure with the internal market according to 
Article 107 (3)(c) TFEU.
53
  
Also, this sector can benefit from aid for early retirement of farmers, 
so that new farmers can enter the market, and aid to repair damages caused 
by natural disasters, or to combat and prevent animal diseases. The latter 
cases can be justified under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, but the Commission 
and the Court have been cautious in the past. In a case concerning a Greek 
law that offered financial assistance to a dairy producer, agricultural 
cooperative called ‘AGNO’, as compensation for the damage it suffered 
from the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine, the Commission doubted 
that the compensation had a direct link to the damage caused by the accident 
that happened more than five years earlier. The result of this case was a 
negative decision, which means the aid was incompatible with the internal 
market, and therefore a recovery decision.
54
  All of those measures are listed 
as special benefits in the before mentioned Guidelines. The agricultural 
sector is independently regulated from the fisheries sector to which different 
guidelines, other than those for agriculture apply.
55
 The fisheries policy is 
under review to comply better with current environmental conditions but 
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Member States have agreed to retain state aid for scrapping of vessels and 
aid for temporary cessation and engine replacement.
56
     
2.4.1.2 Aid to transport      
Another sector that has benefited from state aid is the Transport 
sector. There are Guidelines for Inland Transport,
57
 Maritime Transport
58
 
and Air transport.
59
 The last sector has proven especially susceptible to state 
aid. This can be explained by the fact that State monopolies existed as a 
Europe-wide phenomenon, and governments granted aid in various forms to 
their national carriers. The Commission decided to liberalise this sector in 
the 1980’s, but the efforts to restructure the former national carriers, so that 
they could compete in the free market that was to be developed in this 
sector, led to even more aid;
60
 rescue and restructuring aid measures were 
implemented.
61
 The same situation has occurred in other markets, such as 
the telecommunications, postal services and energy. All of those sectors 
have produced litigation before the Court and actually helped develop state 
aid law significantly.  
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In another case, the airline industry was in need of aid for entirely 
different reasons. After the 11
th
 of September terrorist attacks in the USA, 
the Council of Finance Ministers agreed to support the European airlines, 
because of the risk that the private insurance sector would not be able to 
bear the costs after the attacks. In more recent times, state aid was again 
partly the solution to a problem that occurred to the European airline 
industry. In April 2010 a volcano erupted in Iceland and more than 100,000 
flights were cancelled, and much of the European airspace was closed for 
weeks, due to the fear of safety issues with the volcanic ash that spread 
throughout the continent. The European Commission decided that it would 
be better for Member States to implement state aid measures compatible 
with Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, which is used to authorise measures that aim 
to offset the damages caused by natural disasters.
62
  
State aid measures to the transport sector can often fall under the 
special conditions of the Altmark test because they relate to public service 
compensation. Aid can be declared compatible with the internal market, if it 
is granted to undertakings that have been entrusted with the operation of a 
particular service of general economic interest, so that it fulfills the 
conditions set out in Article 106(2) TFEU. It is not defined in the Treaty 
which services can be deemed as public service and each Member State can 
include any service, which will then be evaluated by the Commission. A 
Communication provides only a list of examples for SGEI: telecoms, posts, 
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broadcasters, education, health services and water and waste management.
63
 
The Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of 
Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest
64
  provides details as to the specific criteria that the Commission 
will examine when it will be evaluating measures that grant aid to public 
service operators. According to the Altmark Trans
65
 judgment of the Court, 
the compensation granted by Member States for the operation of SGEI does 
not constitute prohibited aid, only if four cumulative conditions are fulfilled. 
These conditions are: a) a clear public service assignment, b) the existence 
of pre-determined compensation criteria, c) the compensation does not 
exceed the costs incurred in providing the public service and d) the 
beneficiary is chosen in an open tender, or in the absence of such a tender, 
the compensation does not exceed the costs of a well-run company.
66
  
2.4.1.3 The purpose of aid to the media and 
telecommunications sector  
Another sector that has benefited from state aid is the media and 
telecommunications sector. The media and telecommunications sector has 
                                                 
63
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been part of the Lisbon Strategy to create knowledge based economy.
67
 
State support helps operate public service broadcasting and achieve the aims 
of growth and innovation in the sector. It also promotes diversity, and helps 
satisfy people’s cultural and social needs. The media market was also 
liberalised, but the Member States decided to retain public service 
broadcasters, together with the new privately owned media. Aid to public 
service broadcasters is evaluated under Articles 107 and 106 TFEU, which 
relates to competition rules applicable to services of general economic 
interest (SGEI). Public service broadcasting is important, because it 
provides wide access, without discrimination to the people. State aid has 
benefited public broadcasting by bringing to the public the ‘new audiovisual 
and information services and the new technologies’.68 State aid measures to 
public broadcasters have been found compatible with the internal market by 
the Commission because the Altmark criteria have been satisfied.
69
 In 
another case, though, the problem was to identify whether there was public 
funding in the license fee that the BBC collects as compensation for the 
public service operation of digital channels in the UK. The Commission 
decided that the license fee involves state resources because of the 
agreement with the UK Government that allows the BBC to use the amounts 
collected although the measure did not constitute aid.
70
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Also, subsidies have been used to develop and expand the European 
broadband networks in line with the Guidelines for state aid to broadband.
71
 
It was decided that public funds should be used to help high speed networks 
reach rural areas, to which private investors in the field might not want to 
invest to, if they decided on pure market terms. The rapid deployment of 
broadband is a priority for the Member States set by the Digital Agenda for 
Europe,
72
 which is part of the Europe 2010 policy. The goal for Member 
States is to bring fast broadband to half of European households by 2020. 
This target led to an extraordinary increase of aid to broadband, with over 
1.8 billion Euro of public money used for broadband investments in 2010 
alone.
73
 There is a number of cases where the Commission approved state 
aid measures for broadband networks.
74
 The Commission allows the 
Member States to determine if broadband will be a SGEI, which would 
mean the application of the Altmark criteria in the assessment of the 
measure,
75
 only if private operators are unable to provide coverage in the 
area, and the subsidised network is public, neutral and provides universal 
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coverage, open to both individual and commercial customers, without 
discrimination.
76
  
2.4.1.4 What are the benefits from granting aid to the energy 
sector? 
Finally, the last sector that needs to be identified in this section is the 
coal and steel and in general the energy sector, which will conclude the 
most important sectors of the European economy that are benefiting from 
aid. Coal and Steel in particular had been regulated until 2003 by the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951, which expired. Since 
then state aid in this sector is assessed under the normal rules of the TFEU. 
Aid for this sector has been justified in three cases: when there is need for 
the production of renewable energy, for compensation for stranded costs and 
rescue aid. For the first type, the benefits are self-evident: aid in this sector 
can increase the level of environmental protection, if Member States use 
financial assistance to create incentives on an undertaking level, to ‘achieve 
a higher level of environmental protection than required by Community 
standards, or to increase the environmental protection in the absence of 
Community standards’.77  In the case of stranded costs, the state 
compensates for long term aid given to undertakings before the 
liberalisation of the sector.
78
 Just like other sectors that have been examined 
in this section, the energy sector has been under state monopoly in the past, 
and has been liberalised recently. Therefore, it would be beneficial at this 
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point to briefly explain the connection between subsidies and market 
liberalisation. 
2.4.1.5 What is the role for state aid after a market has been 
liberalised? 
The postal, energy and transport markets were privatised in the 
1990’s, or according to the term preferred by the Commission they were 
liberalised. Market liberalisation is an independent policy, within the DG 
Competition of the Commission, along with the divisions for antitrust, 
mergers and state aid. However, subsidy control and the liberalisation 
policies are interconnected, as we have already seen in the example of air 
transport.
79
  After the opening of those markets to new competitors, there 
was still a need to maintain the providers of public services, as providers of 
a minimum amount of services that should be accessible to all, without 
discrimination or obstacles. State aid has been given to both new 
competitors in a market, such as aid to Ryanair to operate new air routes,
80
 
and to old monopolistic companies, to help them be present in the new 
competitive environment, after liberalisation. This process has produced 
benefits to both consumers and the industries themselves, who are the 
competitors: Open markets have allowed consumers to profit from lower 
prices, and the undertakings introduced new services, which are more 
developed than in the past, and generating more profit than before. In 
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general, this process of liberalisation has benefited the European economy, 
by making it more competitive, both internally and to the outside world.  
However, privatisation is not creating competitiveness, if it simply 
creates a private monopoly in the place of a previous state monopoly.
81
 
Then, the effects will be harmful to consumers, since there will be no 
control over prices and the absence of competition between players will not 
provide incentives for the further expansion of the market.  In all of those 
occasions, state aid has produced positive effects for the sectors concerned 
in a time of need, change or crisis. There are however, other benefits that 
derive from state aid in other policies, which will be examined next. First, 
will be the effects on the regional policy. 
2.4.1.6 Positive effects on the regional policy of the Union 
and the Member States    
 Another policy that was characteristically supported by state aid 
was the regional policy.  Underdeveloped regions of Member States have 
been the ground, where numerous state aid measures have been 
implemented in the past and at the present also. After all, it is still excluded 
from the prohibition of state aid by the Treaty.
82
 The Commission’s view is 
that the way to the future, for regional policy in relation to state aid, should 
be more in line with promoting horizontal measures in regions, such as 
promoting employment and innovation.
83
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Member states can grant regional aid under the conditions laid down 
in the Guidelines for national regional aid 2007-2013,
84
 whose application 
has been extended till 30 June 2014. After that date the newly adopted 
Guidelines will enter into force for the period 2014-2020.
85
 The Member 
States can grant aid to underdeveloped regions to support economic 
development and employment while state aid control must ensure a level 
playing field between Member States.
86
 The regional aid guidelines set out 
the rules under which Member States can grant state aid to companies to 
support investments in new production facilities in the less advantaged 
regions of Europe or to extend or modernise existing facilities. The 
guidelines also contain rules for Member States to draw up regional aid 
maps (the geographical areas where companies can receive regional state 
aid, and at which intensities). Regional aid can have adverse effects, such a 
subsidy race between regions that try to retain businesses in their 
geographical region, by preventing them from relocating.
87
 
Member states may grant aid to SMEs in underdeveloped and 
remote regions, because they are most likely to be affected by the 
disadvantages of the region. On the contrary regional aid to large 
undertakings is unlikely to be accepted.
88
 This kind of aid may in particular 
be operating aid that aims to reduce operating costs and it is prohibited in 
other situations. Operating aid can be administered to outermost regions, 
which are remote geographical areas that are either small in size and have 
difficult topography or climate, with special conditions and less restrictions 
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than in other cases, because it is used to offset the costs generated from the 
disadvantages of the region that the beneficiary operates in.
89
  
In more recent times, however, the European Union has declared 
that it will advance the social model, first, by the Lisbon Strategy and more 
recently, by the aspirations declared in the strategy for ‘Europe 2020’90 to 
become a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy, where employment, 
productivity and social cohesion will reach high levels. Consequently, it is 
expected that governments will continue to grant aid to undertakings or 
projects that promote those policies: that is employment, productivity, 
research and development, environmental projects and cohesion. Certainly, 
the Block exemption regulation includes Articles that exempt certain 
amounts of aid that aim to protect employability.
91
  However, the protection 
of jobs in a single undertaking would be considered selective by the Court 
and the Commission and would not benefit the Member States employment 
policy.
92
 All of those objectives are categorised as horizontal objectives of 
the internal market and will be analysed next.   
2.4.2 Aid to horizontal objectives 
2.4.2.1 Environmental aid 
Ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam the Union has set 
environmental protection as a main objective. Article 191 TFEU (ex Article 
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174 TEC) contains the objective to promote measures that aim at a high 
level of protection under the precautionary principle: according to this 
preventive action should be taken, the damage to the environment should be 
repaired at the source and following that the polluter should pay. Article 192 
TFEU suggests the procedure to be followed for the adoption of legislation 
and measures that fulfill the objectives of Article 191 TFEU and also 
connects the environmental policy with the energy policies of the Member 
States.
93
    
Part of the Union’s environmental and energy policies is to reduce 
emissions
94
 by at least 20% by 2020 and increase the use of renewable and 
sustainable types of energy to 20% of total EU energy consumption by 
2020.
95
 One way of achieving those goals is through state aid. The latest 
Scoreboard shows that 0.09% of EU GDP was used as aid to environmental 
protection objectives, which is the second highest amount of aid for 
horizontal objectives and reveals the commitment of Member States to 
pursue horizontal objectives of common interest.
96
 The basic state aid soft 
law document that includes those objectives is the Community Guidelines 
on state aid for environmental protection.
97
  The aim of the Guidelines is to 
balance the need for generous support measures that promote the 
environment and the protection of competition; in other words Member 
States grant aid to environmental projects because they are considered 
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objectives of common interest. The State Aid Action Plan
98
 also included 
guidance as to how to achieve those environmental objectives in line with 
the state aid policy: strict application of the balancing test will balance the 
positive and negative effects of the measure that will help identify 
environmental measures that involve aid and those that are compatible with 
the internal market. 
The Guidelines contain guidance on the correct application of the 
polluter pays principle. The basic problem with the application of this 
principle was that environmental costs from pollution remained hidden costs 
and the Guidelines introduced Market Based Instruments (MBI) to 
overcome that problem. MBI is a general term that can have various forms: 
MBI can be taxes, charges or tradable permit schemes.
99
 Their benefit is that 
the can be used to correct market failures and help achieve policy aims at 
the same time. The MBI that was introduced into the environmental policy 
is the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS).100 According to it those that 
emit more emissions that the amount permitted should buy allowance left 
from others that emit less. This is an example of the polluter pays principle, 
which can benefit the environment, by using the revenue from selling 
allowances to moderate climate change. This is an excellent example of how 
state aid benefits society and why Member States grant aid. However, the 
ETS has been criticised for not delivering on those positive effects: 
specifically, it created oversupply of allowances and so far the Union has 
                                                 
98
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failed to reduce it to achieve the goal of using the revenue to protect the 
environment. Instead the price of emitting one tonne of GHG (greenhouse 
gasses) has plunged.
101
 
Even though environmental projects are objectives of common 
interest it does not mean that all measures can have positive effects and thus 
be compatible with the internal market. To establish the effects of 
environmental aid measures the Commission follows the following 
assessment: first, it examines if the measure falls within 107(1) TFEU and if 
the answer is yes then it examines of the distortion can be justified. The 
measures might not constitute aid if they are below the threshold of de 
minimis aid, 
102
 or if they are included in the General Block Exemption 
Regulation.
103
 Apart from those provisions, the General Court initially held 
that it may be possible that an environmental measure might not be selective 
if the differential treatment is justified by the nature or general scheme of 
the system it is part of.
104
 Recently, though, the Court had the opportunity to 
clarify its assessment of selectivity in measures that include tax exemptions 
and tax reductions by deciding on renvoi of the British Aggregates case, 
which included an environmental levy.
105
 The Court held that the 
environmental objective of the measure should not have been taken into 
account to justify the differentiation in taxation and that the various 
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aggregates were in a comparable situation, which led the Court to accept 
that the different taxation created a selective advantage after all.
106
   
The Guidelines contain a more strict assessment for measures that 
have high levels of aid.
107
  A key effect that the Commission examines in 
this procedure is the incentive effect created by the measure and its 
necessity. If the measure increases the beneficiary’s willingness to invest 
more in environmental protection then the measure is likely to be 
accepted.
108
 A criticism that the principles of incentive effect and necessity 
have received is that they are too hard to prove considering that in order for 
the Commission to establish the existence of it, it takes under consideration 
various factors, such as the market conditions, the level of risk and the level 
of advantages generated by the project versus the costs of the investment.
109
   
The environmental guidelines are to be amended. The Commission 
indicated that the reason for this need is the intensification of the link 
between the energy and the environmental policy particularly through the 
mainstream use of renewable energy. Thus the Commission proposes to 
adopt new Environmental and Energy Aid Guidelines in order to include 
state aid to the energy industry, which was until now assessed directly by 
the TFEU Articles.
110
 Finally it should be mentioned that the consultation, 
which the Commission initiated, produced some elements that the 
participants have criticised the application of the Guidelines so far. Those 
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can be summarised as a need to simplify and clarify rules and procedures, 
which is a common theme with state aid control: according to the findings 
of the consultation there is a need for clarification of the counterfactual test 
with calculation of eligible extra investment costs because as it stands now 
is difficult; also, there is a need for more flexibility to allow for new market 
and technology development.
111
 
 
2.4.2.2 The purpose of training and employment aid 
The latest Scoreboard reveals that of all horizontal objectives the 
Member States used less aid to SMEs and aid to promote employment and 
training.
112
 This is rather unfortunate, considering that well targeted aid to 
those two objectives could help Member States to overcome rising 
unemployment and stagnating economies due to the ongoing financial and 
debt crisis. Rather, Member States prefer to direct aid to regional projects, 
aid to which accounts for 0.11% of EU GDP and is the largest amount spent 
on any other type of aid to industry and services.
113
  
Aid to training and employment objectives can be altogether 
exempted from the application of state aid provisions, if it is granted to 
individuals, and that is due to the fact that Articles 107 and 108 TFEU only 
apply to undertakings and not individuals. The case law reveals issues with 
the selectivity of employment measures, which were authorised even though 
they only favoured certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
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They were cleared because they did not fulfil another element of Article 
107(1) TFEU, they did not involve state resources.
114
 The analysis of 
existence of aid is important in employment aid. Aid to training and 
employment can also be authorised under the de minimis Regulation,
115
 the 
GBER,
116
 or Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU, if it falls outside the provisions 
of the de minimis and GBE Regulations.  
Of particular importance for the Union is the promotion of 
employment of disabled and disadvantaged workers, which is why the 
Commission adopted a Communication,
117
 a soft law instrument containing 
the criteria, by which it may accept aid measures to those categories of 
workers after notification. According to the Communication, state aid to this 
category of workers can have the form of wage subsidies but should be 
adopted only after the member state examines the use of general measures, 
such as reducing taxation for labour and increasing investment in training. 
Only after the measure is deemed to be appropriate should it be adopted. If 
that analysis is performed the measure can have positive effects: employers 
may consider disabled and disadvantaged workers, such as recent graduates 
with no experience or with lack of specific skills, as less productive. 
Subsidising their wages may provide an incentive for the employers to put 
those workers to work. Covering the extra costs that lower productivity 
generates the aid helps those workers to enter the labour market and 
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eventually, if enough of those categories of workers are employed there will 
be redistribution of income to a wider range of the work force.
118
  
Finally, the Commission has also acknowledged the positive effects 
of training and employment aid to the society as a whole. Those benefits 
come from the fact that this type of aid can increase the skilled workers 
supply in the labour market. Thus more firms can find suitable candidates 
and as a result the competitive labour market will increase the 
competitiveness of the industry.
119
   
However, wage subsidies for disabled and disadvantaged workers 
can have negative effects by causing distortions in the market as well: the 
subsidised workers can easily seem more attractive to the employers 
because of the reduced labour costs to them. This can lead to non-subsidised 
workers being replaced by subsidised workers and thus distort the labour 
market. Also, state aid for employing disadvantaged workers can affect the 
market entry and exit strategies of undertakings. If undertakings see that 
there is available support for a specific subsidised market then they might 
wish to enter that market, even if they would not make that decision without 
the existence of aid.
120
 This is why all of those negative effects need to be 
balanced with the expected positive effects during the examination of a 
measure by the Commission.  
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2.4.2.3 Aid to research, development and innovation (R&D&I) and 
its purpose 
The EU’s policy for R&D&I is being implemented mainly through 
the multiannual Frameworks.
121
 The one that is currently in force is due to 
expire at the end of 2013 and the analysis concerning the modernisation of 
the next Framework is included in chapter 7 of the thesis; this paragraph is 
limited to the effects of aid for R&D&I. The Union has set the goal of 
promoting R&D&I as an objective of common interest. By promoting 
research the Union’s scientific and technological base will strengthen and 
will subsequently encourage it to become more competitive 
internationally.
122
 So, the goal is not only to encourage more research within 
the internal market but also for the Union to be more extrovert. After all, the 
challenges in the globalised economy lie in the Union being able to compete 
with countries that have advantages over the Union, such as a younger 
workforce and loose labour laws. This policy goal is in line with the Lisbon 
Agenda calls for the Union to be the most advanced knowledge based 
economy.  
State aid can play a significant part in helping the Member States 
achieve the goals of the Union in R&D&I. In Economics it is perceived that 
there can be market failures in R&D&I, where there are no market 
incentives for investment in particular research or innovation. Public 
intervention in the form of state aid in such cases is needed, with 
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compatibility criteria that will identify the market failure and direct the aid 
to correct it.
123
  
Therefore there are two important elements that must be present for 
the Commission to authorise aid in R&D&I, and which are constantly 
present in Commission decisions. The first is market failures. In 
GENESIS
124
 the beneficiary claimed that there was a market failure that 
would justify the granting of aid to the beneficiaries. The Commission 
performed its analysis and accepted the market failure and authorised the 
aid. Furthermore, the Commission added in its evaluation that the project 
will have positive effects for the EU as a whole in terms of the 
dissemination of knowledge, given the fact that the materials that would be 
produced would be used in various applications, such as car components, 
energy storage, cables, composites, conductive inks and, finally, the 
environment.
125
 State aid can correct those market failures, and thus the 
Union will achieve more investment in R&D&I.
126
 Consequently, through 
state aid the Union achieves economic efficiency.
127
 In particular more 
investment for R&D&I, through state aid, will produce new products and 
shift the demand towards them, which for the purpose of this market will be 
economic efficiency.  
The second element that the Commission scrutinises in its decisions 
is the presence of incentive effect: in other words the purpose of aid in 
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R&D&I should be the change of behaviour on behalf of the beneficiary. In a 
recent Decision the Commission authorised the aid because it was satisfied 
that the ‘authorities will ensure that aid under the scheme for process and 
organisational innovation in services and for innovation clusters will have 
an incentive effect on the behaviour of the beneficiaries’.128 
However, competitive markets should be able to invest in R&D&I 
without the need for state intervention in the market. Because of market 
failures state intervention can have the favourable effects of the previous 
paragraph. Those effects will only be achieved, though, if there also exist 
certain favourable conditions in the economy. Sufficient intellectual 
property protection is very important for the protection of rights of the 
products and innovations that will be the end result of aid to R&D&I.
129
 
Also, well designed national rules for the administration of investment and 
aid to R&D&I are needed for the most positive outcome. 
2.4.2.4 Risk Capital aid is a Union objective 
A definition of risk capital is found in the Commission’s soft law 
instruments as equity financing of companies with perceived high-growth 
potential during their early growth years.
130
 This defines start up aid for 
companies under conditions of growth forecasts. Therefore, Member States 
can use risk capital aid measures to support start up undertakings, which 
might have difficulty in raising capital from the financial markets. Risk 
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capital aid can be authorised under the GBER
131
 without notification or with 
notification under Article 107(3) TFEU. This kind of state aid can offset 
market failures for start up companies and SMEs in particular. The market 
failure that risk capital is used to help solve is the equity gap that exists in 
the Union market: there is a ‘persistent capital market imperfection’ that 
prevents supply to meet demand at acceptable pricing to both sides.
132
 In 
certain circumstances state aid measures that support risk capital can be an 
effective measure to lift the identified market failures in this field, if 
properly targeted.  
Risk capital’s importance was highlighted in the re-launch of the 
Lisbon Strategy where the Commission acknowledged the lack of risk 
capital funding for new and small businesses.
133
 Also, a series of other 
documents have included risk capital as a priority for the Union.
134
 In 
particular risk capital is connected with the creation of jobs and growth and 
the alleviation of the effects of the financial crisis to SMEs and start ups.
135
  
Despite all those positive effects that risk capital can produce the 
Commission’s market failure assessment has been criticised as taken for 
granted and excluding a proper application of the Market Economy Investor 
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Principle,
136
 even though the Guidelines
137
 contain conditions upon which 
the risk capital measures will be assessed. In recent Commission decision 
this seems to be the approach for identifying the market failure. The 
Commission simply states that the measure facilitates the provision of risk 
capital to SMEs, which would otherwise not receive sufficient capital. The 
measure therefore confers an advantage.’138 
 Due to the stated importance of risk capital aid for the Union’s and 
the Member States’ goals in fostering jobs and growth, the Modernisation 
initiative included the revision of the risk capital Guidelines as a priority. 
Currently, the Commission has published draft Guidelines
139
 to replace the 
2006 Guidelines.  The main issues that have been identified and are put 
under review are; first, there is a need to broaden the scope of the GBER 
authorisation to include access to risk capital for SMEs at later stages of 
their development, (other than the start up and initial growth periods) and 
secondly, to design appropriate compatibility criteria for more substantive 
assessment of measures.
140
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2.4.2.5 The purpose of aid measures to SMEs  
The importance of SMEs
141
 for the European Union’s economy is 
highlighted regularly. Commissioner Almunia emphasised the importance 
of state aid to private undertakings in the current conditions of sluggish 
growth when he presented the modernisation initiative; in particular, well-
designed aid is needed that will address market failures. Such aid is state aid 
that will make access to finance easier for SMEs.
142
  
From the Commissioner’s speech and from Commission Decisions it 
is clear that Member States use state aid to SMEs to correct a market failure 
that does not provide adequate support to this kind of businesses. The 
Commission has accepted aid measures based on their objective: the 
Commission recognises that there is ‘serious difficulty in gaining access to 
capital and credit.’143 This difficulty is caused by the unwillingness of credit 
institutions to support SMEs that have difficulty in securing guarantees for 
the financial assistance their seeking. This situation is the market failure that 
the Member States wish to correct when granting aid to SMEs. Other 
objectives that can be found in Commission decisions that authorise aid to 
SMEs is the fostering of entrepreneurship, innovations and employment.
144
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2.4.2.6 The purpose of aid to Rescue and Restructuring firms 
in difficulty 
State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty has produced 
controversy over the years, because Member States governments want to 
protect their national firms from going bankrupt and see the Commission’s 
Decisions as interference in their national economic policies. In British 
Energy (BE)
145
 the UK Government implemented aid measures before 
notification, for the rescue of British Energy, which was an energy company 
that had market share of 20% in England and Wales and 50% in Scotland. 
The company lost profits after market liberalisation and the introduction of a 
Government plan to bring down electricity prices. The UK Government 
decided that the company was too big to fail and granted rescue aid, whose 
purpose was for BE to cover operating costs, such as wages (notably, the 
rescue aid would secure 4 920 full time employees in the United Kingdom) 
and payments to suppliers, and to prevent default.
146
 
The UK Government was criticised for not notifying the rescue 
measures in the Commission’s decision. From the above it is evident that 
governments use rescue aid to secure other policies, such as the employment 
policy, or to correct failures created from their previous intervention, which 
might conflict with state aid control.     
Currently, aid for rescue and restructuring is granted under the 
conditions of the 2004 Guidelines, which are in force.
147
 There are two 
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distinct stages of state aid granted to firms in difficulty: first is the rescue 
aid, which must be short term limited financial assistance up to six months 
and then follows the long-term restructuring plan, which contains elements 
of aid which helps the undertaking reorganise and return to financial 
stability. The two stage process and the limited time that the first stage 
applies are due to the highly distortive effects
148
 of rescue aid to competition 
and the functioning of the market. 
Even though rescue aid can be used as a horizontal objective it is 
included in sectoral aid in the Scoreboards, because it actually benefits an 
individual undertaking. This is in line with the Lisbon Council of 2000 
asked the Member States to shift the emphasis from aid that supports 
individual companies.
149
 The rescue phase of the aid should be short and 
limited as was mentioned. However, the 2004 Guidelines broadened the 
scope of rescue aid, because in some cases it was obvious that structural 
changes needed to be performed as soon as possible.
150
 The main principle 
that governs the authorisation of rescue aid is the ‘one time, last time’ 
principle, which means that the same undertaking should not receive 
additional aid that keeps it afloat artificially.
151
 Possible rescue measures 
can have the form of loan guarantees or loans with interest rates as low as 
those enjoyed by healthy firms, which is crucial for the success of the rescue 
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plan.
152
 In one case the Commission made an innovative judgment when it 
considered that public declarations of support to an undertaking made by the 
French Minister for Economic Affairs should be examined together with the 
subsequent transfer of a loan to the undertaking in order to determine if 
there is state aid. This overall assessment of a declaration to take necessary 
measures and the measures themselves would overstretch the notion of 
rescue aid and would create a precedent that the Court probably wanted to 
avoid.
153
 Therefore, the Court annulled the Commission Decision for not 
having clear and definitive position on the existence of aid on the basis of 
this innovative argument.
154
  
The restructuring phase’s purpose is much more important because it 
contains the implementation of the plan that will bring the undertaking off 
support and back to operating under market conditions. There are strict 
conditions under which the restructuring aid should be granted: a 
restructuring plan to restore long term viability is needed; aid should be 
limited to the necessary and an own contribution to the restructuring costs is 
needed; aid should not be used for aggressive moves that alter conditions in 
the market; finally, capacity reductions may be imposed if the aid leads to 
the deterioration of the structure of the market.
155
 Those strict conditions are 
in force because of the highly distortive nature of rescue and restructuring 
aid. Its purpose has to be protecting competition and the internal market, 
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however, the last condition of capacity reductions and market share can be 
seen as protecting competitors.
156
 In the case of restructuring aid it certainly 
seems that the purpose of the aid is to protect competition as well as 
competitors, which seems to be a legitimate aim for state aid control in 
general. The R&R Guidelines apply to all other sectors and industries 
except from the financial institutions sector since 2008. Ever since the 
financial crisis started there are detailed new rules applicable to R&R aid to 
financial institutions; the Member States can grant aid according to those 
rules, which needed to change for reasons that will be analysed next.   
The ECOFIN Council of 7 October 2008 concluded that all 
necessary measures would be taken to ensure stability of the financial 
system and that such appropriate measure were among others 
recapitalisations of financial institutions. Such intervention would be 
decided at the national level, each Member State would submit individual 
state aid measures but they should all fall within a common EU wide 
framework of common principles.
157
  
The Commission decided that once the crisis became systemic
158
 the 
control of subsidies was in danger of becoming obsolete and the Member 
States would embark on a subsidy race to try to eliminate the effects of the 
crisis on their banking sectors first and to the rest of the economy as well. 
Even though there were rules in place that could be the base to implement 
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crisis measures,
159
 it was considered necessary to adopt even more detailed 
rules to address the crisis.
160
  
The limitations of those guidelines were that they applied to all firms 
in all sectors, so they were not specifically drafted to be applied to the 
specific circumstances of failing financial institutions.
161
 More specifically, 
the R&R Guidelines requested that as a condition for receiving aid the 
beneficiary would have to contribute 50% of the costs if they were a large 
corporation.
162
 Based on the fact that during the banking crisis there was a 
liquidity shortage for the banks, the crisis framework adapted this principle 
of own contribution into the principle of burden-sharing, which placed the 
shareholders under an obligation to contribute through bans on dividend 
payments. Secondly another limitation of the R&R Guidelines was the 
compensatory measures to competitors, which under the Guidelines 
included capacity reductions and divestments.  
Under the new crisis rules measures to limit distortions to 
competition were included in the Communications.
163
 The new principle of 
limiting distortions of competition was better suited to be applied to banking 
institutions, because it placed ‘a greater focus on market competition 
conditions rather than compensation of competitors as well as the 
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development of behavioural measures for situations where sufficient 
divestments could not be found without threatening viability’.164 
Moreover, the aid measures that were adopted during the crisis had 
little or none at all analysis based on their effects, as it will be further 
discussed in the second chapter of the thesis. Certainly, the counter- 
argument could be that any policy needs to be flexible enough to adapt to 
the new conditions that it faces, however, the Commission’s state aid policy 
is too unstable. Even if the conditions change the key policy choices need to 
be clear so that the legal framework promotes transparency and legal 
certainty
165
 to the stakeholders.  
 
 
2.4.3 Positive effects from granting state aid that counterbalance 
problems caused by external to the EU factors 
Another important element that pushes European governments to 
grant aid to their undertakings is the increasing competition European 
companies face in the international field. In this part of the chapter, the 
focus is on external factors that influence state aid in Europe. Traditional 
competitors in the past were mainly American and Japanese companies, 
since those two were the world’s biggest economies. The idea of creating 
the internal market had one main goal after all, and that was to help 
European enterprises to become bigger and compete with the giants from 
abroad. The most notable episode of a subsidy race between Europe and 
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America is the Airbus – Boeing case. The European response to American 
commercial airplane manufacturers, which dominated the world market 
until the 1970’s, was the creation of Airbus. Airbus is a joint venture of 
many European countries. Its main cross-Atlantic rival, Boeing suspected 
that European governments heavily subsidised Airbus’s production, which 
led to a bilateral Trade Agreement that aimed to stop aid to airplane 
producers.
166
 However, this lucrative industry has urged governments from 
both sides of the Atlantic to grant aid to their companies. The American 
Boeing accused the governments of France, Germany and the UK for 
granting illegal start up aid to Airbus for the production of its new A-380 
project, and filed a complaint with the WTO’s panel for the settlement of 
the dispute.
167
    
 Nowadays though, in the increasingly globalised world economy 
new competitors emerge from developing countries, which create new 
challenges for Europe and state aid. European companies move production 
facilities outside of Europe and into those developing countries that allow 
them to produce in lower costs. As a result, employment levels in Europe 
are decreasing and governments feel the pressure from the people to support 
production at home.
168
 2009 was a year of crisis for Europe, but the Chinese 
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economy continued to grow. As a result unemployment rates in Europe rose 
in one year from 7.3% in October 2008 to 9.3% in October 2009.
169
 At the 
same time the aid volume, which includes state aid measures introduced as a 
percentage of GDP, rose in 2008 to 2.2% of GDP from 0.52% of GDP in the 
Union.
170
 From those figures it is clear that there is a relation between the 
rise in unemployment levels and the rise in state aid volumes. The 
Commission though feels that the internal market was not affected. Also, 
according to the Commission, globalisation need not be a threat to European 
markets, and governments should not resort to protectionism, otherwise 
known as unregulated aid, because that would isolate Europe from the 
world.
171
   State aid can also have negative effects, which is why it is 
prohibited. Those negative effects will be examined next. 
 
2.5 NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF STATE AID 
Government intervention in the form of state aid may have the 
positive influences on the Union’s policies that have been examined above, 
but they primarily affect the functioning of a free market. In a free market 
there should be free competition between players whereas, government 
subsidies distort free competition. This distortion of competition is 
considered a negative effect of state aid and this is why the prohibition 
exists in the first place. The different ways that state aid distorts competition 
are examined next. 
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 2.5.1. Negative costs 
Firstly, it should be noted that money for Subsidies comes from 
State budgets.  Money for the public budget comes from taxation, which in 
turn comes from taxpayer’s (that is people’s) pockets. It is crucial, 
especially in times of tight budget calculations, that taxpayer’s money 
should be spent wisely. A subsidy can turn out to be costly and not so 
effective, after some considerations.
 172
 In the end, the benefit coming from 
the aid should be greater than the cost of the public funding. This is not 
always true, since state aid might not always be the best way to deal with 
inefficiency in the market. The public funds could be more usefully invested 
in more general policy measures, instead of the funding of an undertaking. 
And even if the aid is well targeted, the impact might prove to be less 
efficient, that the granting authority originally intended.  
Consequently, Member States should perform a cost-benefit 
comparison before granting aid. The costs that must be calculated are 
usually ‘opportunity costs’. Those are funds that are dedicated to the 
subsidy amount. However, other costs must be included in the calculation: 
those are the funds that the state spends in order to design, plan and grant 
the aid.  If the benefits overcome the costs of the subsidy then the outcome 
is positive.
173
 
 2.5.2. Negative externalities 
Secondly, state aid can certainly generate other unwanted 
consequences: as it has already been mentioned, subsidies impact on the 
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functioning of the market. This impact can cause anti-competitive outcomes 
in the market, which ultimately, can harm consumers. These consequences 
are sometimes felt only within the national market and are called 
externalities. But other times the consequences are felt in players from other 
countries as well. Those effects can be called cross - border externalities or 
negative spillovers.
174
 They are called cross – border because the subsidy 
has effects across the border from the granting country, to other Member 
States.  Since aid measures are planned nationally, they rarely take into 
account the effects in other Member States. This is why the international 
state aid control system is needed.
175
  
The national authority planning an aid measure only takes into 
account the benefits that will generate for the national economy, without 
considering the counteractions of other Member States. When a subsidy 
affects many Member States, it is only natural that other countries will want 
to control the negative effects that a foreign subsidy is creating to their own 
markets, by designing their own state aid measures. As a result, 
governments are involved in a subsidy race, with no clear aim and 
prospect.
176
 Subsidy races end up spending money unwisely, making state 
aid costly once again in relation to its potential benefits.  
 This situation of a subsidy race and in general aid that is not well 
targeted can create further problems in the internal market, the protection of 
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which is a basic objective of the Treaty.
177
 Competition rules are entrusted 
with securing the operation of the internal market. National measures such 
as subsidies distort the functioning of the internal market when they affect 
other Member States negatively. The market is not achieving the most 
efficient results because of the government interventions. A tool that is 
supposed to protect it can actually work against the internal market if 
abused.   
2.5.3 Negative effects from political interaction with state aid policy 
Unfortunately for the markets, governments are political institutions 
that do not operate in market conditions, or as efficient as the markets would 
want them to.  Governments are made up from politicians who are keen on 
being re-elected to their office. This makes them susceptible to influence 
from voters, public opinion shapers, lobbyists and even donors to political 
campaigns. The situation when decision making might be influenced by 
those players is called government failure. The effect of a government 
failure in the state aid field is that state support might be directed to the 
wrong recipients. As a result, subsidies end up being a misused political tool 
that does not achieve what it is intending to, which is public welfare.
178
  
A perfect example of state aid being used as a political tool for the 
government to intervene in the economy is the Greek Business 
Reconstruction Organisation: in the 1980’s and shortly after the accession of 
Greece to the then European Communities, the new socialist Greek 
government implemented a programme for the restructuring of privately 
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owned companies that were considered too large to fail, because of their 
importance in terms of employment, production and exports in the total of 
the Greek economy.
179
  
The specific measures contained in this law that were scrutinised by 
the Commission were recapitalisation schemes for companies that came 
under the control of the publicly owned Business Reconstruction 
Organisation, in the form of the conversion of the companies’ debt into 
equity capital held by the Organisation and the National Bank of Greece. 
The European Commission authorised those schemes as compatible with 
Article 92(3)(b) EC,
180
 (which is now Article 107(3)(b) TFEU), and 
acknowledged this vast restructuring programme under the condition that 
State aid measures would be individually notified and assessed.
181
  This was 
one of the few cases that a State aid scheme was authorised under the 
provisions of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, because the Commission favours the 
provisions of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. The scheme was justified because of 
the ‘problems and structure of the Greek economy’ which ‘indicated that the 
crisis was not a sectoral one but covered the whole economy’.182  
The BRO was a clear attempt of state intervention in the economy, 
unprecedented in the recent history of Greece, because it allowed the state to 
intervene into failing private companies, by depriving the owners of their 
right to manage their company. It did not go as far as to deprive them of 
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their ownership rights, because this would be clearly unconstitutional.
183
 
The BRO was dismantled in the 1990’s when more centre-right and centre-
left governments started privatisation programmes of state owned 
companies. There are reports in the media though, nowadays, that a revival 
of this type of Organisation, probably adjusted to the current conditions 
would be a possible solution to the crisis that Greece is facing in recent 
years.
184
 This is why the above analysis is not a relic of the past, but an 
important link in the chain of State aid measures in Greece. 
Due to the inherent problems of the structure of the Greek economy, 
the State is obligated to intervene in the economy and provide solutions in 
sectors of the economy that the private sector failed to provide. The 
financial institutions sector is characterised of concentration among five big 
banks, in many of which the State was the main shareholder in the past, or 
still is nowadays in a lesser amount. This concentration led to inadequate 
issuing of new loans to undertakings or the substantial slowness of the 
approval process.
185
 As a result, the liquidity problems in the market drive 
the State to grant aid.  
Apart from the inherent structural problems, the Greek State’s 
policies themselves have been hindering substantial growth of the economy 
that should be based on free and competitive market conditions and not aid. 
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From being a mainly agricultural economy in the 1950’s and much of the 
1960’s, Greece changed to become a mainly industry and services based 
economy in the 1970’s, over a decade. The change did not happen smoothly 
but rather abruptly, and with lack of real plan for the confrontation of the 
consequences on the environment, which put the burden for providing 
solutions to the enterprises. But in order for them to do so, they were in need 
of capital, which was not always available from the financial institutions. 
Once again, the state needed to cover the gap it had created by its own 
actions, or failures.   
2.5.4 Other types of distortions of competition caused by state aid – 
Inefficiencies  
The most distortive and thus negative effect comes from the granting 
of Rescue aid. A subsidy granted to a firm in financial difficulty keeps 
inefficient firms in existence. Without the aid they might have been forced 
to exit the market.
186
 The effect on the market as a whole is the most 
dangerous one. Maintaining failing firms creates dynamic inefficiency. 
Dynamic inefficiency means that the normal market functioning is distorted, 
and thus the affected sector is prevented from achieving efficient outcomes 
in the future. If normal market conditions were applied, the failing firm, 
which received aid, will not exit the market when it should. On the contrary, 
it will survive, keep competing and possibly drive other undertakings out of 
the market before it, causing negative reactions to the industry as a whole.
187
 
Other companies might not be forced to exit the market, but they will 
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certainly be forced to react to the new market conditions that the subsidised 
firm has created. This situation can cause allocative inefficiency in the 
affected market, which basically means that the other firms will either 
diversify their spending to other products, or even other markets, or in 
general re-allocate their resources where competition is still in their favour, 
and this might harm welfare in the long run.  
2.5.5 Negative effects on market power 
It is true that state aid can increase the market power of the 
subsidised firm. This may change the share that the companies have in the 
relevant market. If a company suddenly obtains higher market share it is 
easier for it to ignore its competitors and abuse this power.  Companies may 
start charging higher prices, erect barriers for other companies to enter the 
market they control, and thus prevent healthy competition. The firm’s 
behaviour is altered by the aid. Market entry decisions can be affected by 
subsidies and so can be market exit decisions.
188
 Those negative effects can 
be felt in the national market and also affect trade in other Member States 
where the subsidised company has significant presence. 
The subsidised firm may also want to use aided production to 
relocate some of its production facilities to areas that are eligible for 
regional aid. This will lead to an increase of production in the subsidised 
area, but will also lead to the decrease of production to the original region 
that the facilities were moved away from. Thus, regional cohesion might be 
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affected negatively in the Member States territory or the whole of the 
Union, if production is shifted from one country to the other.
189
  
From the analysis that proceeded, it is evidenced that state aid has 
been used as a tool by governments. State aid is the most efficient tool in the 
government’s political ‘tool case’ that helps it overcome social problems 
and financial difficulties. State aid is especially efficient in times of crises 
like the one that started in 2008 and all the other that occurred before it. The 
crisis is not a once in a lifetime event, according to this researcher. The 
causes behind crises are different each time, whether credit institutions or 
the oil crisis, or the housing market is to be blamed; it is rather the circle of 
capitalism, where bankruptcy is an inherent feature of a market, so that it 
will rise again. But unfortunately, sometimes subsidies might prove to be 
the easy way out of a problem; however, they don’t ‘come for free”.190 It is 
crucial at this point to expand into the decision of Member States’ 
governments to tackle the crisis with more state aid, and how that decision 
affected the relevant rules that existed and how they were amended to fit the 
crisis.   
   
2.6 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 
STATE AID 
Up until 2008, the Union’s main priority was to implement the 
objectives of the State Aid Action Plan for less and better targeted state aid. 
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However, the occurrence of the financial crisis inevitably affected the 
Union’s objective. The Commission issued Communications in 2008 and 
2009 where it states that it considers that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU is 
available as a legal basis for aid measures to address the crisis.
191
 Aid for 
firms in difficulty was usually assessed under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, and 
according to the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines in the past 
(henceforward R&R Guidelines).
192
 However, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU has 
also been used in the past, even though quite scarcely. Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU, then Article 92(3)(b) TEC, was eligible as a legal basis to assess 
measures taken by Member States to battle the recession caused by the 1973 
oil crisis.
193
  
The choice of 107 (3)(b) TFEU as a legal basis has been criticised 
because the Commission decided to justify its decision to adopt it after it 
characterised the crisis as systemic, which means that it affected the whole 
of the economy. However, some believe that there is no real justification for 
the choice of 107 (3)(b) TFEU as a legal basis.
194
 Furthermore, it was 
rejected as a legal basis in the beginning of the crisis when the Commission 
was called to assess the measures taken in the Northern Rock case.
195
 In 
those various Communications adopted during the crisis there is no 
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explanation of the term systemic and how it is viewed by the Commission: 
the question is whether the term ‘systemic’ refers to the banking sector 
alone, or the economy as a whole. If the crisis only affected one sector, 
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU would have been more applicable as a basis.  
In the early stage of the current crisis, some European banks were 
affected by the spill over effects of the crisis in the US market and European 
Member States took ad hoc measures under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the 
R&R Guidelines, such as the ones in the Northern Rock,
196
 or the Bradford 
and Bingley
197
 and Hypo Real Estate
198
 cases. However, even though the 
present crisis started from failing financial institutions, it soon became 
‘systemic’199 and the disturbance affected the whole of the economy of 
Member States, and the credit squeeze caused credit blocking, a drop in 
demand and recession.
200
 This led to the relaxation of state aid rules, with 
the adoption of new soft law instruments by the Commission in 2008- 2009, 
which have been updated thrice since.
201
 A Communication
202
 that was 
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adopted in 2011 keeps in force the four Communications of 2008 – 2009, 
which set the conditions for the compatibility of guarantees, recapitalisation 
and asset relief with the Treaty rules on state aid, as well as the requirements 
for a restructuring or viability plan (the Restructuring Communication).
203
 
The Commission’s Communications are non-binding soft law instruments; 
however, they are a guide to the Commission’s methodology and would 
certainly be taken into consideration by the Court.
204
 
This brief analysis designates that the financial crisis was seen by the 
Commission as a systemic risk to the whole of the economy that could be 
avoided by state aid measures. This brings back the conflict between 
protectionism and liberalism in market regulation. During the crisis there is 
more protectionism and more regulation. However, each Member State’s 
financial system is nationally regulated, even though all are interconnected. 
General guidelines from the supranational authority might be useful to 
prevent a subsidy race between Member States to save their own financial 
institutions, but there are various types of measures available,
205
 and each 
Member State should be able to address the crisis with the measures and the 
intensity of aid that would be more suitable to each situation.
206
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Finally, it should be mentioned that other types of competition 
policy instruments such as mergers have not been used enough.
207
 Mergers 
between financial institutions might be adequate measures to address the 
crisis. There was no need to alter the rules on mergers because they ‘proved 
well equipped to withstand the crisis.’208 Instead of injecting public money 
to failing banks, those that had sound economic figures could take over 
those that would be obligated to exit the market, due to their own bad 
management of risk related issues. Of course, this solution is only viable 
under the condition that there were sound banks, and that not all of them 
were affected by the crisis.   
The results of the new crisis framework are contrary to the reform of 
the implementation of state aid envisaged in the SAAP, in which the 
Commission declared that its objective is to modernise state aid rules based 
on a ‘refined economic approach’ and ‘less and better targeted state aid’. 209 
First of all, large amounts of state aid have been directed in one sector alone 
(the banking sector), completely disregarding previous objectives.
210
   
Also in the SAAP, the Commission reaffirmed the need ‘to balance 
the positive impact of the aid measure against its potentially negative side 
effects’211 in its assessment of the compatibility with the internal market. In 
Commission decisions that have been taken under the new rules, the 
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balancing test was practically absent. This is the result of the new faster 
procedure, which might help to clear a measure faster, but fails in the 
transparency condition.  
Furthermore, no competitors were able, so far, to raise their 
objections in the pre-adoption of the measure stage,
212
 and how could they 
be informed and prepared, when a measure is to be cleared in 24 hours. As 
for the refined economic approach envisaged in the SAAP, it was also 
limited, justified by the urgency of the situation. In a typically approved 
recapitalisation scheme, for example, any economic justification of the 
measure is lacking; instead it was said that:  
‘The Commission found the scheme and the commitments to 
constitute an appropriate means to restore confidence in the creditworthiness 
of Italian financial institutions and to stimulate lending to the real economy. 
The measures are well-designed and interventions will be limited to what is 
necessary to achieve the stabilisation of the Italian financial sector’.213  
Finally, one last major concern is the ability of the state aid control 
mechanism and the market to return to the pre-crisis regime; if however, this 
return will be desired in the future, once the crisis is over. When the new 
crisis framework was adopted, the new rules would only be applicable until 
31 December 2010. The Commission though, has prolonged the 
implementation of the crisis framework until the end of 2011, with some 
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stricter conditions,
214
 and again prolonged beyond the end of 2011, without 
setting a new end of date.
215
 This ongoing state support to the banks 
contradicts what the Commission was expecting or hoping in the early 
stages of the crisis: in 2009 Commissioner for Competition Kroes had 
declared that ‘there can’t be a second bail out. [...] there is no money left for 
a second bailout’.216 The Commission also hopes to set more permanent 
rules for assessing state aid to financial institutions under the legal basis of 
Article 107(3)c TFEU ‘as soon as market conditions permit’,217 which 
seems more than a hope than a reality at this point.   
The Banking Crisis has largely reached the stage where more cases 
and more importance is being given to the restructuring of financial 
institutions that receive state aid. The new Banking Communication
218
 
adopts the principle that recapitalisations and impaired asset measures will 
only be authorised if the restructuring plan is accepted in advance.
219
 Also, 
the Banking Communication increases the minimum requirements for 
burden-sharing.
220
 This is required in current sovereign debt conditions 
because it minimises public intervention. According to the new rules, banks 
that seek state aid should try to raise capital from the market first and ask 
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contribution from their shareholders, and junior debt creditors.
221
 In Anglo 
Irish Bank
222
 the Commission authorised the restructuring plan, which 
involved the complete closing of operations, because it ensures that the 
Bank shares the burden of its rescue. However, it is noted in the 
Commission Decision that the ‘value of assets (to be contributed) is so 
depreciated that the proceeds of their sale is dwarfed by the capital injected 
into both banks.’223 To make things even worse, the Commission admits that 
for the burden-sharing by stockholders the Bank was already completely 
nationalised and private stockholders were ‘wiped-out’.224 This is an 
extreme case, which shows that the crisis rules certainly contain all the 
necessary conditions to secure the public, involvement, losses, though, for 
the tax payer will be inevitable in some cases. 
The first case in the context of the crisis state aid framework to reach 
the Court of the EU is ING.
225
 The case involved aid that the Netherlands 
granted to ING in 2008, which was declared compatible by the Commission 
under the conditions of a restructuring plan.
 226
 Part of the Commission’s 
Decision on the restructuring plan referred to the amendment of conditions 
for the repayment of the initial capital injection of 2008 as being additional 
state aid. The Netherlands challenged the Commission Decision claiming 
that repayment conditions were in conformity with the MEIP
227
 and thus not 
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state aid. The General Court held that the Commission failed to apply the 
MEIP. The General Court’s judgment is interesting because it engages in a 
‘comprehensive review’ of the economic assessments of the Commission, 
even though it did recall that the judicial review of cases where there is 
technical or complex
228
 economic assessments is limited.
229
 The 
Commission appealed the General Court’s judgment on the grounds ‘that 
there is no requirement in law to apply the market economy investor 
principle in relation to an amendment of repayment conditions for a measure 
that itself constituted State aid.’230  The impact of the judgment of the Court 
judging under appeal, concerning the application of the MEIP
231
 in similar 
cases, when delivered, could have an impact on the way Member States 
analyse state aid measures before notifying them; they might be required to 
perform detailed economic assessments, such as the ones that the 
Commission might be obliged to perform even when there are amendments 
of aid measures.
232
  
 
2.7 STATE AID TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER 
FAILING FIRMS AND THE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD   
The crisis state aid framework, which was put in force in 2008, is 
still in effect, even though it was supposed to be temporary. The 
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Commissioner for Competition has admitted that due to the lack of a 
concrete system of control for financial institutions at the European level, 
and due to the dangers that banks face from the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone, the temporary crisis package is the best instrument to manage the 
rescue and restructuring of EU banks.
233
 Thus, until there is a new 
framework for regulating financial institutions, and assessing the risks that 
those activities may or may not take, state aid control will be the instrument 
that will continue to be applied.
234
 The latest figures show that 13% of GDP 
was used by European governments to rescue their banks.
235
 The amount of 
money used is ‘unprecedented’,236 and will continue to rise. Therefore, the 
question is what happens to the danger that financial institutions might 
become even riskier in the future, if they know that, in the end, there will be 
the taxpayer that will save them? And what happened to the free-market 
economy theory, as it was presented earlier in this chapter, which should be 
able to regulate itself, and lead the failing banks out of the market? 
There are questions whether the temporary measures adopted during 
the crisis were actually protecting competition, as state aid control aims to 
do, or whether there were other policies involved that influenced their 
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adoption. For example, the Communication for restructuring banks that 
receive state aid during the crisis acknowledges that the asset-write off and 
the divestment of branches or subsidiaries are measures that need to be 
taken by those benefiting from aid, authorised under the temporary 
frameworks. The Communication acknowledges that the reductions of the 
banks’ balance sheets cannot reduce the banks’ market share, and therefore 
should not be ‘taken into account when assessing the need for structural 
measures’.237  However, in reality, banks that received aid were ordered to 
drastically reduce their balance sheets, as part of the restructuring plans, 
something that cannot be explained on competition terms.
238
 Rather, it is the 
political concerns that lead to the adoption of such measures.
239
  
Another politically influenced measure in the restructuring 
Communication is the obligation imposed to beneficiaries not to pay 
dividends; instead, those amounts could be used for the bank’s own 
contribution to the restructuring costs.
240
 All of those measures are put in 
place to reduce the danger of moral hazard, instead of protecting 
competition. 
The restructuring Communication
241
 also acknowledges the danger 
of moral hazard from the banks that do receive aid, and, in particular, it 
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recognises that aid ‘prolongs past distortions of competition’, ‘which may 
create a moral hazard for the beneficiaries’.242 To add to that, the scale of 
the aid granted to banks is unprecedented, and it may create even greater 
moral hazard.
243
 
The economic notion of moral hazard is used by economists to 
define the danger of the state granting support to a failing firm that cannot 
acquire it from the market on purely market terms, which will lead to 
distortions of competition by abolishing the beneficiary’s incentives to 
compete.
244
    
The answer to the problem of the creation of moral hazard to the 
beneficiaries of crisis aid is to force them to impose tough restructuring 
measures, such as divestments and deleveraging, and also by forcing the 
beneficiaries to share some of the burden.
245
 In particular, the restructuring 
Communication adopts burden sharing of the aid between the state and the 
beneficiary; this should be beneficial, because when there is greater burden 
sharing, and the contribution of the beneficiary is higher, the negative 
effects created by moral hazard are limited.
246
 The beneficiaries’ 
contribution is to be made to the restructuring costs, and can have the form 
of absorbing losses, through their capital, or acquiring capital from the 
markets.  
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The theory of moral hazard is widely commented on, and some 
elements of hazard certainly exist when it comes to saving the doomed. 
However, it does seem to some that it is a notion that has been abused in the 
past and it was ill-used, based on flawed analyses that have misleading 
results.
247
 The creation of a moral hazard argument should not stop 
government intervention, when it is needed; instead, better targeted 
regulation and enforcement will ultimately reduce the risks of state aid on 
competition.   
 
2.8 THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROZONE’S SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
ON STATE AID CONTROL  
The fact that each Member State is different when it comes to its 
economy and financial markets, and that the market failure in each country 
needs to be addressed on its own is evident from the effects of the crisis in 
the Greek, Portuguese, Irish and Cypriot economies. In those economies, the 
crisis has evolved into a sovereign debt crisis,
248
 which of course has 
various reasons that have caused it, other than state aid, but once again the 
financial sector is involved. The same financial institutions that were given 
aid by the Member States’ budgets refuse to lend, not only private 
companies and individuals, but Sovereign states as well.  
In turn, the bad finances of the Member States’ once again endanger 
the financial institutions in those three (for now) countries that need to be 
further aided. This creates a vicious circle of aid and lending shortage in the 
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European Union. More specifically, Member States have adopted state aid 
measures, such as recapitalisation of financial institutions and guarantees 
taken under the new crisis framework. In some Member States though, the 
crisis was transformed into a sovereign debt crisis, and as a consequence 
there was further need for support to financial institutions operating in those 
Member States and possibly all others, depending on the spill-over effects to 
the whole of the Eurozone, in case any Member State defaulted on its debts. 
The result is the establishment of the European Financial Stability Fund 
(henceforward EFSF), which will operate as an additional safeguard for 
financial institutions, to the measures already in place since 2009. The EFSF 
is established by the Eurozone countries as a private company, having as an 
objective to preserve financial stability.
249
 Part of its activity is to grant 
loans to Member States’ governments, which then use the funds to finance 
recapitalisations of financial institutions. This is the only activity of the 
EFSF that fulfils the conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU and has to be 
controlled under state aid rules. Once again, the legal basis for the clearance 
of the aid measures under the EFSF is Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU.  
Recapitalisation schemes have been approved in 2010 under the 
EFSF. In a recent case, the Commission considers the proposed measure by 
the Greek government to be aid granted by an authority, the EFSF, which 
satisfies the imputability criterion and that state resources are used. The 
compatibility analysis is performed under Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU, as in 
the recapitalisation scheme already in place since 2008, because of a serious 
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disturbance in the economy.
250
 Also, 35 billion Euro out of the total 85 
billion Euro that the EFSF loaned to Ireland were granted as state aid to 
Irish financial institutions. It becomes clear that the Member States that 
entered the financial programmes funded by the EFSF will need more 
support in the future, and also other Member States may need support, 
consequently, the EFSF, which was established as a temporary fund, will be 
replaced by a permanent fund, the European Stability Mechanism 
(henceforward ESM). This permanent mechanism will have the same 
activities in the state aid field as the temporary mechanism had, and will 
enter into force once it is ratified by Eurozone Member States’ parliaments; 
however, it will be established as an intergovernmental organisation of the 
Eurozone Member States under public international law, rather than being a 
private company that is the EFSF.
251
   
The adoption of those measures has been criticised, of course, due to 
the fact that the EFSF is considered as a ‘bailout fund’; however, it is 
forbidden by the Treaty for Member States to bailout other Member 
States,
252
 and the legal basis of the fund is considered at least 
controversial.
253
 Despite the controversy, the Regulation that established the 
EFSF
254
 has put aside the criticism, by adopting the view that Article 122(2) 
TFEU is the legal basis for the EFSF, which allows the Union to provide 
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financial assistance to Member States, when they face difficulties caused by 
‘exceptional occurrences beyond its control’.255 Apart from the legal basis 
considerations the EFSF and the financial assistance have also been 
criticised for creating even more moral hazard, both for the financial 
institutions that keep being rescued, and for the governments themselves 
that receive aid; the last part though, is outside the scope of the current 
thesis. To conclude, there needs to be a return to normal market conditions 
as soon as possible, as far as financial institutions are concerned, and more 
support should be directed towards the real economy, by subsidising SMEs, 
R&D&I, infrastructure and networks and SGEI, instead of banks; such 
measures for the real economy will have positive effects towards improving 
the financial situation of Member States.   
 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the focus has been on the reasons that make state aid 
measures so attractive to Member States of the European Union. Specific 
attention was given to the influences of basic economic ideologies that 
shaped competition law, part of which is state aid. First, there was an 
analysis of the wider positioning of state aid control according to political 
economy theory; state aid is considered a protectionist instrument that is 
used by Member States’ governments to promote their industrial and 
economic policies. The research showed that state aid is not an independent 
procedure; it is shaped and transformed according to the special needs of the 
Member States’ economic policies, and is an instrument that is found in the 
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middle of the conflict of those in favour of protectionism and those that 
favour a more liberal economy.  
Secondly, there was an analysis of the objectives of state aid, which 
is used to correct market failures and to promote objectives of common 
interest. The chapter concludes that state aid is appealing to governments 
because of the positive effects on objectives of common interest, such as 
Research, Development and Innovation projects and others which promote 
environmental objectives. The research analysed the different kinds of state 
aid that the Member States have implemented in the past and their 
objectives; through the analysis of the data from the Scoreboards the 
conclusion is that Member States grant more aid to horizontal objectives 
that are considered less anti-competitive. Those types of state aid are closely 
connected with the economic, social and industrial policies of the states and 
also the availability of public resources; they are also used in conjunction 
with each other: for example, regional aid can benefit underdeveloped 
regions and promote employment as well in a certain area, or innovation aid 
can create new products and drive down prices as well, through intensified 
competition between technology companies. However, the positive effects 
were contrasted with the negative effects and the conclusion is that the 
positive and negative effects of state aid need to be balanced, in order for 
the outcome to be ultimately positive. This is the evaluation that the 
Commission has the power to perform in its investigations of aid measures, 
which will be the topic of the next chapter.  
Thirdly, state aid is not a static framework of rules, but it needs to be 
adapted to the current political and market conditions. There was a need for 
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a simplification of state aid rules in order to make them more effective in 
crisis conditions. The benefits and shortcomings of the implemented 
simplification were analysed, and also the effects of the financial crisis on 
the implementation of state aid rules. The conclusion is that simplification 
was necessary, but was not performed without problems. The fact is that 
state aid no matter how well targeted it is, always tends to distort 
competition and affect the functioning of a market, even when it is used to 
correct market failures. This is why it is now time to return to normal 
market conditions, as far as financial institutions are concerned, provide 
more support for the real economy and promote growth policies.      
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE LIMITS OF THE COMMISSION’S SUPERVISION POWERS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
TFEU) apart from, and in addition to the substantive rules on state aid, 
contains the basic procedural rules as well, without which the supranational 
state aid control regime would be incomplete. The Treaty rules on state aid 
seem to be constructed around the idea of a centralised control of subsidies, 
by one institution for the whole of the Union, as the most effective way to 
control state aid in the Member States. However, in more recent years there 
is a trend to decentralise state aid control and competition control in general.  
This thesis will analyse and compare the centralised and decentralised 
aspects of state aid control. In this chapter, the focus will only be in the 
centralised implementation of state aid policy of the European Union. This 
control consists of an administrative process that is usually called 
supervision by the Commission. It can be called the supranational aspect of 
state aid implementation, because it involves supranational authorities, 
namely the Commission, and supranational legislation, such as the Treaty 
and the secondary legislation adopted by the Union’s Institutions. In the 
beginning of this chapter, it is necessary to introduce the basic provisions of 
the Treaty that provide the powers of the Commission that place it in the 
heart of this policy’s implementation. The Treaty also provides for the 
adoption of more detailed legislation, as a way of enhancing the 
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implementation. This chapter will critically analyse the most important legal 
provisions that regulate the Commission’s competence to control subsidies. 
In other words in this chapter of the thesis the first research criterion will be 
applied: the thesis will test the speed and applicability of the state aid 
investigation procedures. Furthermore, the second research criterion will 
also be tested: the chapter will examine whether the rules that govern the 
Commission’s administrative procedures of state aid control fulfill the 
transparency requirement.   
This process consists of phases according to the type of aid that will be 
implemented. The control of subsidies at this stage involves two parties that 
both need to follow the relevant procedures, according to the type of aid. 
Those parties are the Member State that plans to grant aid and the 
Commission. The obligations of each party will be examined and the 
possible outcomes of the different phases will be distinguished. This is 
necessary in order to understand the structure of the supranational state aid 
regime, the powers of its players and their limits.  
Another characteristic of the supranational regime that will be included 
in this chapter is the recovery provision. Special focus should be placed on 
the issues concerning the Commission’s recovery Decisions because the 
weak spot of state aid policy implementation is the enforcement of recovery 
Decisions.
1
 The types of aid that the recovery decision is applicable to, will 
be made distinct from other types of aid that are not subjected to that 
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‘penalty’. Furthermore, it will be very crucial for the thesis to critically 
analyse how recovery actually works and the powers of the Commission and 
the Member States in this process, because it is the main method used to 
enforce decisions that declare aid to be incompatible. Finally, the chapter 
will critically analyse the defenses that have been invoked by the parties in 
recovery cases and their possible outcomes. 
Next, the chapter will embark on the distinction between public and 
private enforcement, by analysing the characteristics of the public 
enforcement. State aid can be enforced both by the state and state 
authorities, and then it is called public enforcement of state aid; also, it can 
be enforced by private individuals, and then it is called private enforcement. 
This chapter is limited to the critical analysis of the enforcement powers of 
the supranational authority.  Some general remarks on enforcement theory 
will also be examined so far as they are applicable to state aid enforcement.  
An examination of all aspects of the supranational state aid 
implementation regime means that this research will critically analyse the 
positive and negative characteristics of the administrative procedure of the 
Commission, whenever it examines state aid measures and also the 
Commission’s public enforcement powers. The analysis will begin with 
those characteristics that make the existence of the supranational control 
most necessary and effective, such as the unified procedures in a Union of 
28 Member States and contrast them with the inadequacies of this process, 
such as the realistic inability of one authority to control vast amounts of aid. 
The chapter will conclude on the limits of the Commission’s supervision 
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powers and procedures and introduce the research to the following chapter, 
which will continue to research the effectiveness of state aid control at the 
supranational level. The enforcement of state aid rules at the European 
Courts will follow in the next chapter.    
3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF STATE 
AID  
For the purpose of the analysis of the effectiveness of the state aid 
policy implementation, this thesis examines in this chapter the supranational 
part of the implementation of state aid law and policy, which is the 
European Union’s state aid regime. This part will be contrasted with the 
national aspect of the implementation of European state aid Control in 
chapters five and six. For the purpose of this research the supranational 
regime includes the public enforcement by the Commission and the judicial 
review by the Court of Justice.  
The national aspect which is the theme of the fifth and sixth chapters 
will include the powers of national authorities that deal with state aid at the 
national level and also the enforcement before national courts of the 
Member States. The research is not performed between public and private 
enforcement, but rather in a wider approach, between the supranational 
implementation and the national one.
2
 This gives the research a more 
thorough approach for the purpose of measuring the effectiveness of the 
implementation of state aid control.   
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3.2.1 Public enforcement by the Commission  
Public enforcement of state aid law at the supranational level is 
awarded to the Commission. Thus, the Commission is the ‘governmental’ 
bureau that has the ability to detect and ‘punish’ breach of state aid rules. 
The Commission, of course, is an institution of the supranational 
organisation of the European Union, and its powers come from the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. It is organised into Directorate 
Generals, and the one responsible for state aid control in most sectors of the 
economy is the DG for Competition.  
However, there are other DGs that share responsibility for the control 
of subsidies because some few sectors of the economy have different rules 
on state aid. Those sectors are the Agricultural sector, with responsibility for 
the control of subsidies in that sector belonging to the DG for Agriculture 
and Rural Development, and the Fisheries sector, with the responsibility 
belonging to the DG Fisheries of the Commission. In the past, aid to the 
transport sector was controlled by the DG Transport, but now it has passed 
to the DG Competition, because many of the general rules (GBER,
3
 de 
minimis rules
4
) are also applicable to aid in the Transport sector. This thesis, 
as was mentioned in the first chapter, has limited itself and excluded 
examination of the special rules for Agriculture and Fisheries.  
                                                 
3
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The Commission makes decisions as a body or it can authorise one 
Commissioner to make a decision.
5
 However, we can make the criticism 
that in the case of state aid implementation the Commission plays the role of 
investigator, prosecutor and judge at the same time. For those reasons it is 
crucial to secure the rights of the parties within such a centralised 
enforcement procedure.  
The other important point in the topic of public enforcement of state aid 
is the protection of human rights, which is central in any type of 
enforcement procedure. The Commission has wide powers to investigate 
state aid cases, given to it by the Procedural Regulation, if it has doubts that 
one of its decisions is not implemented properly.
6
 The ‘Procedural 
Regulation’ empowers the Commission to ‘enter premises,[...] to ask for 
oral explanations[..] and to examine books’ and other documents.7 The new 
Procedural Regulation extends the Commission’s powers to perform 
inquiries in a whole sector of the economy, across various Member States or 
for a specific aid instrument, if there is reasonable suspicion that it 
materially distorts competition and the internal market. Those new powers 
of inquire place the Commission under an obligation to state the reasons for 
the inquiry and the choice of adressees.
8
 At the same time the Member State 
is under an obligation to assist the Commission’s officials and experts with 
                                                 
5
 Currently the president is J M Barroso. J Almunia is the Commissioner who has the 
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their onsite investigation. All of those activities can potentially be highly 
infringing to individual’s human rights. Such powers are used in Cartel 
investigations already,
9
 but its application to state aid cases remains to be 
seen.   
At the same time, though, that the Commission officials are exercising 
those powers, the Commission is also under an actual obligation to examine 
the case in a diligent and impartial manner, according to the Court’s case 
law.
10
 During this examination, it is under the general obligation to respect 
the party’s right to a fair trial and a speedy procedure, which is provided for 
by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and by Article 47 of 
the recently adopted by the Union ‘Charter of Fundamental rights of the 
European Union’11 that is already binding. As a result, the Commission has 
to respect both the Charter and the Convention, and the parties can invoke 
them in a state aid investigation.  
Also, another important point in respect of human rights protection in 
public enforcement of state aid is the right to access files, which are held by 
any institution.
12
 The Procedural Regulation does not include a specific 
Article securing the parties access to the Commission files, as does 
Regulation 1/2003 for Competition cases.
13
 Instead, the Commission’s 
practice is to actually restrict the parties’ right to access files from a state aid 
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investigation, by claiming possible infringement of ‘business, or 
professional secrecy’. The Court has ruled in favour of protecting business 
secrets in state aid investigations, in line with previous case law.
14
 Such case 
law is the AKZO judgment, where it was held that a third party may not be 
provided with documents that contain business secrets, and that the relevant 
company may act to prevent that. This, of course, has practical implications 
for the third parties, and potentially infringes their human rights.  
However, the public enforcement of state aid reserves a more 
favourable approach for the Member State, which is involved in the state aid 
decision making process. The case law accepts that if the Member State has 
not been heard, it is possible to annul the Commission’s decision, because 
this right is provided for in the Procedural Regulation,
15
 and it is an essential 
part of the procedure. 
The new Procedural Regulation recognises the right of interested 
parties to submit complaints in a specific form. The purpose of this new 
procedure is to inform the Commission of any alleged use of unlawful aid or 
misuse of aid.
16
 The complainant, though, is placed under strict conditions 
to comply with a specific form; otherwise the Commission may not examine 
the complaint. The handling of complaints is a big innovation of the new 
Procedural Regulation,
17
 and it allows the Commission to focus on the most 
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potentially distortive measures; along with the new investigation powers 
into sectors or aid instruments. Those new investigative powers are 
considered ex officio,
18
 which means that they start on the Commission’s 
initiative, unlike complaints, after it becomes aware of significant 
distortions of competition that can potentially harm the internal market. 
3.2.2 Public enforcement by the Council  
The Council has some powers in relation to authorising aid. Article 
108(2) TFEU provides that the Council can declare aid that a Member State 
plans to grant as compatible with the internal market, after an application by 
the Member State. This power of the Council is restricted though, from the 
condition that the decision has to be made unanimously, and that there 
should be exceptional circumstances that justify this decision. Usually, this 
provision has been used for aid in the agricultural sector, but overall it has 
not been extensively used.  
The problems that might arise from such a decision on compatibility by 
the Council derive from the possibility of conflicts that might occur from a 
Commission decision on the same aid. The court has accepted that the 
Commission is the central player for the control of aid, and that the power of 
the Council is exceptional.
19
 The Council does not have the power to 
disregard a previous Commission decision of incompatibility on the same 
aid plan and decide that it is compatible. Nor can it decide after the time 
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limit of three months, set by the Treaty Article 108, if the Commission has 
started the examination of the measure.  
Another issue that might arise has to do with aid that was given as 
‘compensation’ for aid that was previously declared incompatible by the 
Commission and recovered. According to the case law, the Member State 
applied to the Council asking it to declare aid of the same amount and to the 
same recipient as compatible; aid that was previously declared incompatible 
by a Commission decision and that had been recovered. The Court, in that 
case, held that the Council lacked competence to declare the new aid 
compatible, because it would render the recovery ineffective.
20
 
 
3.3 THE ROLE AND POWERS OF THE COMMISSION IN STATE AID 
ENFORCEMENT  
Article 108 TFEU provides for the system of implementation of the 
procedural rules of state aid, otherwise known as enforcement procedures. 
Other important legislative documents, in this context of implementing the 
procedural aspect of state aid, are the ‘Procedural Regulation’ No 
734/2013
21
 and the ‘Implementing Regulation’ 794/200422, which provides 
details for the Commission’s competences. In addition Regulation 734/2013 
is directly applicable to the Member States, so there is no need for national 
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implementing measures for them to become applicable; the direct effect of 
Regulation 734/2013 makes its application easier and enforceable by the 
national courts as well.
23
 Also, the Procedural Regulation is applicable to all 
aid regardless of the sector of the economy that the aid is implemented.
24
  
Finally, it is expressed in the foreword of the amended Procedural 
Regulation that there was a need for amending certain procedures in order to 
make ‘the Commission more effective’,25 which is also similar to the aim of 
this research, which is to critically examine the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the state aid policy. Before the adoption of the 
Regulation, the procedures on state aid control were established by the 
Commission’s practice and the Court’s review; a practice which did not 
secure ‘transparency’ or ‘legal certainty’.26 Securing those two conditions 
has always been the goal of any reform, and the lack of them has been the 
main criticism for the Commission’s supervision.  
3.3.1 Ex ante control of state aid and ex post monitoring of aid  
It should be mentioned, from the forefront, that the Commission has the 
power to control aid both before it is implemented by the Member State and 
during and after its implementation. Article 108 TFEU grants the following 
types of powers to the Commission in relation to controlling aid: first, to 
control new aid that is notified to it and second, to monitor aid that has 
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already been implemented. This is a dual system of control: ex ante 
supervision of aid means examination of the proposed measure before any 
aid is granted. Ex post means monitoring of existing aid. The latter ex post 
monitoring means that the Commission is under an obligation and ability, at 
the same time, to make sure that cleared compatible aid remains compatible, 
and does not change, so that it produces negative results and distorts the 
market. It is possible for Member States to alter aspects of existing aid but 
also to defy the conditions, upon which the measure was declared 
compatible, by the Commission’s conditional decision. If there was no ex 
post control the whole system of supervision by the Commission would be 
undermined. Member states would be capable of having their aid measures 
approved and then altering them to become anticompetitive, if there was 
lack of control during their implementation. 
The measures that are in force, under the Procedural Regulation, to 
support the Commission in its powers to perform ex post monitoring of aid 
consist of the Member States’ obligation to submit annual reports to the 
Commission.
27
 There are detailed rules as to the content and form of those 
reports,
28
 so that those are effective in their purpose to help the Commission 
identify possible breaches of its positive decisions, on state aid measures. 
Also, the Commission has powers to make on site examinations,
29
 whenever 
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it has doubts as to whether the Member State complies with the obligations 
to notify aid, and to provide all the necessary details for the Commission to 
make its decisions on compatibility with the internal market. The 
Commission declared that the benefits of monitoring aid are important, 
because monitoring contributes to the ‘development of the single market.’30 
 3.3.2 Types of aid 
According to the supervision system set up by Article 108 TFEU and 
the Procedural Regulation aid is categorised into four different types. Each 
type has differences in the supervision procedure. The types are: new aid 
that is granted after accession to the Union; existing aid, which was first 
granted by a member State before its accession to the Union; unlawful aid, 
which is granted without prior notification to and approval by the 
Commission, and misused aid, which is authorised aid that has violated 
terms of its approval.
31
  
3.3.2.1 Aid schemes 
Another distinction, which is made by the Regulation, is that of aid 
schemes and individual aid measures.
32
 According to the Procedural 
Regulation both new and existing aid can be granted in the form of either an 
aid scheme or individual aid. A scheme can be approved as a whole, in 
advance, and particular aid measures to specific undertakings that form part 
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of a scheme need not be notified to the Commission, unless the 
Commission’s approval decision requires the contrary, which means that the 
measure should be notified as new aid.
33
 However, the Court held
34
 that 
when a member state grants individual aid as part of an approved aid 
scheme, it must make sure that the aid follows the criteria of the approved 
scheme.
35
 
The scoreboard shows that Member States grant more aid measures (in 
numbers of measures adopted) in the form of block exempted aid under the 
GBER and less individual measures that are individually scrutinized by the 
Commission.
36
 Though, when the criterion based on which the distinction is 
being made is the volume of aid, then the Member States grant more aid in 
volume through aid schemes: in 2011 aid granted through schemes reached 
55.1% of total aid to industry.
37
 This means that the Commission resources 
can focus on assessing ad hoc individual measures that are more distortive 
potentially.  
The State Aid Modernisation aims at orienting scarce public finances to 
growth generating measures. In this context state aid control can achieve the 
objective ‘to do less with more’ by modernising a number of soft law 
instruments, streamlining procedures with the amendment of the Procedural 
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Regulation and introduce the evaluation of aid schemes.
38
 The introduction 
of evaluation is deemed important because larger aid schemes can 
potentially be more distortive in the internal market
39
 and because of 
deficiencies in the implementation of aid schemes, highlighted by the 
Commission’s monitoring.40 Evaluation means the measured impact of aid 
schemes.
41
 The objectives of evaluating the impact of aid schemes in the 
market are: to assess the effectiveness of aid schemes, to verify the 
assumptions that led to ex ante approval of the scheme, to assess negative 
results and propose solutions and lead to better designed measures.
42
 This is 
a very interesting factor of the State Aid Modernisation initiative, because it 
will lead to better implementation of state aid control, which is what this 
thesis researches.  
3.3.2.2 New aid  
The classification of aid as new is an objective assessment. According 
to the Court all aid that is not existing in the sense that the procedural 
Regulation defines it must be considered new aid and the preliminary 
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examination procedure should be set in motion.
43
 When it comes to the first 
of those types, which is new aid, the main problem that occurs, in practice, 
is to distinguish between a new aid measure and an existing one. And that is 
difficult because according to Article 1(c) of the Regulation any existing aid 
that has been altered, since the approval decision, must be considered and 
dealt with as new aid. Changes of the granting bodies, or the recipients of 
the aid, and changes in the granting period, or the amounts of aid must be 
considered serious alterations that justify the aid measure to be considered 
new aid. In Keller and Keller, for example, the Court held that an ‘increase 
in the number of recipients’ of the aid that was approved was significant 
alteration that constituted new aid that should have been notified.
44
  
New aid according to Article 108 (3) TFEU has to be notified to the 
Commission, prior to implementation by the Member State granting it. This 
notification obligation is the basis of the Commission’s control powers. 
Without it, it would not be in the centre of state aid control. However, it is 
clear that the volume of aid measures in 28 Member States is too high for 
one institution to control. This is why the scope of notification has been 
limited over the years, by introducing the following exemptions. 
Only aid that fulfils all of the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU has to 
be notified, which is by itself a limitation to the notification obligation, 
since it excludes aid that does not fulfil all of the criteria. Also, another 
limitation to the scope of the notification obligation was materialised, 
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through the adoption of the De minimis regulation,
45
 which automatically 
exempted from the notification obligation a large number of measures. The 
De minimis Regulation was adopted by the Commission, not the Council, 
and the legal basis for its adoption was Article 2 of the Procedural 
Regulation. The Commission has established, through its experience in 
dealing with state aid cases, that small amounts of aid do not distort 
competition, and thus should be deemed as not fulfilling all of the criteria in 
Article 107(1) TFEU. However, the real reasons behind the adoption of the 
De minimis Regulation is to relieve the burden of investigating all measures 
as it seems to be the wording of Article 108(3) TFEU, which would be 
impossible today.
46
     
3.3.2.3 Block exempted aid  
The other exception from the notification obligation is the General 
Block Exemption Regulation (henceforward GBER),
47
 which consolidated 
previous sector specific Block Exemption Regulations. Once again, the 
main reason for the adoption of the GBER has to do with practical 
considerations, rather than legal ones. The Commission was and still is the 
receiver of hundreds of notifications of state aid measures each year that 
aim at commonly acceptable objectives. Such objectives have to do with the 
benefits of state aid that have been analysed in the previous chapter, and 
which do not harm competition. It is preferable that such measures are 
approved as quickly as possible, and the notification procedure would halt 
                                                 
45
 Commission Regulation (EC) 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, [2006] OJ L 379/5 
46
 L. O. Blanco (ed) EC Competition procedure (2
nd
 edn, Oxford OUP 2006) para 21-85. 
47
 Commission Regulation (EC) 800/2008 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty declaring certain categories of Aid compatible with the Common Market (General 
Block Exemption Regulation) (‘GBER’) [2008] OJ L214/3.  
161 
 
their application. The benefits of the GBER are mainly focused in 
guaranteeing growth and the creation of jobs for the Europeans. Among 
others, the GBER benefits aid to SMEs, the protection of the environment, 
the protection of disadvantaged regions, research and innovation and the 
promotion of equality between men and women, through incentives for 
women entrepreneurs.   
However, it should be noted that aid that has not been notified, due to 
its implementation according to the provisions of the GBER, is being 
monitored by the Commission after its implementation, for securing that the 
Member State is complying with the rules of the Regulation. Article 10 of 
the Regulation provides for an ex post monitoring of such aid schemes on a 
sample basis, so that proper enforcement of state aid is maintained. The 
Commission has performed such sample tests in an intensified way for the 
period 2011/2012 according to the Scoreboard.
48
 The findings are cause for 
concern.  Even though in previous versions of the Scoreboard the 
Commission claimed that the system of the Block Exemption 
implementation of state aid cases is functioning in a satisfactory manner, 
without giving further evidence,
49
 it now says that ‘there seems to be an 
overall increase in the number of problematic cases.’50 More than one-third 
of the cases monitored in 2011/2012 had problems
51
 either of non-notified 
modifications, compatibility conditions that had not properly been 
transcribed in the national legislation implementing the measure and others. 
                                                 
48
 State Aid Scoreboard Autumn 2012 update, COM(2012) 778 final para 5.4. 
49
 State Aid Scoreboard Autumn 2010 update, COM(2010) 701 final 68. 
50
 State Aid Scoreboard Autumn 2012 update, COM(2012) 778 final para 5.4. 
51
 Ibid. 
162 
 
Another worrying factor that arises from the monitoring of exempted aid 
measures is the varying level of compliance rates across Member States.
52
  
The last category of aid that has been exempted from the notification 
obligation, which is added to the growing list of exemptions, is aid granted 
as compensation for performing public service obligations; specifically, aid 
in this field is exempted either for certain categories of services (such as for 
hospitals and social housing), or for all other categories of public service 
compensation up to a certain amount of aid (currently, compensation up to 
fifteen million euro to providers).
53
 Again the justification for the exemption 
comes from the fact that such aid does not confer advantages to the 
receiving undertaking,
54
 and therefore can be exempted. It is clear from all 
those exemptions that, as the number of Member States rises, the 
Commission is eager to alleviate some of its implementing duties, in favour 
of targeting other, more harmful aid measures.
55
   
Another problem with the notification obligation is that only aid that 
can be deemed to be incompatible with the internal market should be 
notified. However, it lies in the Commission’s exclusive right to make that 
decision on compatibility, according to Article 107(1) TFEU. Member states 
and their authorities of any kind lack that competence. Thus, the question 
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that arises is how is a Member State able to conclude that a plan to grant aid 
would be considered incompatible, and for this reason to go ahead with the 
notification, to secure that the aid will not be subsequently characterised 
unlawful, if it is not properly notified?
56
 The answer to this problem is 
logically the pre-notification procedure, where a Member State can make an 
informal pre-notification, after which the Commission issues informal 
guidance on features of the measure that may be considered incompatible, 
and for this reason, eligible for notification.  
Under the State Aid Modernisation the Commission has adopted the 
Enabling Regulation,
57
 which allows the Commission to amend the GBER 
and add categories of aid to be exempted from notification in the future. 
Those categories are: aid for innovation, culture, natural disasters, sport, 
certain broadband infrastructure, other infrastructure, social aid for transport 
to remote regions and aid for certain agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
issues. The inclusion of those categories will broaden the application of the 
GBER
58
 further more, and more and more measures will escape the 
Commission’s ex ante scrutiny. This means that it is very important to have 
proper implementation of the ex post control and also, better understanding 
                                                 
56
 A Sinnaeve et al, ‘The new regulation on State Aid procedures’ (1999) 36 CMLRev 1153 
57
 Council Regulation No 733/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 994/98 
on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community to certain categories of horizontal State aid [2013] OJ L204/ 11 
58
 Commission Regulation (EC) 800/2008 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty declaring certain categories of Aid compatible with the Common Market (General 
Block Exemption Regulation) (‘GBER’) [2008] OJ L214/3 
164 
 
of the state aid rules by the Member States,
59
 which are criteria of this thesis 
for the evaluation of state aid control implementation. 
3.3.2.4 Altered aid  
However, the other crucial point is whether after the alteration it was 
necessary to notify the whole of the scheme from the beginning, or the 
altered part as a new aid measure. The consequence is that, if the whole of 
the scheme is not notified, the whole turns into unlawful aid. The Court has 
accepted that there should be notification of the whole scheme, except for 
cases, where the altered measure does not influence the decision, made by 
the Commission, and thus, when the altered measure can be separated from 
the whole scheme and notified individually.
60
  
This, of course, is a very fluid criterion by the court that can be 
interpreted rather widely in each case, especially, since the Procedural 
Regulation itself takes no position on the subject of altered aid notification 
obligations. The Implementing Regulation provides for a definition to what 
altered aid means to the Commission,
61
 which somewhat provides for some 
guidance as to whether there is need to notify; nonetheless a direct provision 
for the obligation to notify the whole scheme, after alteration, would be 
more favourable, for legal certainty. The definition of altered aid in the 
Implementing Regulation is very broad; The Implementing Regulation 
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defines alteration of existing aid as ‘any change other than modifications of 
a purely formal or administrative nature’62 however, it also allows for an 
increase of up to 20% of the amount authorised under the Commission’s 
decision. Such an increase should not be considered alteration and does not 
have to be notified individually.
63
 The Court held that alteration of the field 
of the beneficiary’s activity is not alteration of existing aid64 and also that 
guarantees from a different public body than the one that initially was 
included in the authorisation of the aid should not be notified.
65
  
3.3.2.5 Existing aid  
New and altered aid is distinguished from existing aid because the last 
category has different treatment in this implementing mechanism. Existing 
aid is all aid measures that were introduced before the entry into force of the 
Treaty for each member state, which is the date of its accession to the 
Union. Also existing aid the aid though must have been first granted by 
States before accession to the Union, and must continue to exist after 
accession. The treaty rules, in particular, do not apply before accession, so 
the Commission has no control over existing aid measures. The only power 
the Commission has on existing aid is for the future application of it.
66
 The 
most significant consequence of this is that there is a danger of not having 
the same standard of control to all EU Member States, because some aid, 
that is existing aid, cannot be subjected to the penalty of a recovery order by 
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the Commission, and is exempted from a notification obligation with 
everything that follows it.
67
 Also existing aid is aid that has been authorized 
by the Commission or the Council. The Procedural Regulation
68
 considers 
as existing aid, aid that would not fulfill the criteria of state aid when it was 
first put into effect but became state aid due to the ‘evolution’ of the internal 
market. The Court held that this must be interpreted as a change in either the 
economic or the legal framework of the particular sector.
69
 If the 
Commission alters its assessment method due to more rigorous state aid 
control the market has not evolved.
70
 
The Union rules on existing aid are really important during the pre-
accession period, when negotiations are taking place between the applicant 
State and the Commission, for the closing of the Chapter on Competition. In 
order not to allow the favourable handling of existing aid, against the 
interests of existing Member States, it was particularly important for the 
Commission, at the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1994, to 
control existing aid, in a manner that was credible. That was easy then, 
because those three countries were all Members of the EEA which is a 
supranational organisation that applies state aid rules, similar to the EU 
ones.
71
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However, ten new Member States acceded in 2004 that had no previous 
state aid laws, or equal supranational control mechanisms. The Commission 
established a two tier system for the control of existing aid at the pre-
accession stage of those ten countries. The applicant States, by establishing 
national state aid authorities, examined existing aid measures and submitted 
lists of those measures to the Commission; lists that were included in the 
Accession Treaties. Also, they recognised the power of the Commission to 
raise objections to those decisions of recognising existing aid by the national 
authorities, and thus, the supranational mechanism was again present to 
provide its high status of state aid control experience, as part of their pre-
accession obligations.     
If a member state alters existing aid then it must be treated like new aid 
and follow the notification procedure, which obligation the Court held that it 
should be interpreted strictly.
72
 If alteration is established then everything 
that applies to altered aid should be observed.  
3.3.3 The Standstill clause and its consequences.  
Articles 108(3) TFEU and 3 of Regulation No 734/2013 provide for the 
‘standstill clause’. What this provision requires is that the Commission must 
first decide on the compatibility of the measure, or must fail to make such a 
decision, within specific timeframes, after notification, and then the 
Member State is allowed to grant the aid. This requirement is the ‘standstill 
clause’, and it forms part of the notification procedure. The reason behind 
the adoption of this obligation is to secure the competencies of the 
                                                 
72
 Opinion of AG Wagner in Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren [1979] 
ECR 2161, p 2204 
168 
 
Commission, at the centre of the state aid control implementation 
mechanism. It also has a wider consequence, which is the protection of this 
mechanism itself.
73
  
The practical implication of this standstill clause is of course the fact 
that aid measures are not put into effect, and do not produce their possible 
distortive effects in the functioning of the internal market.
74
 It is a 
preventive measure, without which an incompatible state aid would have 
caused its harmful effects; effects that a coercive measure, such as the 
recovery decision would not repair.  
What happens to the standstill clause depends on the Commission’s 
decision. If it does not decide within two months, which is the timeframe of 
Article 4 of the Procedural Regulation, the measure can be implemented, 
because it is considered cleared. If the Commission reaches a negative 
decision, after the examination of the measure, the standstill clause is no 
longer in force, and the measure’s implementation is prohibited. If the 
Commission reaches a positive decision, the standstill obligation’s effect is 
terminated, and the measure can be implemented according to the decision.  
A problem that arises from the obligation not to put into effect a 
planned aid measure, until the Commission decides on it, or omits a 
decision, is to determine what can be considered an act of implementation of 
the measure by the Member State. This, of course, is important; because the 
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Member State may invoke that it has not implemented the measure in Court, 
in order to avoid the repercussions of a possible breach of the standstill 
obligation. The Regulations or the Treaty include no indication, but the 
Court has dealt with this issue a number of times. According to the Court, 
an act of implementation is the administrative or legislative act that enables 
the aid to be performed, even at a draft stage, and it is not necessary to 
prove that public money have been transferred to the receiving 
undertaking.
75
 This is certainly a wide interpretation of the scope of the act 
of implementation, which aims at securing the conformity of Member States 
with their notification obligations.    
A consequence of the standstill clause is that Article 108 (3) TFEU, 
which provides for the standstill obligation, also provides for the distinct 
competences of the Commission and the national courts, with regard to their 
powers to implement Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. According to established 
case law of the Court, the Commission and the national courts have 
complementary and separate roles in supervising member State’s 
compliance with their obligations, under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
76
 The 
Member State is obligated to enforce the standstill clause, because Article 
108(3) TFEU has direct effect, and does not require additional national 
measures to incorporate it into the national legal order. This means that the 
national courts can also directly enforce Article 108(3), when they rule on 
an aid measure, and make appropriate decisions to suspend the application 
of a measure, which is found to be in breach of the standstill clause.  
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In relation to the distinction between the competences of the 
Commission and the national courts, which derives from Article 108(3), as 
was explained above, it should be said, in brief, that the Commission’s most 
important competence is to assess the compatibility of the aid measure with 
Articles 107 (2) and 107(3) TFEU. The national courts, on the other hand, 
do not have competence to perform such compatibility assessment. Their 
role is to protect rights of those individuals, harmed by the implementation 
of unlawful aid, or in cases of recovery of unlawful aid.
 77
 
3.4 DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRELIMINARY AND FORMAL 
INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES 
The Commission after notification of a member State’s plans to grant 
aid, or after a complaint by a competitor of a firm that received non notified 
aid, starts the process of the preliminary examination of the measure.
78
 The 
Commission is under an obligation to decide on the compatibility of the 
measure within two months. This time limit has been adopted by the 
Procedural Regulation, and it incorporates the previous case law of the 
Court that has been followed, ever since the Lorenz
79
 case. If the 
Commission, after the preliminary examination, finds that the measure does 
not constitute aid, or if the measure is aid, according to Article 107(1) 
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TFEU, but compatible, according to the same Lorenz 
80
case, it is not bound 
to issue a decision.
81
  
After the expiration of the two month period with a positive decision or 
without any decision the Member State may implement the planned 
measure. However, this implementation cannot happen automatically. The 
State must give notice to the Commission that it plans to implement the 
measure and wait for 15 days before it actually does for the possibility that 
the Commission may raise objections. This second notification obligation 
has raised questions in the past as to what are the appropriate means for 
notification, such as fax or post.
82
 Nevertheless, the Commission and the 
Member States have adopted the online system for notifications, so those 
kinds of problems must have been minimised. Since 1
st
 January 2006 all 
notification are to be performed electronically through the Commission’s 
electronic State Aid notification system (State Aid Notification Interactive - 
SANI).
83
 If, during the preliminary examination, the Commission has 
doubts about the measure’s compatibility, it initiates the formal 
investigation procedure.
84
  
At this second stage, the Commission requests full information from 
the Member State concerning the facts of the particular case and gives 
notice to interested third parties to submit their comments. After the formal 
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investigation, the Commission may issue
85
 a positive decision or a no aid 
decision. The first means that there is aid, but is considered compatible with 
the internal market and the second means that the elements of aid have not 
been all fulfilled, according to Article 107 (1) TFEU. Also, it may decide to 
issue a negative decision or a conditional decision. According to the first, 
there is incompatible aid that must not be implemented and according to the 
second, the aid will be compatible, only if certain conditions are satisfied. 
The time limit for a Commission decision, after the formal investigation 
procedure is much longer than that of the preliminary examination, set to 18 
months.
86
  
Apart from the differences in time limits and procedural preconditions 
for the start and different outcomes of each stage, the main difference 
between the two phases was outlined by the Court: in the preliminary phase 
the Commission forms a first opinion on the measure, but during the formal 
investigation it requests full information from the member State, which must 
comply otherwise the notification will be deemed as withdrawn.
87
 Also, the 
preliminary phase is informal and it does not involve dialogue with 
‘interested parties’, but only with the member State that has notified the 
measure. Third parties can put their complaints forward in the formal 
investigation only.
88
 However, third parties have a time limit to put forward 
their complaints at the start of the formal phase, only as one of the sources 
of material information for the case concerned. Afterwards, the Commission 
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is not obligated to engage in exchange of conversations with the ‘interested 
parties’.89 
The final issue that arises from this analysis of the formal and the 
preliminary investigation procedures is who exactly can be considered as an 
‘interested party’? This ‘title’ is found in Court judgments and the 
‘Procedural Regulation’.90 It is awarded to any member State and any 
person [...] whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid’.91 This 
is not interpreted widely by the Court but only includes third parties whose 
competitive position in the market is affected.
92
 
The fact that there are two different subsequent procedures that may be 
implemented until the Commission reaches a final decision on a single state 
aid measure has proven to be a very lengthy process. The initial period for a 
decision after the preliminary procedure is two months
93
 and the period for a 
decision after the conclusion of a formal investigation procedure is eighteen 
months,
94
 if no extensions are agreed between the Commission and the 
Member State involved and no more information is sought. This means that 
at best a final decision will be delivered almost two years after notification, 
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or after initiating the procedure on its own, this is a lengthy process not very 
business-friendly, because it leaves the potential recipient in limbo for two 
years, expecting to receive aid that may never be received after all. 
According to the first research criterion timely procedures are necessary and 
the Commission seems to have failed so far to deliver timely decisions.  
The Commission attempted to simplify its procedures by adopting the 
Notice on a simplified procedure for certain types of state aid
95
 and the Best 
Practices Code.
96
 The Notice will be applied to notified state aid measures 
that comply with previous established decision making within the same 
framework, or guidelines. This of course pre-supposes a pre - notification 
contact
97
 of the Member State with the Commission, which will help it 
provide all the information necessary. This new pre – notification phase 
replaces the preliminary investigation at large and thus the Commission 
hopes to achieve the goal of delivering a decision within the Simplification 
package within twenty working days!
98
 
3.5 CRITIQUE FOR THE SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE 
The code of Best Practice, 
99
 which was adopted as part of the reform 
package envisaged in the SAAP in 2009, establishes another stage in this 
assessment procedure by the Commission. Indeed, section 3 of the code 
introduces the pre-notification stage, where the Commission and the 
Member State before notification can discuss notification matters and also 
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substantial issues of the measure.
100
 This new phase has been criticised 
because it leads to an informal non-binding ‘decision’ by the Commission, 
but one that influences the final decision, and which does not add to the 
efficiency of the process, because it can substantially delay the final 
decision by adding another step.
101
 
On the other hand, the Notice on the Simplified Procedure
102
 is a 
welcome step in the right direction for the purpose of making State aid 
implementation more effective and simple. It introduces a simplified 
procedure of control for cases that are based on standardised Guidelines or 
well established Commission decision making. It introduces a simplified 
procedure, which will lead to a decision in 20 working days, according to 
the Notice.  
3.6 THE DIFFERENCES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN 
MISUSED AND UNLAWFUL AID 
The first comment that seems worth mentioning in the case of unlawful 
and misused aid is that of the initiation of the procedure. In the case of new 
aid, the procedure starts with the notification by the Member State. In the 
case of misused aid, the notification happened before the aid was first 
implemented, but a change in the way the aid was used by the beneficiary 
undertaking has turned it into a new category. In the case of unlawful aid, 
there was no notification from the beginning of its implementation. The 
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answer to the question of what sets off the procedure in those two types of 
cases is any source of information given to the Commission.
103
 If such 
information is received, usually from a competitor, the Commission initiates 
the procedure of examination.  
The most notable difference is the absence of a specific time limit for 
the Commission to reach a decision, probably because it is more difficult for 
the investigators to acquire the information they require, since there is no 
notification with all the facts of the case in hand. This, though, has led in the 
past in considerable lengthy procedures that last more than six months, 
which has been allowed by the Court.
104
 During this long period of 
investigation the Commission can ask for interim measures to be enforced: 
the suspension of the use of the aid and the recovery injunction. A rare 
example for such a suspension injunction for unlawful aid was given by a 
case concerning the rather complicated and not so efficient Greek tax 
system.
105
 Also, more recently, a suspension injunction was issued for a 
Romanian privatisation plan of Tractorul, which was a tractor producer 
owned by the State. The Commission thought that the sale conditions 
constituted aid and ordered the Romanian government to suspend the aid.
106
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The recovery injunction
107
 is another interim measure that should be 
distinguished from the recovery decision. The injunction can be issued by 
the Commission in cases where it has no doubt that an unlawful aid
108
  is aid 
according to the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU, but it has still not decided 
on its compatibility. In addition, there must be a ‘serious risk of substantial 
and irreparable damage to a competitor’.109 Of course, this last condition 
makes it very difficult to apply the injunction, because it is very difficult to 
prove that there can be irreparable damage from aid to another 
undertaking.
110
 The final decision by the Commission in both unlawful and 
misused aid is that it can lead to a final recovery decision, which is taken 
after the formal procedure has concluded with a negative decision. This 
brings the chapter to its next step in the analysis of the administrative 
implementing procedure of state aid, which is the recovery obligation of 
illegal aid.  
3.7 WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RECOVERY?  
 The legal basis for the recovery decision is currently Article 14 of 
the Procedural Regulation, which leaves the Commission with no discretion, 
than to order recovery. The wording of the Article: ‘Where negative 
decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide 
that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to 
                                                 
107
 Article 11(2) of the Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty 
[2013] OJ L-204/15 
108
 The recovery injunction is not applicable to misused Aid. 
109
 Article 11(2) of the Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty 
[2013] OJ L-204/15 
110
 Up to October 2013 the recovery injunction has not been implemented by the 
Commission. 
178 
 
recover the aid from the beneficiary’111 leaves no discretion; in case the 
Commission reaches a negative decision for unlawful aid, it shall order the 
recovery. That is contrary to the situation before the adoption of the 
Regulation. In the past, recovery was only recognised by the Court as an 
option, available to the Commission, which could ask for the repayment of 
the unlawfully paid aid. That is the meaning of the phrase ‘may include an 
obligation to require repayment’, which can be found in the first ever case to 
recognise such powers to the Commission.
112
 
The two characteristics, not notified aid and incompatible aid are the 
necessary preconditions for the issuing of a recovery decision. More 
specifically, it is not possible to order recovery, just because the aid was not 
notified; it has to be declared incompatible too.
113
 Recovery can be ordered 
for both unlawful and misused aid, because misused aid is also not notified 
aid. However, the Commission is obligated not to order repayment if the 
facts of the specific case make recovery contrary to a general principle of 
Community law.
114
  
The Procedural Regulation accepts that the Commission cannot 
order recovery if that decision would go against a general principle of Union 
law. Hence, it is only natural to examine which those principles might in 
fact be.  
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3.7.1 Recovery and the principle of legitimate expectations 
It has been held that the repayment obligation imposed by the 
Commission for incompatible aid that was not notified does not breach the 
principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
115
 This principle of 
legitimate expectations has been declared a superior rule of law by the 
Court, and if breached, during any procedure, by any institution, it can lead 
to the institution being liable for that breach, and possibly annulling the 
relevant decision on the ground of that breach. This is why it is almost 
always invoked in recovery hearings. But for it to apply there must be some 
conditions met: firstly, there must be a union act or conduct that allows one 
to have a legitimate expectation and secondly, the prudent trader could not 
foresee the decision that affects his business.
116
   
Because of the mandatory nature of the procedure of state aid control 
laid down in Article 108 of the TFEU, specifically imposing the notification 
obligation, the Court, in most of the cases that it has been invoked before it, 
held that there is no legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful, if the 
procedure of Article 108 TFEU was not followed.
117
 And the test for 
determining if the procedure should have been known and if it was followed 
is the diligent businessman who should know, if it was followed or not.
118
 
This means that almost whenever there is no notification the beneficiary 
should expect a possible recovery decision, after the negative decision.  
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In a series of cases the principle of legitimate expectation has been 
rejected again. In particular, the Commission had given three successive 
positive decisions for aid given by the French State to CELF, which is a 
company promoting French culture worldwide. All of those three positive 
Commission decisions were annulled by the Court of First Instance (CFI)
119
 
and the ECJ (now the General Court and the Court of Justice of the Union), 
when it was called to judge the case held that the succession of three 
positive decisions and their annulments cannot allow the recipient to have 
legitimate expectations that the aid is eventually compatible. On the 
contrary, the Court held it should raise doubts about its compatibility.
120
 
3.7.2 Recovery and the principle of legal certainty 
Another conflict that may arise from a recovery decision is that with 
the obligation to respect the principle of legal certainty. The question that 
arises is if Member States do not notify, can they rely on the principle of 
legal certainty to annul a recovery decision? Usually, the court decides that 
they cannot rely on the principle of legal certainty and they will have to 
enforce the recovery decision, even in atypical measures.
121
 In one case 
though, the recipient invoked the principle of legal certainty before the 
Court, against a Commission decision to recover aid, because the 
Commission had taken more than 26 months to reach that decision, and it 
claimed that this delay had created a certainty and an expectation that the 
                                                 
119
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aid was legal. The Court accepted that argument, and declared the 
Commission’s decision void as a whole.122 
The only argument that the Commission and the Court can accept as 
a valid reason for which a Member State has not complied with the recovery 
obligation of unlawful and incompatible aid is the defence that it was 
absolutely impossible to implement the decision.
123
 However, that argument 
alone does not stand in the Court. In addition, the Member State has to 
demonstrate that it has taken any necessary steps to implement the decision, 
and has proposed to the Commission any alternative steps to overcome the 
difficulties that it faced in its efforts to realise the recovery.
124
 
3.7.3 Efficient implementation is a precondition of repayment.  
From the last analysis it is evident that recovery of illegal aid has to 
be implemented in the most efficient way possible. The Commission’s 
decision would be without substance, if it did not include strict conditions 
for its implementation. Especially, since there is no supranational procedure, 
its implementation is largely left to the competence of national authorities 
and their national laws and administrative procedures.
125
   
There may be no supranational procedure for repaying unlawfully 
paid amounts of aid to the State budget, but the Procedural Regulation lays 
down the rules. According to the Procedural Regulation, the procedure to 
refund the aid should achieve recovery from the beneficiary without delay 
and should respect national legal procedures, only if those achieve 
‘immediate and effective execution’ of the Commission’s recovery 
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decision.
126
 It was said that this Article ‘is an expression of the principle of 
effectiveness’127 in Union law, which limits the autonomous character of the 
national provisions, if they are not effective to achieve the results envisaged 
in the Union law. This Article is the legal basis behind the Commission’s 
practice to include in every recovery decision a phrase that basically 
reproduces the text in Article 14(3) of the Procedural Regulation, but it does 
not impose specific time limits, within which the recovery must be 
completed at the national level.
128
   
 
3.8. PROBLEMS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY 
DECISIONS 
Notoriously, recovery has not been a successful procedure in state 
aid enforcement. The Commission’s Scoreboard shows that the situation is 
improving in the implementation of the recovery decisions. The table 1 at 
the Appendix shows that between 2000 and 2012 the Commission adopted 
172 recovery decisions for the total of Members States. In 30/6/2012, 128 of 
those cases were closed, which means that aid in 44 cases is still to be 
recovered.
129
 The number of recovery cases, still pending in 31.12.2004,
130
 
was 93,
131
 which shows the progress that was made. Table 3 is even more 
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revealing perhaps because it shows the percentage of illegal and 
incompatible aid that has yet to be recovered. At 2012, that figure stands at 
14.4%.
132
 Compared to the almost 50% that was still pending to be 
recovered at the end of 2004,
133
 it shows that there have been steps in the 
right direction, when it comes to enforcing state aid recovery decisions. 
Even though the situation is improving it is necessary to examine the 
problems that hinder implementation of recovery decisions. 
When it comes to enforcing state aid recovery decisions a lot is left 
to the competence of Member States, under some conditions of course. In 
many cases, the Member States have been unwilling or unable to effectively 
and timely conclude the repayment of the illegal aid that was instructed by 
the Commission in a negative decision. Member states usually argue that 
they have difficulties, with problems relating to the issue of who should be 
held responsible for making the repayment, especially in large aid schemes. 
Other problems have been encountered with provisions of national laws and 
the appropriate form of the repayment. More particularly in Commission v 
Greece
134
 the Court rejected the argument of the Greek government that 
repayment of illegal tax exemptions should be made by a form of retroactive 
tax, and favoured repayment in amounts of cash equivalent to the illegal aid.  
Years after the previous case, Commission v Greece,
135
 the Court 
returned on the matter of suitable form of repayment and clarified whether 
forms other than cash are suitable. In Commission v Germany
136
 the Court 
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affirmed that repayment of illegal aid can be made by means, other than 
cash payments. In that case, Germany was required to recover aid which 
consisted of the difference in the amounts of remuneration actually paid, 
with the ones that would have been paid in market conditions, for the 
transfer of a state bank to the WestLB bank. Germany proposed that the 
surplus of the WestLB should be distributed to the shareholders, and that 
should be considered as completion of the recovery obligation. The Court 
set the criteria for finding compliance with the recovery obligation, when 
means other than cash payments are to be implemented by the Member 
States: the measures must be transparent so that the Commission can assess 
their ability to eliminate the distortion of competition.
137
 In Commission v 
Germany the conditions that the Court set were not met so the Court 
rejected the proposed measure of ‘recovery’ as unsuitable.138  
Also, there have been significant delays in the implementation of 
Commission recovery decisions in the past and the Commission tried to 
overcome those delays by inserting Article 14(3) in the Procedural 
Regulation.
139
 However, it did not go far enough and it did not establish 
specific timeframes even after the amendment of the Procedural Regulation 
in the context of the 2012 Modernisation initiative. The Court though, in 
most cases, has accepted such time-frames, which are included in 
Commission recovery decisions, as a time limit for the execution of the 
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decision.
140
 In Commission v Greece the Commission requested to be 
informed, within two months, of the measures Greece has taken to enact the 
recovery, and the Court accepted that Greece had failed to comply with the 
recovery decision ‘within the prescribed period’.141   
Another problem may arise for the recovery if the national 
administrative procedures that implemented the Commission Decision are 
annulled. In Scott v Ville D’Orleans,142 the Administrative Court of Nantes 
in France sent a preliminary question to the Court, asking it whether 
annulment of national assessments done for the repayment of aid where 
compatible with Article 14(3) of the Procedural Regulation that provides for 
recovery without delay and effectively by the national authorities. The 
problem would be that, if the national assessments were to be annulled for 
procedural reasons, the recovery would have no legal basis and would have 
to be reversed. 
The Court replied that the national measure could be annulled, if it 
did not have as a consequence the repayment of the illegal aid to the 
beneficiary. If on the contrary, the annulment resulted in the beneficiary 
regaining the illegal aid, even provisionally, it would mean that the 
anticompetitive advantage would be reinstated and thus, annulment of 
national measures would be incompatible with Article 14(3) of the 
Procedural Regulation that would prevail as a supranational rule of law.      
 The whole system of implementing state aid law by the Commission 
is an ex ante system, that tries to prevent illegal aid from being granted, so 
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that it does not produce the negative results that have been presented in the 
previous chapter of this research. It is based on the notification of a plan to 
grant aid. This is how the implementation procedure should be ideally. 
However, the positive effects of state aid in the national economies of 
Member States and the lack of knowledge or capability as to the correct 
procedure contribute to the fact that a lot of aid still escapes the 
Commission’s control. Consequently, this is a big inefficiency of the 
supranational state aid regime, which was acknowledged by the 
Commission in its Notice on recovery.
143
  
 
3.9 THE NOTICE ON RECOVERY AND HOW IT AIMS TO 
OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS  
 
The most notable novelties in the implementation of recovery 
decisions brought by the Notice on Recovery are the following: firstly, the 
Commission has recognised that the two month limit that it used to set for 
the execution of its recovery decisions has proved in practice to be 
unenforceable as being too short. Therefore, it introduces a four month limit 
divided in two separate phases. In the first phase, all the relevant 
information from the Member State concerning the plans for 
implementation of the recovery must have reached the Commission, within 
two months of the decision. Afterwards, there is another two months, in 
addition, for the Member State to actually execute those notified plans.
144
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This of course is a small but inevitable retreat by the Commission, which 
instead will focus its attention on what could be done, after it has found that 
a Member State is unwilling to comply.    
The next most important step in improving the implementation of 
aid recovery decision attempted by the Notice is the application of the 
‘Deggendorf’ principle. By virtue of the Court’s findings in the case TWD 
Deggendorf v Commission,
145
 the court has allowed the Commission to 
order the suspension of new compatible aid aimed at a recipient that still has 
to repay an older illegal aid. This new ability for the Commission has been 
translated into a principle that the Commission intends to enforce with 
added determination, since it can prove rather efficient for the purpose of 
persuading Member States and aid recipients to repay incompatible aid. 
Last, and most importantly, the Notice declares the determination of 
the Commission to make use of Article 228 of the EC Treaty (now Article 
260 TFEU).
146
 According to the Treaty, if a Member State is found by the 
Commission to be infringing one of its decisions, it can lodge proceedings 
in the Court according to the Article 226 EC (now Article 258 TFEU). If the 
Member State is found not to be complying by the Court, then the 
Commission can bring another case before the Court, this time based on 
Article 228(2) EC (now 260 TFEU), if it considers that it continues to not 
comply with the Court’s judgment. According to Article 260 TFEU (228 
EC), the Court, if it once again finds non-compliance by the Member State 
can impose ‘a lump sum or penalty payment’.  
                                                 
145
 Case T-244/93 and T-486/93 TWD Deggendorf v Commission [1995] ECR II-2265. 
146
 Notice from the Commission – Towards an effective implementation of Commission 
decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State Aid [2007] 
OJ C272/4 para 74. 
188 
 
This punishment can be rather harsh, and can be imposed for any 
kind of breach of Union decisions, not only in the field of state aid. 
Enforcement of Member States’ obligations under the TFEU can be 
reinforced by the application of Article 260 TFEU.
147
 After the adoption of 
this practice, there was the first case, where both a lump sum and a periodic 
penalty have been imposed on a Member State for non-compliance with the 
recovery decision. This is the case Commission v Greece,
148
 which will be 
commented next, as it marks the start of strict enforcement of recovery 
decisions in certain cases. Following that first judgment, a periodic penalty 
and a lump sum penalty of €30 million were imposed on Italy on the basis 
that it did not recover employment aid, which means that this instrument 
will be used to achieve compliance from the Member States with 
Commission Decisions.
149
  
 
3.10 CRITIQUE ON THE CASE COMMISSION V GREECE
150
 
From the beginning it should be mentioned that the wording of the 
Article 260 TFEU ‘may impose a lump sum or penalty payment’, if 
interpreted literally, means that it is only possible to impose one punishment 
or the other. However, the interpretation of the Court in a previous case
151
 
has resulted in accepting the cumulative application of both punishments, 
for the same infringement, and thus, both punishments were imposed on 
Greece in the specific case. The Court rejected the argument that both 
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punishments would be disproportionate, because of the duration of the 
infringement and the severity of the distortion of competition.
152
 The 
decision in this case was adopted by the Court in 7 July 2009 but the 
application against Greece was filed in 3 August 2007, two years before the 
financial crisis hit the country, so it would have been impossible for the 
country to argue that it faces difficulty in paying the financial sanctions, 
imposed on it, due to the country’s financing problems.153 However, it 
might have been possible for the Court to take the current situation in 
consideration, if the crisis was present at the time of the judgment.
154
  
Moreover, in the past the Court has accepted that, when making its 
decision on calculating penalties, it is not bound by the Commission’s 
recommendation on the sums of cash to be recovered. Instead, it has 
discretion to fix the sums, taking into consideration and into proportion the 
breach and the ability of the Member State to pay.
155
 One can argue that this 
has not happened in Commission v Greece given the dire state  of the Greek 
public finances, or that the Court’s decision should be challenged in the 
future on that ground.  
More recently though, in case T-52/12R,
156
 the President of the 
General Court temporarily suspended a Commission Decision
157
 ordering 
recovery of illegal aid that Greece granted to farmers that suffered damage 
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from natural causes. The reason for granting interim relief from recovery 
was the financial and social situation in Greece: the Court held that due to 
the exceptional circumstances that the member state (Greece) is facing 
priority should be given to preserving the economic and social peace and 
concentrating government tax collection resources to their tax collecting 
task.
158
  
After this Order the question is whether other Member States will 
successfully overturn recovery orders by claiming social and economic 
unrest before the Court? The Order of the President of the Court in Case T-
366/13
159
 rejected the French Republic’s motion to apply the Opinion in 
Case  T-52/12 R, because the circumstances where not similar.  It has been 
said that since the Court seems, from the above Order, reluctant to assist the 
Commission to focus its resources to serious distortions, which is a priority 
under the State Aid Modernisation, maybe this will lead to a two-speed state 
aid control: less disturbed economies might have to endure more severe 
judgments, if disturbed ones can avoid recovery.
160
  
The other noteworthy characteristic in the case Commission v 
Hellenic Republic
161
 is that Greece has successfully argued that the defence 
of set - off is valid, as a possible method of implementing recovery 
decisions in state aid cases. It only failed to prove that defence, for certain 
amounts of aid that it had been ordered to recover. In other words, it failed 
to prove that sums of the aid had in fact been set-off, with other sums that 
                                                 
158
 Order of the President of the Court of 19 September 2012 in Case T-52/12 R Greece v 
Commission [2012] ECR 0 (NYR) para 54. 
159
 Order of the President of the Court in Case T-366/13 R France v Commission [2013] ECR 
0 (NYR) para 51. 
160
 Leigh Hancher, ‘Editorial - State Aid Recovery – A New Public Order? [2013] 1 EStAL 1, 4 
161
 Case C-369/07 Commission v Hellenic Republic [2009] ECR I-5703 
191 
 
the Hellenic Republic owed to Olympic Airlines, according to the 
provisions of national law. Even so, it still did not execute the recovery 
decision for those sums four years after it was first issued.  
The Court accepted the Commission’s proposal to impose both a 
lump sum and a periodic penalty, and that the calculation of the sanctions 
should be based on the criteria of the serious nature of the infringement, the 
duration of the infringement and the need to set a deterrent for the future.
162
 
All of those criteria are set in a Commission Communication
163
 that applies 
to all cases of application of Article 228 EC (260 TFEU), not just state aid 
cases. In the specific case, the Court exercised its discretion rather harshly, 
and ordered Greece to pay a lump sum of two million Euro,
164
 even though 
the Commission’s recommendation was 10,512 Euro;165 which is a huge 
increase. Even so, the Commission’s method of calculating the fine, as it is 
set out in the relative Communication
166
 has been criticised because it 
includes in its conditions the Member State’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and the voting rights in the Council, which is a political and not an 
economic factor, likely to raise the fines in some cases.
167
 Those are the 
basic points of concern raised by this key case according to this research.  
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3.11 THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE SUPRANATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OF STATE AID CONTROL 
In this chapter, so far, this thesis examined the competences of the 
Commission in implementing EU state aid law. The Commission is in the 
centre of the control of state aid at the Union level. It is an institution of a 
supranational organisation that has the competence to adopt legislation on 
state aid, an ability deriving from the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. This system of state aid control, as it has been presented so 
far, is characterised as a centralised system, with the Commission having 
powers to adopt legislation and to enforce that legislation. It is opposed to 
the decentralised, were each Member of the supranational organisation has 
established national authorities, which have competencies similar to the 
Commission. It is true that there are positive effects from having such a 
centralized system of state aid control. Those positive characteristics are: 
3.11.1 Same standard of implementation of state aid rules in 28 
Member States. 
The biggest benefit of a centralised system of implementation of legal 
rules is that it ensures that the same standards are being applied to all 
Member States, regardless of their individual characteristics, or their status 
as a new or old Member of the Union.
168
 It also ensures that the same 
standard is applied to all cases that have common legal and factual 
characteristics, regardless of their ‘nationality’, or whether they affect small 
or large countries, small or multinational corporations.  
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The importance of this same standard of implementation is highlighted 
even more, when it is contrasted with 28 different national procedures that 
currently exist for the purpose of recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid. 
It has already been mentioned that those different national procedures have 
appeared as problems, which bring obstacles to the execution of recovery 
decisions. Such systems have ultimately been criticised by the Court, 
because of their complications and delays.
169
 On the other hand, the part of 
the recovery process that is left to the Commission’s competence has 
specific timeframes that need to be followed.   
3.11.2 The centralised control of state aid strengthens the internal 
market.  
The centralised character of the control of state aid has also been 
considered beneficial for the implementation of the internal market.
170
 State 
aid is planned and implemented by national governments, which, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, have their own national economic agendas to 
execute. Agendas that sometimes might clash with the policies of other 
Member States, or even with the common goal that should be the 
effectiveness of the internal market.  
The basic economic characteristic that the Union is founded on is the 
creation and preservation of the internal market. This achievement has 
demolished the barriers between the Member States and created an internal 
market for trading across the 28 Member States. It is necessary to keep 
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competition running in the internal market and for that to happen there 
needs to be a supranational authority that can control and coordinate the 
national authorities whose action may harm competition; by having 
supranational state aid control the national state aid measures are limited 
and their effects on the market can be controlled. Thus competition 
increases and the undertakings can achieve economic growth. In return, the 
internal market is becoming more integrated
171
 and the benefits are seen in 
the growth of the Union’s economic indicators. 
3.11.3 The Commission as an independent examiner and decision 
maker in state aid cases.  
Moreover, the supranational authority that is the Commission is not 
easily influenced by local interest groups that need to promote their 
interests; interests, which might be more easily realised through subsidies. 
Even though, in modern times, lobbyists are particularly targeting 
authorities such as the Commission to achieve their goals, it still must be 
easier to influence a national authority, than a supranational one, which 
employs thousands of employees.      
The Commission at the centre of a supranational regime is independent 
of such national goals and has the power vested in it by the Treaty to take 
decisions of incompatibility, and even impose sanctions in the case of 
recovery for example. All of those actions can limit the Member States’ 
freedom to implement their fiscal and industrial policies, but at the same 
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time can benefit the evolution of the Union by maintaining a fair and 
effective internal market.
172
  
3.11.4 Cooperation between the Commission and the parties results in 
better decisions.  
Furthermore, the control of state aid that is performed by the 
Commission sets higher standards of implementation and of handing-over 
justice. The Commission’s process ensures that non – State actors of the 
state aid implementation mechanism get the chance to put their comments 
forward, even with the limited scope that we have seen in the preliminary 
and final investigation processes.  
Those non – State actors are ‘players’, other than the state planning to 
implement the specific aid project, and include the ‘interested parties,’173 
namely, competitors and other Member States with interests in the case. The 
information they provide is helpful for the Commission to reach a fair 
decision and actually helps it along the process of enforcement and judicial 
review of its decisions.
174
 The Court has accepted this obligation of the 
Commission to ‘engage in talks with [...] third parties’ in order to overcome 
difficulties.
175
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3.11.5 The supranational authorities have more experience and ability 
to be more flexible in state aid cases.  
Beyond the legal and political benefits that the supranational 
implementation of state aid brings for the Union, there are practical issues 
that need to be mentioned. The Commission and the Court have been 
adopting legislation and implementing the control of subsidies for decades 
now. It is a well-established fact that the supranational authorities have 
accumulated much experience and are better qualified to examine complex 
issues of state aid matters, especially when detailed economic analysis is 
needed. This is why the examination of compatibility lies in the exclusive 
competence of the Commission and not in the competence of the national 
courts.
176
  
Furthermore, there is also a network of national contact points that co-
operate with the Commission and provide information for individual state 
aid cases that help the Commission to make its assessments on 
compatibility. Those assessments need to be sound because they are crucial 
from the start of the investigation, with the preliminary examination and 
even after the final decision and into the possibility of recovery. 
 More importantly, the Commission has the ability to be more flexible 
than a court and much more flexible than a national authority that may be 
influenced by a number of political factors and by possible social 
implications that derive from subsidies. The supranational mechanism’s 
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most significant benefit was highlighted recently: it can be adapted swiftly 
to tackle new market conditions, such as a pan- European or even a 
worldwide systemic crisis. Without the supranational rules and procedures 
on state aid, the European governments might have been unable to reach an 
agreement on a common solution to the problem. And even with the 
criticism that was made to the crisis framework in the previous chapter, the 
fact remains that the Commission did react swiftly and possibly prevented a 
subsidy race. 
 Finally, the supranational implementation of state aid takes under 
consideration wider implications of aid on the internal market, such as 
consumer protection that the national courts are not obliged to protect when 
judging state aid cases. The Commission’s soft law is constantly adapted, 
expanded and improved to include the respect of Union objectives from 
state aid rules, such as the promotion of employment in the Union and the 
promotion of the environment and of the Union’s objective to become the 
most advanced knowledge based economy by 2020.
177
 Specific rules and 
Block exemptions
178
 that have been adopted at the supranational level help 
target state aid to those objectives, rather than the most harmful measures. 
By way of national legislation and procedures the benefits would not come 
fast enough, or in the best way possible for all Member States, given some 
economic divergences that would hinder new ideas to be implemented. 
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In practice, the benefits of recent Commission priorities, such as the 
adoption of the new General Block Exemption Regulation are evident in the 
wider implementation of state aid control. Throughout 2009 and 2010, there 
has been significant increase in the number of block exempted measures,
179
 
which means that there was more space left for other more distortive 
measures to be scrutinised by the Commission.  However, the centralized 
control of subsidies has negatives effects too. 
3.12 THE NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
SUPRANATIONAL STATE AID MECHANISM 
3.12.1 Practical difficulties for the supranational authority. 
Article 108 TFEU requires that all aid measures should be notified to 
the Commission, before being implemented by Member States, save for the 
aid in the exempted cases that have been examined earlier in the chapter.
180
 
In general, those exemptions from the notification obligation can be 
confined into three categories; de minimis aid, measures that fall into the 
provisions of the GBER and finally individual measures that can be covered 
by an authorised scheme.  This gives the power to the Commission to be the 
authority in state aid control. It also obliges it to examine all new aid 
measures that the Member States plan to introduce. Having a Union of 28 
Member States, this means that the Directorate General for Competition of 
the Commission would have to have an army of employees, working 
exclusively on notified and not notified state aid cases. It is revealing that 
from 2000-2011 the Commission took 986 decisions on unlawful aid 
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alone.
181
 The latest data released by the Commission about numbers of 
notifications of aid measures indicate that the numbers range from 595 in 
2010, when national budgets were rationalised to 912 in 2006, which was 
pre- crisis.
182
 
This data shows a significant increase in the numbers of measures that 
the Member States are implementing, which means that the Commission is 
faced with a workload that it would not be possible to address effectively. 
The effective implementation of state aid cases requires not only clear 
proceedings but speedy ones too. With such a workload it would be 
impossible to deliver quality decisions, within the time limits. This is the 
biggest disadvantage of the supranational regime. Given that the numbers of 
Member States have increased significantly over the past decade, with the 
expansions of the Union in 2004 and 2007 and more countries on their way 
to accession,
183
 those numbers of state aid measures will certainly increase 
in the future.  
It should be added at this point that state aid was chosen as a means to 
tackle the financial crisis in 2008, which is drawn from the fact that there 
were additional measures worth up to 353.9 billion euro only during 
2009,
184
 though, that number has dropped significantly; in 2011 crisis aid is 
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worth €31.7 billion.185 Somehow, though, the supranational mechanism still 
managed to overcome the practical difficulties and emerged on top of the 
situation, even with the crisis in full effect. Of course, this happened 
because the Commission had already acknowledged that the numbers 
imposed a limit to its competences quite early.  
In the Report on Competition for 1998 the Commission basically 
admits that ‘Given the high number of aid measures the Commission has to 
assess, it must inevitably concentrate on major cases involving large 
amounts of aid or new legal issues’.186 This need prompted the adoption of 
the Procedural Regulation, which was adopted after a political settlement 
with the Council in order to help modernise state aid monitoring.
187
  
To overcome those practical difficulties the Commission started 
introducing legislation and soft law instruments that would enable it to 
distinguish between the least anticompetitive forms of aid and the ones that 
distort competition and affect the internal market the most. Those 
instruments have been the Notice on de minimis aid, the General Block 
Exemption Regulation and other simplified procedure documents that have 
already been presented. The aim of all of those is to help relief the 
supranational authority with the overload it was facing. 
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3.12.2 Limits to the abilities of the Commission imposed by the 
primary, secondary legislation and soft law and conflicts with other 
Union Institutions. 
The Commission has faced other problems concerning the 
implementation of state aid rules. The Treaty Articles on state aid have not 
been detailed enough to be implemented on increasingly more complex state 
aid measures that have been introduced by Member States. Therefore, the 
Treaty itself that empowers the Commission has been a limit to it as well. 
To overcome those problems, the Commission once again resorted to 
adopting more detailed legislation to clarify and make the implementation 
of state aid more transparent. In most preambles of new legislation 
documents the Commission justifies their adoption as a means of promoting 
effectiveness and transparency in state aid control.
188
 
Moreover, the nature of the legislative process in the European Union 
has been a limit on the supranational state aid regime. The Commission 
might have powers and autonomy to implement soft law legislation 
nowadays. However, its powers to adopt legislation has not always been a 
given, as it will be evidenced from the following incident, between the 
Commission and the Council. It is true that the Commission’s competence 
to adopt rules on state aid lies in the Treaty, but the extent and length of 
those powers are unclear. In 1966 and in 1972 the Council rejected the 
Commission’s proposals for draft regulations on the Procedure of State aid 
                                                 
188
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control and to exempt certain categories of aid from notification.
189
 Then in 
1990 it was the Commission that rejected proposals from the Council 
President of the time for the Commission to submit a proposed regulation 
that would give powers to the Council to set criteria for the evaluation of 
state aid cases. The Commission felt that the Council was overstepping its 
powers, and interpreted its own powers for the first time, as giving it the 
exclusive authority to specify Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU (then 
Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty).
190
 From the analysis that preceded it is 
clear that the Commission’s powers in state aid control were challenged in 
the past by other institutions. This challenge forced the Commission to 
concentrate all the decisive power where state aid is concerned, which 
paved the way for the adoption of all the soft law legislation that has 
fragmented the state aid policy. This section again has been a case where the 
second research criterion of coherent legislation has not been fulfilled.   
3.12.3 The supranational implementation of state aid policy is 
extremely concentrated into one authority.   
However, one other negative characteristic of the supranational 
mechanism is the powers of the Commission. Because the members of the 
Commission are not elected
191
 by the European people, it can be said that 
the institution of the Union that is the Commission lacks democratic 
legitimisation. The Commissioners are appointed by the governments of the 
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Member States, and are currently being approved by the European 
Parliament, in an effort to bring more democracy in the institutions of the 
Union. This lack of democratic legitimisation affects state aid control 
especially, because of the centralised character of the mechanism foreseen 
by the Treaty. The Commission has gathered too many powers related to the 
implementation of the Union’s state aid policy. 
As it was already analysed in this chapter, the Commission has the 
power to adopt new legislation concerning the future application of state aid 
rules. This includes the regular proposals to other institutions for the 
adoption of Union legislative acts, such as Regulations; this power also 
includes the adoption of its own soft law legislation, such as guidelines and 
Frameworks, which are increasing in quantity but also in importance. The 
problem with soft law is the ambiguity of its legal status. It does not have 
the status of Directives and Regulations, which can be directly applicable. 
Some of the soft law instruments are only binding on the Commission and 
not the Member States. Although, the Commission has found ways to make 
the Member States accept its Notices and Guidelines and thus make them 
binding on them.
192
 Also soft law is only adopted by the Commission 
without it having to consult with the other institutions as in the regular 
legislative procedure for the adoption of Regulations for example. This 
creates the problem that the Commission can guide the polices of the 
Member States through its soft law and also force them to accept them, 
without anyone having any control over this process.   
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In addition, the Commission has the power to investigate specific 
measures adopted by the Member States, when it initiates the preliminary or 
the subsequently the formal investigation procedures. As we have seen, 
those powers can even take the form of a proper enforcement agency, with 
rights to access individual premises and even e-mail accounts. 
Consequently, and most importantly, apart from making the rules, the 
Commission is the enforcer of those rules as well. It has the power to make 
decisions on individual cases, which may reach as far as penalties, such as 
the penalty in Commission v Greece.
193
 Being the legislator, examiner and 
judge is never good in a democracy, especially when third party rights are 
not always being enforced successfully.
194
 It is, however, beneficial that 
other institutions, such as the Court have the power to review Commission 
decisions to ensure the rights of the individuals involved in state aid cases. 
3.12.4 Problems with the rights of third parties in the investigation 
procedures of the Commission 
With regard to the respect of private party rights, it should be noted that 
the Union procedures, in general, have been criticised, because they are not 
open to the public and more importantly to the interested parties themselves. 
This is another problem in the implementation of state aid rules.
195
 
According to consistent case law from the Court, the parties to a state aid 
investigation under Article 108(2) TFEU are the Commission and the 
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Member State implementing the aid measure;
196
 even the beneficiary of the 
aid has not been given the status of the party in the Commission’s 
investigation procedures.
197
 The investigation is performed between the 
Commission and the Member states. This has negative consequences to 
everyone else affected by the aid, since everyone, other than the Member 
State granting the aid, has no access to the Commission’s files for reasons of 
professional secrecy. 
The CFI (now General Court), though, has passed a judgment
198
 that 
could potentially give a solution to the problems occurring from the fact that 
the Procedural Regulation does not allow ‘parties’, other than the Member 
State, to access the Commission’s  files regarding a specific case that the 
‘party’ has a legitimate interest in. The Court has applied, in a state aid case, 
the Transparency Regulation,
199
 which is applicable to all EU cases, not just 
state aid. This Regulation forces the Commission to give reasons for 
restricting the party’s access to file documents. In the same case, the Court 
has basically overridden the shortcomings of the Procedural Regulation, in 
relation to its poor treatment of third parties, by applying a more general 
rule of law. If that principle would be applied in the future, in state aid cases 
it would be a step forward.
200
 However, the CFI’s judgment (now General 
Court) was annulled, and the Court held that the third parties under the 
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Procedural Regulation do not have rights to access files in the administrative 
procedure of state aid control, run by the Commission.
201
 After this first 
judgment, the Court confirmed the Commission’s Decision to reject the 
requested access to documents in the Commission’s files for the alleged 
state aid that Ryanair received.
202
 The reasoning of the Court was that the 
investigation was still ongoing.
203
 The second research criterion that 
requires transparency in the Commission’s procedures has not been fulfilled 
in this context of state aid control.    
 The Commission is not obligated to hear the concerned parties’ 
comments in the preliminary stage, under Article 20 of the Procedural 
Regulation.
204
 Consequently, if a case is closed at that stage, as it happened 
in Athinaiki techniki AE v Commission
205
, without opening the formal 
investigation procedure, the complainant, which in that case was a 
competitor, did not have the opportunity to be heard, which affected his 
right to challenge the no aid decision by the Commission. It is true that, at 
the preliminary stage, the right of defense is not recognised to third parties 
in state aid cases, and some believe that this is a negative aspect of the 
Procedural Regulation that should be revised in a future amendment of this 
Regulation.
206
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3.12.5 What problems can arise from conflict of interests between the 
Commission and the Member States?  
Also, another limit put to the supranational regime are of course the 
Member States and their interests, which might not always match the 
interests of the supranational authorities. The Member States’ governments 
are democratically elected representatives of the people of Europe, whereas 
the Commission is an administrative authority that is constantly being 
criticised for not having a democratic basis. Ministers, as politicians, want 
their plans to be approved, so that they can show to the electorate that they 
have represented them well and have served their interests. Whereas, the 
Commission is, or should be concerned with applying the policies it has set 
for itself.  
The Commission’s policies and the Member State’s own national 
economic policies have not always been compatible. After Lisbon
207
 and the 
adoption of the State Aid Action Plan
208
 the Commission set as an objective 
of the state aid policy to have ‘less and better targeted’ state aid in the 
future. The State Aid Action Plan is a soft law document that is not binding 
on the Member States. It is only providing guidance for the way that the 
Commission will pursue the examination of aid measures in the future.  
However, this objective of state aid control might interfere with the 
Member States’ economic policies. As it was introduced in the first chapter 
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of the thesis,
209
 the Council adopted the position for less aid to be granted to 
undertakings. Nevertheless, the Commission cannot force Member States 
governments’ to grant state aid to specific purposes.210 The decision to grant 
aid to any undertaking is still a power that lies with the Member States. If it 
will be compatible with the internal market is for the Commission to decide 
according to the Treaty. What the Commission can do is to give guidance as 
to which measures are deemed to be considered more competition friendly 
and thus approved by its examination.    
Furthermore, it should be noted that in trying to avoid state aid rules, 
Member States have introduced new forms of aid measures, such as tax 
exemptions, which have made it difficult for the Commission to capture all 
illegal or unlawful aid. In its pursuing of transparency and legal certainty, 
the Commission has adopted numerous soft law documents, such as 
guidelines and sector frameworks. The result though, today, is that the soft 
law adopted by the Commission is too much and toο detailed,211 and might 
clash with the purpose it was supposed to serve. Legal certainty could be 
compromised in aid measures, such as a scheme that would require the 
application of many different sets of rules, substantive and procedural. It is 
evident from the above analysis that the Commission’s choice of 
implementing state aid control through soft law has not benefited the 
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coherence and transparency of the state aid rules and procedures, so the 
second research criterion has not been fulfilled in this case either.    
A further negative aspect of the supranational mechanism has to do 
with the ability of the Commission to be autonomous again, but not against 
other EU institutions; this time against Member States. The Commission is 
required under the Treaty to propose to the Member States all the necessary 
measures that it considers are required, in order for it to implement its 
obligations to State aid control, as transparent and effectively as possible.
212
 
Those measures (usually in the form of guidelines and frameworks) are 
introduced and altered, according to the evolution and the changes that 
happen in the internal market, which is the ultimate goal of the Union and 
all of its policies. Sometimes, the Member States have not been willing to 
co-operate with the Commission in respect of the adoption of those 
guidelines and frameworks.  
The process of adopting those soft law documents is as follows: the 
Commission proposes them to the Member States, and then they have to 
accept them, in order for them to be considered valid. If a Member State 
does not accept a proposed Framework for the control of aid, in a particular 
sector of the economy that is accepted by all others, and that Framework 
subsequently enters into force, the Commission opens the formal 
investigation procedure for all aid in that sector by that Member State, in 
order to make it accept it.
213
 This procedure can be considered to be 
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bordering with a threatening behaviour, which should not have any place in 
a democratic process of adopting new legislation, even soft law.  
This is exactly what happened when Sweden had rejected a Framework 
for the application of state aid in the motor vehicle industry. It was the only 
Member State to reject it. The Commission then initiated the formal 
investigation procedure for all existing aid in the motor vehicle industry in 
Sweden, which could have resulted in decisions against the interests of 
Sweden. Eventually Sweden accepted the Framework and the case was 
closed.
214
 The Court has also accepted the legal character of such guidelines 
and Frameworks in the state aid control, as ‘measures of general 
application’215 that are in force, for as long as they are adopted for, or 
prolonged by Commission decisions. As such, they cannot be considered 
altered by individual decisions on specific state aid cases, but must be 
changed with a specific decision by the Commission on their existence.
216
 
3.12.6 Limits imposed by inefficiencies of the enforcement mechanism 
Lastly, and more importantly, the effective implementation of state aid 
policy by the supranational regime presupposes effective enforcement of the 
Commission decisions. This means that Member States that have been 
found in breach of its decisions should be forced to implement the necessary 
measures to enforce those decisions. Enforcement of decisions for illegal aid 
as we have seen means repayment of the amounts that have been paid into 
the beneficiary of the aid. It is also true that enforcement of recovery 
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decisions has encountered many problems in the past; a fact that sets 
another limit to the effectiveness of the implementation capabilities of the 
supranational state aid regime. 
To overcome those difficulties the Commission proposed a three step 
approach: firstly, it will monitor more closely the application of recovery 
decisions, and when it finds that recovery does not comply with the 
conditions of effectiveness and timely manner, it will activate the 
procedures under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, that have been examined in 
the Commission v Hellenic Republic
217
 case. Secondly, it will further 
promote transparency in its decisions and procedures, something that has 
started to happen through the adoption of the Simplification package,
218
 for 
example, and also help establish national state aid authorities or contact 
points in Member States. Thirdly, it will co-operate with national authorities 
and ‘train’ them in having a better knowledge of state aid rules, so that they 
can design better national measures.
219
  
From the last three points made by the Commission itself, it is evident 
that the supranational regime recognises its own shortcomings and limits. 
Those can be distinguished and summarised in legal limits from gaps in the 
relevant legislation, such as the inadequacies of the Procedural Regulation, 
in limits imposed by players in the supranational state aid law mechanism, 
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and finally in limits that occur in the implementation of the rules and 
procedures in real life conditions. The conclusion is that the answer to those 
problems might be in further reform of the relevant rules, which will correct 
some of the gaps. However, it becomes apparent that the implementation of 
state aid law and policy might need to always include national laws, 
authorities and courts as equal partners with the supranational ones.  
3.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to discover the limits of the supranational 
mechanism of state aid control. The results provide the thesis with the 
problems that need to be dealt with, in order to make the implementation of 
state aid more efficient within the European Union. 
The legislation of the Union both primary and secondary, that is the 
Treaty and the legislation adopted by the Union’s institutions, complete the 
supranational administrative procedure for the control of state aid, as it is 
dictated by the Treaty. This legal framework has evolved over the years, and 
has codified the Court’s case law, aiming at making Union law more certain 
and transparent. Those two characteristics are constantly set by the 
Commission as the conditions for improving the supranational regime with 
the aim to make it more efficient. The State Aid Modernisation has 
improved the handing of complaints but has not reinforced the position of 
third parties during the preliminary and formal investigation procedures. 
The Modernisation has also improved the rules for the evaluation of larger 
aid schemes, which potentially are more distortive than individual aid 
measures. The Modernisation has also potentially exempted more types of 
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aid from the notification obligation, which means that there is need for 
better designed measures on behalf of the Member States and more effective 
ex post monitoring from the Commission, so that illegal aid is recovered.  
Through the application of the first research criterion, which was set as 
the speed and applicability of the state aid procedures the thesis performed a 
critical analysis of legislation, case law, procedures and powers of the 
‘players’. This chapter has found the positive characteristics of the 
supranational state aid regime, such as the strengthening of the internal 
market and the ability to bring flexibility to the rules when needed by 
market conditions. The negative characteristics of the supranational control 
of state aid were also analysed, which explain why the supranational regime 
has not always been considered successful enough. The conclusion of this 
chapter has been that the rules on state aid have become too complicated in 
trying to serve the need for transparency and legal certainty. As it has been 
analysed in paragraph 3.6 of this chapter, the absence of a time limit by 
which the Commission’s administrative procedure should have been 
finished has led in the past in considerable lengthy procedures that last more 
than six months, which has been allowed by the Court. The procedures and 
the enforcement of the rules do not address the complexity of the aid 
measures implemented by Member States; there is further need for reform 
of the implementation of state aid law at the supranational level, and also 
there is a need for co-operation with the Member States. The Commission’s 
decisions can be reviewed in the European Courts and the Courts’ 
jurisdiction will be critically evaluated in the next chapter of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AID RULES IN THE COURT OF 
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(henceforward Court) are the two institutions that share competence in 
enforcing state aid rules at the supranational level. Both of those institutions 
have distinct competences, awarded to them by the Treaty and the 
secondary legislation; however, both comprise the supranational mechanism 
for the control of state aid. In the previous chapter, the thesis analysed the 
enforcement powers of the Commission and the problems that arise from 
those Commission procedures in the field of state aid; This chapter will 
critically examine the powers of the Court in enforcing state aid control, and 
thus complete the supranational aspect of state aid control, which comprises 
one aspect of this thesis; the other being the national aspect of state aid 
control.  
In this chapter, the thesis will mainly apply the third research 
criterion, which seeks to evaluate the robustness of the enforcement of state 
aid law at the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter will 
perform a brief analysis of the general status of the Court in the European 
Union, in order to better understand its powers in the field of state aid, 
which is a Union policy. Also, the different types of actions that the Court 
has jurisdiction to hear will be analysed, which will help the research to 
conclude on the way the Court’s case law can affect and possibly direct or 
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even shape state aid policy. Another issue that will be raised in this chapter 
will be the difficulty in gaining standing in the Court. This is a substantial 
problem for competitors and third parties that may want to defend their 
rights in the European Court. The difficulty in gaining standing might 
explain the low levels of state aid cases that are being brought before the 
Court.  Finally, the last issue that will be raised is the Court’s problems to 
order interim relief, as a way of restoring the damage suffered temporarily, 
until there is a final judgment.  
 
4.2 THE STATUS OF THE COURT IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER.  
Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon,
1
 which is the latest amendment to 
the Treaties, introduced some changes to the establishment of the Court. It is 
now officially called the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
consists of three courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court (first 
established in 1988 as the Court of First Instance) and the Civil Service 
Tribunal (established in 2004).
2
 Only the Court of Justice and the General 
Court have jurisdiction to rule on state aid cases. The subject matter of the 
Civil Service Tribunal is limited to cases concerning disputes between the 
Union and its civil servants.  
The mandate of the Court, given to it by the TEU, is to ‘ensure that 
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’.3 
More specifically, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction in the following 
cases: when a national court submits reference for a preliminary ruling by 
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the Court;
4
 when a Member State fails to comply with an obligation under 
Union law;
5
 when the annulment of an act, adopted by a Union institution, is 
sought;
6
 when an action is brought against a Union institution for failure to 
act,
7
 and finally when actions for damages are lodged against Union 
institutions, for non-contractual liability, caused by the enactment of the 
Institution’s duties. Also, the Court decides on appeals on points of law, 
against decisions of the General Court.
8
 Contrary, The General Court has 
jurisdiction to rule, in first instance, on several of those cases, such as the 
review of the legality of acts of the institutions, a Member State’s action 
against an institution for failure to act and the award of compensation for 
damages caused by Union’s institution decision.9    
 
4.3 THE SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IN RELATION TO 
STATE AID CASES.  
The Court may be called to judge a case concerning the 
implementation of a state aid measure. The first type of state aid case before 
the Court can be a reference to the Court by a national court, for a 
preliminary ruling. Another type of case can be an action from the 
Commission against a Member State, for failure to comply with an 
obligation, conferred upon it by the Treaty Articles on state aid; thirdly, an 
action for annulment of a Commission decision on state aid may be brought 
before the Court. Fourthly, actions for damages against the Commission 
                                                 
4
 Article 267 TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47.  
5
 Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47.  
6
 Articles 263 and 264 TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47. 
7
 Articles 265 and 266 TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47. 
8
 Article 257 TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47.  
9
 Article 256 TFEU [2012] OJ C326/47.  
217 
 
may be brought, for harm caused by the performance of its duties, 
concerning state aid; a Member State may bring an action against another 
Member State for failing to comply with a state aid obligation, and finally, 
an action may be brought against the Commission for failing to act in a state 
aid case.  
All of those forms of actions are possible and admissible by the 
Court, but all of them do not appear frequently in the case law. Each 
individual action will be critically analysed in the next paragraphs, and then 
the possible problems in the Courts proceedings will also be examined, 
which might explain why some types of actions are not that common in 
enforcing state aid before the Court of Justice.   
 
4.4 STATISTICS OF THE JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON STATE AID ENFORCEMENT 
In the last five years (2008-2012) that data exist, the Court of Justice 
has had a stable number of new cases, ranging from about 562 to 688.
10
 
Throughout the five year period, the trend is that the number of references 
for a preliminary ruling filed by national courts is rising. Additionally, it is 
the most common type of case that the Court of Justice deals with, 
(regardless of the subject matter), whereas, the number of direct actions is 
dropping.
11
 This means that the Court has less chances of making direct 
rulings on EU law cases, and thus fewer opportunities to directly influence 
the development of EU law with its case law. Certainly, preliminary rulings 
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are to be respected by the national courts that request them, but it is for the 
national court to ultimately judge, and possibly interpret the Court’s 
preliminary ruling.   
More specifically, out of the 632 new cases that were admitted in the 
Court of Justice in 2012, which was the most recent year that such data was 
published at the time of writing, only 28 had state aid as the subject matter 
of their action.
12
 In the same year (2012), the number of cases that were 
admitted in the General Court that had state aid as their subject matter was 
36 out of a total of 617 new cases,
13
 which amounts to roughly 5.8 per cent 
of the total number of new cases. Those numbers can lead to two 
assumptions: first, that the enforcement of state aid in the Court is at a low 
level in quantity, and that the General Court is currently more involved in 
state aid enforcement than the Court of Justice.  
The reasons for such a small amount of enforcement will be 
examined in the following paragraphs of this chapter. This observation is 
important because the Commission is currently promoting enforcement of 
state aid at national courts, but enforcement in the Court of the European 
Union is not exactly thriving. Either everything is running smoothly in state 
aid policy, or there are problems that force interested parties to turn away 
from seeking enforcement of state aid decisions more vigorously. The 
results of the research that have been presented so far and the problems that 
occur in the implementation of the state aid policy show that more changes 
need to happen.    
 
                                                 
12
 See table 5 in the appendix.  
13
 See table 6 in the appendix.  
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4.5 TYPES OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS OF STATE AID RULES IN 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU. 
State aid cases can be brought before the Court in many forms of 
actions. Some are more common than others: the most common ones are 
actions against Member States, preliminary rulings and actions for 
annulment of Commission decisions in the state aid field. Those types of 
actions will be analysed next, in the context and the specific needs of state 
aid control.  
4.5.1   Commission actions against Member States 
Member states have certain obligations under EU law; primary law 
and secondary law imposes those obligations to Member States, which have 
to comply with the provisions of Union legislation, in areas where the Union 
has competence, exclusive or shared with the Member States. Competition 
law, whose one part is state aid, is an area of exclusive competence of the 
Union, which means that the Union has power to adopt legislation, or 
empower Member States to legislate in the field of Competition law.  
In the context of state aid, the Commission has powers to safeguard 
the Treaties and the application of EU law. However, Member States for 
various reasons sometimes fail to comply with the provisions of certain EU 
legislation. When a Member State fails to comply, the Commission has 
power to bring infringement proceedings before the Court. According to 
Article 17 (1) TEU (which has effectively replaced former art. 211 TEC, 
which awarded the Commission with the title of Guardian of the Treaties), 
the Commission has the obligation to ensure proper application of Union 
law. This Article is the legal basis for the Commission’s powers to seek 
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enforcement actions against Member States.   However, due to limited until 
recently investigative powers and resources the Commission had to rely on 
complaints in order to initiate enforcement procedures against Member 
States in the field of state aid.
14
 The new Procedural Regulation
15
 aims to 
grant more investigative powers to the Commission by way of introducing 
for the first time a legal basis for launching investigation into sectors or 
certain instruments, across Member States.
16
 At the same time, the State Aid 
Modernisation aims to enhance complaint handling by setting out a detailed 
procedure, by which complaints will be dealt with.
17
 The application of 
those provisions and their effects on state aid control remains to be seen.  
4.5.2 What are the consequences of infringement of State Aid rules?  
In general, all enforcement procedures against Member States for 
failure to fulfil an obligation under the EU treaty are brought before the 
Court by the Commission, having as a legal basis Article 258 TFEU (former 
Article 226 TEC),
18
 regardless of subject matter. This Article applies for 
failures to fulfil Commission state aid decisions, but it has been criticised in 
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 Richard Rawlings, ‘Engaged elites Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in 
Commission Enforcement’ (2000) 6(1) European Law Journal 4, 5. 
15
 Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [2013] OJ L-204/15 
16
 Article 20a of Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty 
[2013] OJ L-204/15 
17
 Article 20(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty 
[2013] OJ L-204/15 
18
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ 
C 83/47 art 258: ‘If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving 
the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.  
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by 
the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.’ 
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the past for creating a rather complex enforcement system:
19
 the 
Commission may become aware of infringements of state aid law from 
complaints made by third parties; subsequently, it must filter those 
complaints, and decide to act on the most distortive infringements.
20
 It sends 
a letter to the Member State asking it to comment on the complaint.
21
 
Article 20(2) of the Procedural Regulation
22
 also applies to complaint 
handling. According to it, if the Commission decides that the facts and 
points of law put forward by the complainant interested party are not 
sufficient enough to open a prima facie examination, the Commission must 
ask the party to submit comments within a month. If no comments are 
submitted the complaint is deemed to have been withdrawn. The handling of 
complaints must be diligent and impartial
23
 and this requirement is 
connected with the principle of sound administration that the Commission, 
just like any other administration in a state governed by the rule of law, 
must obey.  
If the Commission does not open the formal investigation procedure 
after all this procedure has been performed, then the complainant can pursue 
enforcement in the Court, by challenging the Commission’s failure to act. 
The Court has held that it is sufficient that the applicant’s interests might be 
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 R Rawlings, ‘Engaged elites citizen action and institutional attitudes in Commission 
enforcement’ (2000) 6(1) ELJ 4.   
20
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 Eric Morgan de Rivery and Liliane Gam, ‘Judgment of 13 September 2010 in Greece 
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affected and it is a rather broad definition, which includes any number of 
competitors.
24
   
This initiation of the enforcement procedure by the Commission is 
considered to be centralised and not the most efficient at all times.
25
 The 
reasons for that, as this thesis has already presented in chapter three, is that 
the Commission has neither the necessary resources or the time to detect all 
infringements; additionally, it might be influenced politically, or through 
lobbying by economic actors and favour certain Member States or certain 
cases.
26
 The procedure under Article 258 TFEU (former Article 226 EC) has 
been criticised for being politicised
27
 due to the nature of the procedure, 
according to which there are negotiations with the member state before a 
Decision is made by the College of Commissioners, if there is a Decision at 
all. Usually the Commission rejects the political character of the procedure 
by saying that there was no infringement in the first place. Those negative 
effects of the centralised enforcement affect the Court’s performance as 
well. It is evident from the small numbers of state aid cases that not all 
infringements of state aid law are subjected to the judicial review of the 
Court.  
However, apart from Article 258 TFEU (former art. 226 TEC) there 
is another legal basis available to bring an action before the court, which 
applies only to infringements of state aid law. This is the procedure 
available to the Commission to bring an action against a Member State 
                                                 
24
 Case C-78/03P Commission v ARE [2005] ECR I-10737, paras 35 and 36. 
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 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law text cases and materials (3
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 ed OUP 2003) 401. 
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 For further analysis on the issue of the negative characteristics of centralised 
enforcement procedures see chapter three, paragraph 3.12.  
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 Melanie Smith, ‘Enforcement, monitoring, verification, outsourcing: the decline and 
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according to Article 108 (2) TFEU.
28
 There are some differences in the 
procedure of each action and the scope of application of the two different 
legal bases available for actions against Member States, in cases of state aid 
law infringement. Firstly, the procedure of Article 108(2) TFEU requires 
more formalities,
29
 than a simple letter to the Member State as the procedure 
of Article 258 TFEU requires. Those formalities included in the procedure 
of Article 108(2) TFEU are the following; firstly, all interested parties must 
submit observations and therefore the Commission is fully informed of the 
facts of the case. Secondly, Article 108(2) TFEU results in a faster 
application to the Court, without having to go through the stage where the 
Member State has to submit its ‘observations’ to the Commission and the 
Commission has to adopt a reasoned opinion. This faster process is a much 
easier administrative process for the Commission.
30
  
The question is whether the Commission is free to choose whichever 
legal basis for any type of infringement of state aid law or is it bound by any 
provision to choose one over the other? Article 23(1) of the Procedural 
Regulation
31
 seems to dictate that the Commission should follow Article 
108(2) TFEU, whenever the Member State does not comply with a 
conditional or a negative Commission decision, which orders recovery of 
unlawful aid.  
                                                 
28
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What happens though in all other cases? It seems more appropriate 
to always use the more specific procedure of Article 108(2) TFEU in all 
state aid cases, since it is lex specialis compared to Article 258, which is lex 
generalis for all EU law infringements. Especially, whenever the 
compatibility of the aid measure with the internal market is in question, the 
Court has held that the Article 108(2) TFEU procedure should be followed, 
because of the guarantees that it offers to all parties, which is specifically 
designed to overcome the problems created by the compatibility issues; 
however, the Court does state that the Article 258 TFEU procedure is not 
precluded even in this type of cases.
32
 The case law, though, suggests that 
whenever there is failure to notify new aid the procedure in Article 258 
could be more beneficial, but not obligatory.
33
 The assumption is made by 
the wording of the Court’s conclusion: ‘the Commission may avail’ from 
Article 258 and it is not obliged to bring an action under that Article rather 
than 108(2) TFEU.  
4.5.3 The procedure and effects of a Court judgment finding failure  
to comply either under Article 108(2) TFEU or 258 TFEU. 
Once proceedings have been initiated before the Court, regardless of 
the legal basis used in actions against Member States for failure to comply 
with state aid decisions, the remedies available for the Member State and the 
defences are largely the same for both. First of all, it should be noted that 
the vast majority of cases have to do with the Member State not complying 
with a recovery order by the Commission. In trying to justify its failure to 
comply with a recovery decision the Member State cannot plea before the 
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 Case 290/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR 493, paras 16-17.  
33
 Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-3125, para 34.  
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Court of Justice that national provisions or practices made it impossible to 
comply.
34
 The only plea that would be admissible if proven will be that it 
was absolutely impossible for it to comply.
35
  
In all possible cases of failure to comply with state aid law, the 
Member State cannot plea in a proceeding against it that the Commission 
decision, with which it failed to comply, is illegal.
36
 In other words, an 
indirect plea over the validity of a Commission decision is not admissible in 
proceedings for breach of Union law by Member States. The Court had the 
opportunity to state the reasons for that inadmissibility many times: the 
Treaty distinguishes between the remedies offered for Article 258 and 
Article 260 proceedings (which provides for actions against the validity of 
Union institutions’ acts). Those remedies have ‘different objectives and are 
subject to different rules’.37   
It is rather unfortunate that usually an action against a Member State 
and an action against the validity of a Commission decision are brought 
before different courts. The first action is brought before the Court of Justice 
and the second before the General Court. Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer makes an interesting point: before the establishment of the General 
Court the problem was non-existent, since both actions could be brought 
                                                 
34
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before the same court and the Court heard both actions at the same day.
38
 
Now that there are two Courts, the answer to this problem could not be for 
the Court of Justice to stay proceedings until judgment for the validity is 
reached by the General Court, because the Article 278 TFEU actions before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union do not have suspensory effect.
39
 
The only situation that the Court has accepted that the invalidity of a 
Commission decision is the reason for a Member State’s non-compliance is 
when there are ‘serious and manifest defects’ in the decision, which would 
render it non-existent.
40
 Only then can the Court rule on the validity of a 
state aid decision, in a case where the state is being sued for failure to 
comply with that very same decision. Otherwise, the only valid plea, in a 
case concerning non-compliance, would be that it has been absolutely 
impossible for the Member State to implement the decision. However, that 
is difficult to prove in Court; the Court has rejected reasons, such as badly 
drafted Commission decisions, or that the state does not know what to 
recover since there was no transfer of state founds in its case law.
41
 
 After the Court has reached a judgment that accepts that a Member 
State is in breach of state aid law, the Member State must take action to 
comply with that judgment, as soon as possible. Article 260 (1) TFEU 
(former Article 228 TEC) provides for the obligation of the Member State to 
comply with the Court’s judgments. Compliance of the infringing Member 
                                                 
38
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State should go as far as the practical elimination of the infringements and 
the consequences past or future.
42
  
4.5.4 Financial penalties in the Court of Justice of the EU as a means 
of enforcement 
The Member State must take all necessary measures to comply with 
the judgment of the Court. What are the options if it does not comply with 
the judgment though? Then, according to Article 260(2) TFEU the 
Commission can bring another action before the Court, asking it to impose 
financial penalties on the non-complying Member State. The financial 
penalties can take the form of a lump sum or a periodic penalty for the time 
that the infringement lasted.  Article 260 TFEU has been adopted by the 
Commission as the most effective way of enforcing recovery decisions 
against reluctant Member States.
43
  
The Court on its part has endorsed the Commission’s stance to 
pursue the persistent non-compliance with recovery decisions and 
condemned Greece to pay both a lump sum and a penalty for each day of 
delay in its Commission v Greece
44
 case, for the first time; furthermore, the 
Court increased the amounts that the Commission was asking for in its 
action.
45
 By doing so, the Court and the Commission, according to some 
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writers, established ‘a more credible State aid control system, at least as far 
as public enforcement of its decisions is concerned.’46  
According to others though, the financial penalties as a means of 
enforcing EU law have been criticised: the ‘draconian treatment by the EU 
institutions of the recipients of unlawfully granted State aid is to try to 
transform potential grantees of State aid into policemen;’47 on the contrary, 
there is no penalty against the Member State that grants unlawful state aid. 
Financial penalties should be examined more for their effectiveness. 
Certainly, this is more relevant for poorer Member States. If they are called 
to pay multimillion penalties into the EU budget, that money would have to 
be saved from other actions. National actions that would be considered more 
urgent by the people of those poorer states, than the infringement of EU law 
would ever be. Especially now, that the financial position of some Member 
States is at risk.
48
 Consequently, having to pay penalties in the EU budget 
might not prove to be the most effective way to optimise state aid 
enforcement. This financial sanction should be used with great caution 
especially when a Commission decision to impose penalties is being 
reviewed by the Court. 
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4.6 REFERENCES FROM NATIONAL COURTS FOR PRELIMINARY 
RULINGS  
According to Article 267 TFEU (ex 234 TEC), the Court of Justice 
has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the 
Treaty and on the validity and interpretation of secondary legislation, 
adopted by the Union’s institutions. The importance of this jurisdiction of 
the Court is founded on two facts: first of all, the statistics of the Court 
prove that an equal number of direct actions and references for preliminary 
rulings are filled in the Court that have as a subject matter state aid cases.
49
 
The second point that proves the importance of this jurisdiction in state aid 
cases is the fact that references for preliminary rulings connect the national 
jurisdictions with the supranational jurisdiction, and eventually can promote 
uniform application of state aid law. Due to the fact that enforcement before 
national courts is promoted, even though enforcement of state aid law is still 
in early stages, the national courts have this instrument to use at their 
disposal, to clarify unclear aspects of Union state aid law that might not be 
clear to every single national judge, especially an inexperienced first 
instance judge.  
The ruling of the Court interpreting the Union law is binding on the 
national court that requested it. However, there are limits as to what the 
question referred to the Court of Justice can actually include. In state aid 
                                                 
49
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matters, the national court can request the interpretation of Articles 107 (1) 
TFEU and 108 TFEU; it can also inquire about the validity and 
interpretation of Commission decisions, concerning specific state aid cases. 
Due to the fact that the concept of aid causes so many ambiguities, it is a 
privilege to have a supranational authority that will guide national courts to 
the right direction. The one thing that the Court of Justice cannot answer, 
though, is the issue of compatibility of an aid measure with the internal 
market, since that interpretation is the exclusive competence of the 
Commission and not the national courts.
50
 
The importance of the references for preliminary rulings in the state 
aid field has been reiterated by the Court of Justice in its GIL insurance
51
 
judgment. The case concerned an Insurance Premium Tax for services and 
goods that was considered to be state aid by all the United Kingdom Courts 
because of its difference with the VAT rate. The Court of Justice was asked 
to interpret whether there was sufficient effect on trade between Member 
States, but it was not asked to interpret whether that Tax was actually state 
aid, because the referring UK court was convinced it was. The Court of 
Justice though, examined whether the questions that it received were 
actually hypothetical, and went on to examine the real issue of whether the 
tax was within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
52
 The fact that the Court 
of Justice was able to determine the real issues of the case and correctly 
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interpret EU law, when national courts failed, reaffirms the importance of 
preliminary questions.
53
           
 
4.7 ACTIONS AGAINST THE COMMISSION IN STATE AID CASES  
 There are two types of actions that can be brought against the 
Commission in the Court of Justice of the European Union in the state aid 
field of law. Article 263 TFEU provides for the Court’s jurisdiction to rule 
on the legality of the Commission’s state aid decisions. Whereas, Article 
265 TFEU provides for the Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the Commission’s 
failure to act in state aid cases. Those two types of actions will be critically 
examined in the following paragraphs of the chapter. Both of those types of 
action of course can be used to challenge acts of other Community 
institutions in the state aid field, such as the Council’s decisions under 
Article 108(2) TFEU. However, due to the central role of the Commission 
in state aid control, the focus in state aid cases is actions against the 
Commission.   
4.7.1 Actions for annulment of state aid decisions in the Court- legal 
basis 
In chapter three of the thesis the research presented the various steps 
that the Commission takes in its administrative procedure of exercising state 
aid control. Mainly those steps are the preliminary examination and if there 
are grounds for it the Commission opens the formal investigation. Both of 
those steps end with Commission Decisions, according to the findings of the 
relevant examination procedure. Those Decisions, though, according to 
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Article 108 TFEU and the Procedural Regulation No 734/2013, have 
different legal statuses and effects. The parties in those procedures may 
need to challenge the validity of any of those decisions and the procedures 
that led to them. Therefore, Article 263 TFEU provides for the legal basis 
for actions against institutional decisions in the state aid field. Due to the 
different nature of those Decisions made by the Commission, not all of them 
can be the subject of judicial review in the Court of Justice.  
4.7.2 Admissibility of acts that can be subject to annulment  
Article 263 TFEU makes a distinction between acts of the 
institutions that can be subject to actions for annulment, and only includes 
acts that produce ‘legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’.54 Therefore, the 
admissibility of acts, which are open to challenge before the Court is usually 
contested. The acts of the Commission that produce legal effects are 
certainly the final decisions, either after the preliminary phase or the formal 
investigations procedure. Those can be decisions that the measure is not 
state aid,
55
 or that the measure is state aid but compatible with the internal 
market.
56
 Also, the negative decision, which does not allow the 
implementation of the aid measure is admissible, and can be challenged 
before the Court. Finally, conditional decisions, which authorise aid, to be 
implemented, under certain conditions, are challengeable before the Court.
57
 
Article 263(4) TFEU, after the Lisbon amendment, has made it 
possible for private parties to challenge acts that are “regulatory,” under the 
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condition (Lisbon criterion) that they are of direct concern to them and that 
they do not entail implementing measures. The TFEU does not include a 
definition of what is a regulatory act, regrettably for some,
58
 due to the 
significance of the notion to the outcome of proceedings; however, the 
Court held that it is to be a non-legislative act of a general nature.
59
 In state 
aid cases many acts can be characterised as non-legislative. This part of the 
Lisbon criterion will not be difficult to prove before the Court, however, the 
lack of implementing measures:
60
 usually, Commission Decisions in the 
field of state aid can be classified as regulatory, but they are followed by 
implementing measures such as recovery Decisions, which make the 
satisfaction of the Lisbon criterion difficult.
61
 Even after the changes that 
the Lisbon Treaty has brought to locus standi the problems with proving 
standing in any particular case remain.
62
      
However, there are Commission decisions which produce different 
effects according to whether the aid in question is new or existing aid: thus, 
Commission decisions that open the formal investigation procedure for 
existing aid do not produce legal effects and therefore, are not admissible 
before the Court of Justice for annulment. Conversely, Commission 
decisions to open the formal investigation procedure for new aid produce 
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legal effects and are admissible for annulment.
 63
 This diversification is 
justified, because the decision to open the formal investigation for measures 
classified as new aid alters the position of both the measure and the 
beneficiaries. The change is found in that the perception of new aid means 
that there is an element of doubt, whether the measure is legal or not.
64
 
From the examination of the case law, concerning cases that an 
annulment of a state aid decision is sought, the issue of the nature or the 
form of the act that is being challenged seems to appear quite often. The 
issue has to do with the distinction of the final decision that can be 
challenged, from various preparatory acts that the Commission issues at the 
lengthy preliminary or formal investigation procedures, such as preparatory 
acts that inform the Member State of the different stages of the examination, 
which might not be admissible. In the Athinaiki Techniki
65
 case, the General 
Court was asked to annul a letter addressed by the Commission to the 
complainant, Athinaiki Techniki, during an exchange of information. In the 
letter, the Commission informed the undertaking that its complaints against 
another competitor where not sufficient enough, and that the Commission 
would not continue with the examination of the case. The General Court 
ruled that the letter was not a decision that could be admissible for 
annulment before the Court, according to Article 263 TFEU, because a final 
decision would follow, which would be admissible for annulment.
66
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The Court of Justice, though, judging the same case, under appeal, 
held against the General Court that the contested letter was indeed a definite 
position by the Commission on the complaint of the Athinaiki Techniki; the 
Court of Justice held that the letter produced legal effects, because it 
precluded Athinaiki Techniki from taking part in the subsequent formal 
investigation, and therefore it was admissible for annulment under Article 
263 TFEU.
67
 The Court by overturning the General Court’s judgment 
reaffirmed that annulment is available to all acts of the institutions 
regardless of their nature or form. The important criterion to decide on the 
admissibility is the legal effects that the act produces that changes the legal 
position of the applicant.
68
 
Another type of act that presents special interest in relation to its 
admissibility for annulment is the different injunctions that the Commission 
issues, during the administrative procedure, according to the Procedural 
Regulation,
69
 which have been analysed in chapter three. More particularly, 
the Court has held that the injunctions, provided for in Article 11 of the 
Procedural Regulation, which constitute an order by the Commission to the 
Member State to suspend the implementation of the aid measure
70
 or to 
provisionally recover aid
71
 already granted, are admissible for annulment. 
Those types of injunctions do have legal effects, in the meaning of Article 
263 TFEU.  
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Lastly, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the admissibility of 
information injunctions issued by the Commission, according to Article 10 
(3) of the Procedural Regulation.
72
 In the recent Deutsche Post
73
 judgment, 
the Court overturned the General Court’s judgment; the Court held that the 
information injunction was not admissible for annulment, according to 
Article 263 TFEU. Instead, it held that the decision produced binding legal 
effects and after it annulled the decision, it referred the case back to the 
General Court to rule on the merits of the case.
74
   
4.7.3 Who is eligible to bring an annulment action before the Court? 
The issue of who is eligible to bring an action for annulment against 
a Union act has produced abundance of case law and controversy in theory. 
The problems have to do with standing before the Court, especially before 
the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty.
75
 Standing before any court refers to 
the ability to prove sufficient connection with the contested act in that the 
rights of the applicant are affected by it. If the applicant is successful in 
proving that, the Court would allow the applicant to challenge the validity of 
the act and overturn its results. Otherwise, standing is known as locus 
standi. Article 263 TFEU provides for the locus standi of the different 
applicants in cases of annulment of state aid decisions. However, Article 
263 TFEU distinguishes between two types of applicants: privileged 
applicants and non-privileged ones. The effects of this distinction between 
applicants will be analysed next. 
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In actions of annulment of state aid decisions, the privileged 
applicants are the Member States, according to Article 263(2) TFEU. In 
chapter three of the thesis it was scrutinised that the administrative 
procedure of the examination of state aid measures takes place between the 
Commission and the Member State that plans to grant aid; interested parties 
especially at preliminary stage cannot submit their comments, which means 
that they cannot be heard. In addition, Article 25 of the Procedural 
Regulation
76
 considers that the addressee of Commission decisions is the 
Member State. The two Articles, combined, place Member States in a more 
favourable position. Consequently, Member States can bring actions for 
annulment of Union decisions, without having to prove any conditions that 
would render their action to be admissible. The non-existence of conditions 
for Member States was established in the case law, long before the adoption 
of the procedural regulation in fields other than state aid.
77
  
The beneficiary of the aid and its competitors in contrast, are legal 
persons, other than the Member State, and they must bring actions for 
annulment of state aid decisions, according to Article 263(4) TFEU. This 
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU provides for the conditions, under which 
non-privileged applicants can lodge actions for annulment. Those conditions 
are that the individual applicants must prove that the decision under 
challenge is of direct and individual concern to them. The literature has been 
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critical of the Court’s strict interpretation of the conditions set above.78 
Those conditions were first defined by the court in its Plaumann
79
 case.  
     
4.7.3.1 Difficulty in gaining locus standi after Plaumann    
The wording of Article 263(4) TFEU does not allow non- privileged 
applicants ‘unfettered access’ to the Court.80 Furthermore, the Plaumann 
case concerned an action for annulment of a customs duty case and not state 
aid, however, it is of importance for any annulment action, because for the 
first time the Court interpreted Article 263(4) TFEU for non-privileged 
applicants. The Court held that the individual concern of applicants, others 
than those to whom the decision is addressed to, is proven, if the decision 
‘affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other 
persons’.81 According to the Court, those attributes or circumstances 
distinguish them from all others, just like the addressee.  
The Plaumann test, as those conditions are now known in theory, 
has been criticised for causing problems for individuals on two fronts: first 
in reality the number of competitors might be restricted to two, or very few 
competitors, and how is one of them going to distinguish themselves from 
the other, since they both compete in the same field? Secondly, the concept 
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of individual concern made it practically impossible for private parties to 
bring enforcement actions before the Court of Justice.
82
  
 More specifically, in state aid cases the ability of private parties to 
prove direct concern is not that difficult. The contested decision is not 
addressed to the individual, but rather to the Member State, which may need 
to adopt national measures, in order to implement the Commission decision. 
However, the Court has held that if the Member State has demonstrated that 
it intends to implement the decision, and there is no doubt about it from the 
documents of the procedure, then any beneficiary or competitor may be 
directly concerned.
83
  
In contrast, proving individual concern, when third parties ask for an 
act to be annulled, is hindered by other factors in state aid cases. The fact 
that the administrative procedure is so centralised and particularly the fact 
that the preliminary investigation procedure is basically only performed 
between the Commission and the Member State
84
 causes problems to third 
parties, if they wanted to annul a Commission decision of that stage.   
Also, another problem might be that the individual might not have 
all the information it needs from the preliminary stage, because the 
Commission does not request, or publishes full information at this stage. 
This limited information available might cause problems to a third party 
having to prove individual concern, in order for its action for annulment to 
be declared admissible before the Court.
85
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The beneficiary of an individual aid measure can be easily accepted 
to have direct and individual concern.
86
 However, another factor that 
hinders the application of the individual concern test in state aid cases 
emerges when the contested decision refers to an aid scheme, rather than 
individual aid. Aid schemes are intended for general application, and the 
recipients are not individually concerned. The Court has held, in that 
respect, that an undertaking cannot prove individual concern solely because 
it operates in the sector that the aid scheme is intended for.
87
 However, the 
situation changes, according to the Court, if the undertaking is the actual 
beneficiary of aid in an aid scheme, which was ordered to repay that aid 
from the Commission. The beneficiary of the aid is individually concerned 
to challenge the validity of the Commission’s recovery decision.88 
According to the TWD judgment
89
, which involved recovery of 
unlawful aid, the Court held that the fact that the recipient of aid did not 
bring an action for annulment of the Commission’s recovery decision meant 
that the decision became definitive vis-a-vis the recipient of the aid. 
Furthermore, the decision could not be challenged later in a national court, 
during the challenge of the national measures implementing that decision, 
and therefore the recipients of aid have lost standing.  
After the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended Article 263 TFEU, there 
is now a new condition on standing for actions for annulment in addition to 
the older conditions, which required the applicant to be either the addressee 
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of the contested act or being directly and individually concerned. According 
to the new Article 263(4) TFEU, if the applicant is concerned by an act that 
does not entail implementing measures, that is sufficient to gain standing. 
This new provision has widened standing, by making certain measures of 
general application challengeable.
90
 
 However, does the TWD principle apply to measures of general 
application? The answer seems to be against the application of the TWD 
principle, which makes an act definitive, if the time limit has passed. The 
rationale is that the time limit for challenging a general measure will start 
from the day of publication, notification or made known to the interested 
party, which does not secure legal certainty.
91
 
The Court has established that there is a general principle of 
effective judicial protection, which underlies in the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States.
92
 This principle is also included in the 
Convention for the protection of human rights
93
 and the Charter of 
fundamental rights.
94
 This principle is directed towards the national courts; 
however, the European Courts should follow this principle as well, since 
they apply EU law just like the national courts do. Otherwise, if the 
principle of effective judicial protection was only intended to apply to the 
national courts, there would have been a division in the European system of 
judicial control, where one part of it, which is the national courts are 
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subjected to different, stricter rules than the European Courts. The issue was 
raised in the Court of Justice: in the Ocalan
95
 case it was claimed that the 
strict interpretation of the rules on gaining locus standi, before the Court, 
according to Article 263 (4) TFEU, breached Article 6 of the Convention on 
Human Rights. The case was not successful, and, although, it did not have 
state aid as its subject matter, is important for all annulment actions since 
Article 263 (4) TFEU is applied in every case for annulment, no matter what 
its subject matter is.    
4.7.3.2 The rationale for the strict interpretation of the ‘direct and 
individual concern’ criterion in standing before the Court of Justice 
The interpretation of the individual concern criterion for third parties 
has been rather hostile in the early case law, which has been examined so far 
in this part of the chapter. The Court has almost restricted the rights of third 
parties to gain standing in actions of annulment of Institutional decisions. 
Some writers and the Court attribute that strictness in the intention of the 
Treaty itself: the wording of Article 263(4) TFEU presupposes that private 
parties should not be free to challenge Union decisions, which are addressed 
to Member States.
96
  
However, that is not entirely true. Other writers have made the 
distinction between the subject matter of the annulment cases. In the state 
aid and competition cases the administrative procedure sometimes is 
initiated by a complaint from a competitor. This exchange of information 
between the Commission and the complainant has led to the granting of 
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standing for competitors more easily,
97
 than in cases with different subject 
matter, such as the Common agricultural policy; that was the subject matter 
of the initial judgment that created the Plaumann test; the Plaumann case 
itself.  
Whatever the reasons for that strict interpretation of the individual 
concern criterion may be, the Union’s state aid control has recently changed 
course somewhat, in that the private enforcement is so eagerly promoted by 
the Commission. It should be reminded, at this point, that private 
enforcement is part of the decentralisation of state aid, which will allow 
private parties to challenge state aid decisions both before national courts 
and also before the Union’s Courts. There is no real benefit, if the 
Commission promotes the enforcement before national courts, but does not 
act to resolve the issues that appear in enforcement before the Court of 
Justice, such as the problems with locus standi; after all, the Court of Justice 
currently delivers more judgments on state aid than the national courts do.  
4.7.3.3 How has the case law on actions for the annulment of state 
aid decisions evolved?  
Due to the problems caused by the strict interpretation of the locus 
standi rules in Article 263 (4) TFEU proceedings and the criticism it has 
generated from the academics, the Court has recently shown signs that the 
interpretation of standing for non-privileged applicants might be relaxed. In 
cases Cook
98
 and Matra,
99
 the Court established another test, less strict than 
the one in Plaumann: third parties or competitors that where denied the right 
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to challenge an Article 108(2) TFEU decision, because the Commission did 
not open the formal investigation procedure of Article 108(2) TFEU, should 
be given the right to challenge that Commission decision as concerned 
parties, whose rights might have been affected by the aid.
100
 The new test 
found difficulties in its application before the Court though. In some cases 
the Court rejected the applicant’s action as inadmissible, because the 
applicants had not explicitly stated that they wanted to secure their 
procedural rights that were denied by not opening the formal investigation 
procedure.
101
   
The Court clarified in subsequent judgments that the applicant, 
whose rights were violated by the Commission’s decision not to open the 
formal investigation procedure, should not be considered to be individually 
concerned by the mere fact that it demonstrates that it is a party concerned, 
within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU. Therefore, the competitor’s 
annulment action was inadmissible, according to Article 263(4) TFEU.
102
 
This judgment set aside the opposing ruling at first instance, which 
considered the action for annulment admissible on more relaxed conditions.  
Even more recently, the competitors rights to challenge Commission 
decisions on state aid seem to have been strengthened by two judgments: in 
Athinaiki Techniki
103
 the Court considered a letter, which stated that there 
was no sufficient evidence to open the formal investigation procedure to be 
a challengeable act; therefore, allowing the competitor to bring an action of 
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annulment of that ‘decision’ before the Court, according to Article 263(4) 
TFEU.  
The case law is still not settled in the matter of admissibility of third 
party actions of annulment of Commission decisions; it is affected by the 
interpretation of the individual concern criterion that the Court adopts each 
time. The criticism and the uncertainty concerning the issue could end, and 
the rights of third parties strengthened, if the relevant Articles of the 
procedural regulation are amended.
104
  
 4.7.4 Time limits and scope of review 
Article 263(6) TFEU imposes a time limit by which the action for 
annulment must be brought before the Court. The limit is two months from 
the time of publication of the contested act or the notification of it to the 
applicant, if it is an act that needs to be notified; or from the day the 
applicant became aware of it, if it was neither published nor notified. After 
that two month limit has passed, the action will be inadmissible. 
 Contrary, Article 263(2) TFEU limits the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
Court performs judicial review of acts adopted by the institutions of the 
European Union. Thus, the grounds available to it for review are substantive 
matters, such as lack of competence, or misuse of powers, or breach of the 
Treaties or secondary legislation and procedural grounds such as 
infringement of procedural rules.  
In the field of state aid the Court can rule on the concept of aid, 
according to the rules of Article 107 and 108 TFEU, if called to do so by the 
applicant. Due to the fact that the Commission enjoys wide discretion in its 
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assessment of aid measures, the Court has some limits to what it cannot 
review: the Commission especially enjoys wide discretion in its assessment 
of compatibility, according to Article 107(3) TFEU, which involves 
assessments of economic and social nature,
105
 which will be further 
analysed in the seventh chapter of this thesis, because their form part of the 
previous modernisations of state aid control. In those areas that the 
Commission enjoys discretion, the Court cannot substitute its own 
assessment for that of the Commission. The Court is restricted when 
reviewing such a decision, to examine if the Commission has misused its 
powers or erred manifestly.
106
  
However, in other judgments, the Court has made a distinction 
between the judicial review it performs on whether it is examining the 
application of Article 107(1) TFEU or 108(3) TFEU. At first instance, the 
General Court held that the Union’s judicature may review the criteria 
chosen by the Commission, when it is assessing whether a measure falls 
under Article 107(1) TFEU;
107
 in other words, when assessing the concept 
of aid. The reason for that is that the criteria applied to analyse the concept 
of aid are objective.  
Contrary, the Commission enjoys discretion in assessing the 
compatibility of aid, according to Article 108(3) TFEU, but relies on 
complex economic and social assessments, which are not objective; 
therefore, the Court should perform a ‘comprehensive review as to whether 
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a measure falls within the scope of Article 92(1) [now 107(1) TFEU] of the 
Treaty’, according to those assessments.108  
This distinction however, is not yet settled case law; in a more recent 
judgment the Court has returned to its settled case law, as it called it: 
whenever the Court reviews a Commission decision, which has applied 
complex economic analysis to establish the concept of aid, according to 
Article 107(1) TFEU, the Court must confine itself in reviewing the rules of 
procedure, whether the facts where have been accurately stated and whether 
there was not any manifest error or misuse of powers.
109
 
4.7.5 Actions for failure to act against the Commission 
The next available action against the Union’s institutions in the state 
aid field is an action for failure to act. This action is provided for in Article 
265 TFEU. It should be noted that the actions before the Court can only be 
admissible, if the applicant has previously asked the institution to act, and a 
time limit of two months has passed from the time it was asked to act.
110
 In 
the state aid context, this action would appear possible, whenever the 
Commission fails to adopt a decision terminating the preliminary or formal 
investigation procedures.
111
 
Another possible case that an action for failure to act would be 
permissible in the state aid field would be that against the Commission’s 
failure to open the formal investigation procedure. The interested party, 
which would usually be a competitor that filed the complained with the 
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Commission in the first place, should be allowed to bring an action 
acknowledging that failure to act.
112
   
The judgment on an action for failure to act against the Union’s 
institution can only determine the failure. Nevertheless, the Court cannot go 
further and issue direction to the Commission, as to what action is needed 
for compliance. It is up to the institution to take the necessary measures to 
comply with the Court’s judgment.113 
 Article 265 (1) TFEU classifies Member States and other 
institutions as privileged applicants, for the purpose of bringing actions for 
failure to comply with obligations under EU law. Whereas, Article 265(3) 
TFEU classifies natural persons or legal persons as non- privileged 
applicants, in same way as the Treaty classifies applicants of actions for 
annulment. In analogy, everything that was analysed in paragraph 4.7.3 of 
this chapter, in relation with admissibility of applicants, is relevant for 
actions for failure to act as well. Indeed, the Court has held that Articles 263 
and 265 TFEU ‘prescribe one and the same remedy’.114 The Court has also 
held that just as Article 263(4) TFEU allows third parties to challenge the 
validity of acts if they are directly and individually concerned, the same 
interpretation must be given for the purpose of Article 265(3) TFEU.
115
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4.8 ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES BEFORE THE COURT 
Article 340 TFEU provides for the liability of the Union’s 
Institutions if damage is caused by the performance of their duties. In the 
field of state aid, the potential liability of the Commission, during the 
performance of its duties regarding state aid control, or against the Council, 
when authorising aid according to Article 108(2) TFEU, will be non-
contractual liability; consequently, Article 340(2) TFEU will be applicable 
to state aid cases. The action for damages against the Commission for a 
damage caused by the performance of its state aid control will be brought 
before the Court of Justice, according to Article 268 TFEU. However, this 
Article is interpreted in conjunction with Article 256 TFEU, which awards 
jurisdiction at first instance to the General Court; therefore, the case for 
damages will reach the Court of Justice on appeal only.
116
 
4.8.1 The criteria for awarding damages in the Court of justice in 
state aid cases.   
Article 340, paragraph 2 TFEU contains a condition that the 
claimant has to prove in Court, in order for his claim for damages to be 
successful. This condition is that the claim will be judged in accordance to 
the principles, which are common to the laws on non-contractual liability of 
the Member States. So the question that arises is which are those conditions 
and where can they be found? Due to the fact that there is no European tort 
law in force in the European Union, the Court must look at the individual 
national laws of the Member States, and accept the principles that appear in 
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most jurisdictions as common between Member States; then the Court can 
apply them in each case for damages.  
The case law of the Court provides a list of principles that are 
common in all Member States: the Court held that three conditions must be 
met to prove non-contractual liability of its institutions. Firstly, that ‘the rule 
of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals;’117 
secondly, that ‘the breach must be sufficiently serious;’118 and thirdly ‘there 
must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on 
the state and the damage sustained by the injured parties.’119 
To establish sufficient breach of Union law, which is the second 
condition the applicant, according to the Court, must prove that the 
Institution manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion.
120
 
Since the Commission has wide discretion it should be difficult to prove 
sufficient breach in state aid cases.  Out of the three conditions the most 
difficult to prove in state aid must be the direct link between the decision on 
the aid measure and the damage suffered by the applicant, which is the third 
condition. In BAI V Commission,
121
 the applicant BAI claimed for 
compensation for the damage allegedly suffered because of the delay on 
behalf of the Commission in communicating to it the text of a decision 
terminating the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU, concerning aid to a 
competitor.  The Court rejected both claims from the applicant that it 
suffered material damage or alternatively non-material damage from the 
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delay of the notification of the Commission’s decision. The Court based its 
findings to the fact that the cause of any damage should have been the 
decision and not the delay in notification. Since the applicant did not prove 
the existence of a link between the alleged damage and the Commission’s 
decision the claim was dismissed.
122
  
4.8.2 Cases for damages in the Court for breach of state aid law.  
The search in the Court’s case law database123 returned just twenty 
damages cases in the field of state aid control. The number of course is 
small, and the reasons for this are probably that the burden of proof lies with 
the applicant
124
 and the conditions cannot be proven easily by the applicant. 
In relation to the third condition, the Court has held that even if the conduct 
of the Institution is such as to cause the damage, it is the possible negligent 
actions of the applicant that can break the causal link with the Institution, 
and thus the condition will not be satisfied. The Court suggests that if the 
applicant did not use the available interim measures, in order to reduce the 
loss that he allegedly suffered, this could be considered negligent action.
125
 
This connection of the claim for damages by the Court with interim relief 
seems like a rather unfair imposition on the plaintiffs.  
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In a successful case of state aid, where the applicant was actually 
awarded damages against the Commission, the Court accepted that the 
publication of confidential information on the Official Journal, included in a 
decision by the Commission on a state aid measure, caused harm to the 
reputation of the applicant, and therefore it accepted the causal link between 
the Commission’s decision and the harm to the undertaking.126 Certainly, 
there is need for more transparency from the Commission and such 
decisions do not promote transparency; on the contrary, they withhold 
information from the Commission’s communications to the public. The 
second criterion that seeks more transparency in the implementation of the 
state aid policy has failed in this example.    
One possible benefit for the applicant claiming for damages in state 
aid cases might come from the comparison of the conditions contained in 
Article 340 (2) TFEU with those contained in Article 263(4) and 265(3) 
TFEU. The applicant for damages does not have the obligation to prove 
direct and individual concern as those applicants that seek to annul 
Commission decisions or declare that the Commission failed to act. So, even 
if the causal link is difficult to prove, at least the standing requirements are 
more relaxed in this procedure.
127
 Lastly, it has been said that private 
enforcement actions for damages do not actually restore observance of EU 
state aid law; this is due to the fact that they only directly benefit the 
applicant and restoration of the observance of EU law is only achieved 
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when illegal aid is successfully prohibited from being granted or 
recovered.
128
 
   
4.9 MEMBER STATES’ ACTIONS AGAINST OTHER MEMBER 
STATES IN THE STATE AID FIELD 
The Treaty allows the possibility for a Member State of the 
European Union to bring an action against another Member State for failing 
to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties. Article 259 TFEU (former 227 
TEC) grants that privilege to Member States. The Treaty, though, imposes 
the obligation for the matter to pass through the Commission first. The 
Commission must be informed and it must provide its opinion first, then the 
Member State can turn to the Court. Indeed, the Commission’s opinion is 
not substantial after three months from the time it received the complaint.  
From the research in the Court’s database of case law, no action of a 
Member State against another has turned up in the field of state aid.
129
 
Clearly, the Member States do not consider it practical to enforce state aid 
rules through that procedure. After all, if a complaint reaches the 
Commission it will most likely start the administrative procedure, which 
may or may not lead to the judicial review of its decisions before the Court 
of Justice.    
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4.10 PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO ORDER 
INTERIM RELIEF. 
  Article 278 TFEU provides that the actions before the Court have no 
suspensory effect. Hence, the institution’s act continues to produce its 
effects until the final judgment, unless the applicant asks for a suspension. 
Also, according to Article 279 TFEU the Court may order interim measures. 
The jurisdiction to order interim measures derives from the principle of 
effective judicial protection.
130
  
Cumulative conditions must be satisfied before an order for interim 
measures can be adopted by the Court: ‘such an order is justified, prima 
facie, in fact and in law and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid 
serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests’.131  
Those conditions are scrutinised by the Court, thus applications for 
interim measures are not successful in state aid cases.
132
 If the applicants, 
though, are deterred from applying for interim measures, this might affect 
the outcome of other possible procedures, such as the action for damages. In 
some cases the Court connects the award of damages with a previous filling 
for interim relief by the applicant for damages. In BAI V Commission for 
example, the Court notes that the applicant never asked the suspension of 
execution of the Commission’s decision that allegedly caused it damage. 
The Court seems to advise that if the applicant had asked for a suspension 
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the alleged damage would have been reduced;
133
 however, the applicant 
would still need to prove the conditions for the award of damages.  
The General Court accepted interim relief in a series of orders, 
having to do with repayment of aid after negative Commission decisions; 
however, the Court of Justice, judging on appeal dismissed those orders. 
The Court based its decision on the fact that the decision that was asked to 
be suspended had already been judged by the Court in an action for 
annulment, and the application was found to be unfounded; thus the 
condition that the order was justified prima facie, in fact and in law was not 
satisfied.
134
      
 
4.11 SHOULD THERE BE A EUROPEAN COMPETITION COURT? 
 Ever since the Court of First Instance [now renamed as the General 
Court] was established, it was awarded with the jurisdiction to hear 
competition law and state aid law cases at first Instance. The appeals against 
the General Court’s judgments are heard by the Court of Justice. This was 
introduced for two reasons; first, to relief the Court of its workload and 
secondly, the appeals in substance were necessary, in order to bring the 
European Judicial system for competition and state aid in line with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
135
     
Looking at table 7 in the Appendix, it is clear that the number of 
Competition law cases is, as expected, much higher than state aid cases. 
Together, the two subject matters, combined, make up about one fourth of 
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all new cases introduced before the General Court every year. The number 
is substantial but not as high as, for example, cases introduced concerning 
intellectual property matters. 
 It has been debated, whether a Competition Court should be 
established.
136
 This would be possible, since according to the Treaty
137
 the 
Council and the Parliament have the competence to set up specialised 
courts, attached to the General Court.
138
 The benefits of such a reform 
would be that a specialised Court might be more efficient in delivering 
judgments in competition cases, where complex economic and social 
analysis is required, at some extent; also, the time required to reach a 
decision would be reduced significantly, and that would help deliver justice 
more promptly, without the now usual delays. If such a reform was to 
happen the benefits would influence the enforcement of state aid law in the 
European Court in a positive way. It would be a welcome reform from the 
researcher’s opinion, and a recommendation of this part of the thesis.    
However, most writers believe that the Court and especially the 
General Court ‘has done well since it was set up’.139 Some changes to the 
Procedural Regulation, with the aim at improving the standing conditions of 
third parties would be more beneficial for state aid control, given the small 
numbers of cases. Besides, it is true that the Court has the ability to call for 
experts to submit their expert opinions, if that is considered to be needed in 
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some cases. More use of that provision might also be more beneficial, 
instead of a new Competition Court.      
 
4.12 CONCLUSION 
 The Commission’s decisions are subject to judicial review by the 
General Court and the Court of Justice. The Commission has the power to 
ask the Court to enforce its decisions in cases that the Member State does 
not comply with its decision or the conditions within that. Also, Member 
States and individuals can ask the Court to review the validity of 
institution’s decisions and further ask for damages, when the Union’s 
institutions actions cause loss to them. 
 The effects of the structure of the administrative procedure between 
the Commission and the Member state planning to grant aid, as it is 
established in the Procedural Regulation reach the judicial review by the 
Court. The Treaty itself distinguishes applicants for state aid cases in 
privileged and non-privileged ones. This distinction creates problems for 
beneficiaries of aid and competitors of beneficiaries that are subjected under 
strict conditions of admissibility, in case they want to bring any action 
against a Commission decision or the failure of the institution to act. This 
situation jeopardises the rights of those third parties, placing them in a 
discriminating situation, which affects the whole efficiency of the judicial 
review system of state aid decision by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.   
A more liberal interpretation of the conditions that awards standing 
to non-privileged applicants before the Court has been introduced in some 
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cases; however, the case law is not yet settled, and many writers have 
debated the need for the Court to adopt more liberal judgments in the state 
aid field. If that would to happen, many problems would be resolved, and 
the enforcement of state aid in the Court would be more appealing to 
individuals. The research applied the third criterion and tested the 
enforcement of state aid control in the European Courts. The conclusion is 
that there are many problems that explain the little numbers of cases before 
the European Courts. Those problems mainly have to do with the difficulty 
for third parties to fulfil the condition of having direct and individual 
concern, in order for them to gain standing before the Court and challenge a 
Commission state aid decision. Additionally, in damages cases the difficulty 
mainly lies in proving the direct link between the Commission’s decision 
and the alleged damage suffered by the competitor or beneficiary of the aid. 
Finally, in state aid cases the Court has rejected interim relief orders because 
it does not consider them prima facie justified. Ultimately, having effective 
enforcement will benefit the state aid policy, in achieving the aim of less 
and better targeted aid. Next, the thesis critically analyses the powers and 
procedures of the national actors of the implementation of the state aid 
policy.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IS THERE A NEED FOR MORE EFFICIENT ENFORCEMENT OF 
STATE AID CONTROL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL? 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the supranational level, the Commission has a dual role regarding 
state aid control in the European Union. First, the Commission has the 
power to shape state aid policy by introducing new legislation and secondly, 
it has the competence to enforce this state aid policy by applying its a priori 
and ex post control
140
 of state aid measures, and by ordering recovery of 
illegal state aid. Those powers were the subject matter of the third chapter. 
EU state aid rules can also be enforced by national authorities of each 
Member State. The TFEU does not involve a harmonisation of national laws 
and procedures that allow them to grant aid.
141
 It does not affect Member 
States’ powers to design and grant state aid; this is a national competence.142 
  However, there is a problem of misapplication of state aid rules at 
the national level: there are irregularities, particularly with non- notified aid, 
that have been identified as non-compliance on behalf of the Member States 
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with the state aid rules at the national level
143
 that make the analysis of the 
national aspect of state aid control necessary. The Scoreboard reveals that 
negative Decisions with recovery represent about 23% of the 986 Decision 
that the Commission took for unlawful aid between 2000-2010. This 
intervention by the Commission in the form of negative Decisions is nine 
times higher in non-notified cases.
144
 This problem has led some to say that 
‘either at the design stage and/or implementation stage of a State aid 
measure is that competition and the interests of the rest of the Member 
States are likely to be harmed to a disproportionate degree.’145 This chapter 
therefore aims at providing for the possible solutions to the problem of non- 
compliance at the national level, which has been highlighted by the 
Modernisation initiative, by analysing the possible solutions: the 
institutional changes that Member States can adopt, if they want to better 
comply with state aid control in the future. 
The first question that arises from the fact that state aid control can 
be performed at both the supranational and national level is which national 
authorities have been entrusted with the control of state aid. The second 
question that follows from the first is which provisions are applicable at the 
national level? Finally, the last question has to do with the assessment of the 
level of state aid control at the national level and the conclusions on the 
shortfalls and positives of the national aspect of state aid enforcement. In 
this chapter the first research criterion will be applied: the thesis will test the 
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speed and applicability of national procedures that relate to the 
implementation of state aid control.    
 
5.2 ACTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING CONFORMITY WITH EU 
STATE AID RULES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.   
The problem of non-compliance with state aid rules has its roots in 
the reluctance of Member States’ governments to give up control of their 
national industrial policies. In the past the Commission has sought to 
overcome that with improving the procedures that were examined in 
previous chapters or amending and introducing new soft law instruments 
that would clarify issues and provide guidance. Detailed rules can make 
enforcement less costly but can also make economic policies and state aid 
control less flexible.
146
 Both of those changes were meant to incentivise 
Member States to comply and help the Commission to monitor state aid 
better. However, the Court of Auditors
147
 reported that the Commission 
failed to perform ex post monitoring of non-notified measures, as well as 
measures that were adopted by Member States under the de minimis 
Regulation.
148
  
There are actions that can be implemented to achieve the goals of the 
Modernisation: which is to have effective national systems accompanied by 
increased commitment and delivery on the part of the national authorities in 
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terms of compliance.
149
 To achieve the goal of information gathering from 
individuals and undertakings the Procedural Regulation has included the 
option of imposing fines and periodic penalties to those that do not comply 
with the Commission’s information requests.150 This provision does not 
apply to Member States because they are under an obligation to cooperate 
with the Commission;
151
 an obligation that derives from Article 4 of the 
TEU.
152
 This provision could be extended to cover not only information 
requests but also non-compliance with state aid rules of procedure and 
substance, such as the standstill obligation. If sanctions for granting illegal 
state aid outweigh the gains from granting it, by adding the costs for 
penalties and other administrative costs then Member States might be be 
more compliant with state aid law.
153
 However, the imposition of fines and 
penalties as a means of enforcement has been criticised in the previous 
chapters, in relation to fines for not enforcing recovery Decisions; it is not 
the best possible deterrent, especially in the current crisis.  
Another proposal for achieving ‘commitment and delivery on the 
part of the national authorities in terms of compliance’154 with state aid 
control rules is training the national authorities that are involved in 
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designing and granting state aid. The Commission already operates schemes 
for training national Judges. The programme started in 2002 and has already 
trained 7000 national Judges in the Member States aiming to promote better 
enforcement of state aid in national Courts.
155
 However, the role of the 
Commission is not to train national administrators and even if training was 
an option it would be a very expensive and large scale operation. The only 
viable option for training members of the national administration systems is 
through the annual Competition Forums that the Commission initiated in 
2012. However, training will not automatically lead to better compliance: if 
an authority has better knowledge of the state aid rules it might use this 
knowledge to make measures seem compatible, even if it still intends to 
bend the rules.
156
  
Lastly, another proposal for achieving better compliance with state 
aid control at the national level has been put forward and is less costly than 
training. The certification of national authorities that design and grant block 
exempted state aid measures could be an option. The certification involves 
external verification that the authority has effective internal procedures and 
that its reports are credible.
157
 According to that proposal, certification of 
national authorities is a requirement for other EU policies, such as the 
payments of the Common Agricultural Policy that cannot be implemented 
by authorities that have not been certified for their institutional capacity.
158
 
This practice could be implemented to state aid control, although it does 
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involve willingness from the Member States’ governments to agree to such 
external certifications for such an important industrial policy instrument that 
is state aid. The research suggests that the introduction of independent 
national state aid authorities is a viable option that will enhance compliance 
with state aid control rules. This position will be further analysed next.  
 
5.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
STATE AID CONTROL.  
5.3.1 The principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty 
The competences of the Union institutions are either exclusive, or 
shared with the Member States (otherwise, non-exclusive). The allocation of 
shared competences is facilitated by the principle of subsidiarity. The 
principle of subsidiarity was introduced in EU law by Article 5 of the then 
EC Treaty, after its amendment by the Maastricht Treaty.
159
 Before the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity was applied in 
areas, where the Community did not have exclusive competence. The 
Community could take action in non-exclusive areas of competence, only if 
the action was needed at the Community level, because the effects of that 
action would better serve the purpose, or if the Member States could not 
achieve the objectives of the required action on their own. After the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality have been reinforced. 
  The Lisbon Treaty includes the principle in Article 5 TEU and the 
protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
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proportionality, which accompanies the Treaty. The powers of the Union 
and its institutions are conferred upon them by the Treaties. How these 
powers are exercised should be judged according to the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. When the Union has exclusive competence, 
the principle of subsidiarity cannot be applied; it is only applicable when the 
Union shares competence with the Member States. However, those who call 
for a limitation of Union competences and the reinstatement of national 
powers can make use of the principle of subsidiarity; others, though, think 
that the principle is not adequate to promote their cause of reallocation of 
powers, because subsidiarity cannot provide for the optimum allocation of 
competence between the Union and the Member States.
160
  
5.3.2 Is there scope of application of the principle of subsidiarity in 
the implementation of the EU’s state aid policy?  
In state aid control the Union has exclusive competence to decide on 
the compatibility of aid measures with the Treaty, because the Treaty 
confers that power to the Commission exclusively.
161
 Subsequently, as the 
rules stand, there is no scope for the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, when the Commission decides on the application of the 
compatibility criteria of Article 107 TFEU. However, the Member States 
can decide on the application of the Block Exemption Regulation and the de 
minimis aid, without having to consult the Commission, beforehand. 
Consequently, there is scope for the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, whenever the Member States decide on the correct enforcement 
of state aid in the form of the observation of the standstill obligation and the 
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implementation of the recovery orders by the Commission. According to the 
Commission’s President: ‘the EU works better, when it focuses on its core 
business.’162  The principle of subsidiarity can help the Union allocate its 
resources efficiently, and focus on where the Union can offer more value, 
leaving Member States to complement the Union institutions at the national 
level. There is no need to consider the Union’s institutions and the Member 
States’ governments and public bodies as rivals, rather, it would be best to 
clearly define their competences and allow then some space in state aid 
control.    
In the current climate that the Eurozone debt crisis has taken control 
over politics all over the European Union, there is a heightened debate about 
the powers and competences of the EU, in general. Due to the fact that the 
rules on the implementation of the Euro have failed, partly because of a 
design flaw, where the monetary union was achieved before establishing a 
fiscal and financial union, and partly because of the Member States’ 
governments not respecting the stability pact rules that required them to 
keep budget deficits and public debt low, many European leaders, 
economists and the markets call for a change in the Treaty.  
There is one trend that desires closer cooperation, in new areas that 
had been left in the competence of the Member States before the crisis, such 
as taxation and pensions. On the other hand, there is another trend that seeks 
to restore powers at the national level, because they feel that the Union has 
failed, and since it is not producing better results as the principle of 
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subsidiarity requires, Member States could have more powers over the 
Union institutions. Whatever happens in the future, it is now certain that 
there is going to be another amendment to the Treaties. The right balance is 
needed between Union powers and national implementation of state aid 
rules and the principle of subsidiarity can help prove who does what more 
efficiently.  
 
5.4 THE ROLE AND POWERS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES IN 
STATE AID ENFORCEMENT. 
Currently, there are different realities within the 28 Member States, 
in relation to the existence of national state aid authorities: some Member 
States have independent national administrative bodies, with some powers 
to implement state aid rules and some do not; or are relying on national 
competition authorities, or just the departments within the ministries of 
economics.   
Out of the 28 current members of the Union, twenty
163
 rely on 
ministries or departments within ministries to assist and coordinate granting 
authorities. Their main responsibilities include assistance with the 
notification of aid measures, monitoring of state aid and sending annual 
reports on state aid of de minimis or exempted from notification measures 
that have been implemented within their national jurisdictions. Six Member 
States
164
 rely on their national competition authorities whose primary role is 
to enforce Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and merger control, to perform 
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the notification and reporting of state aid measures to the Commission. 
Finally, two Member States, namely Malta and Cyprus have introduced two 
new independent state aid administrative authorities. There is 
interconnection between Competition authorities and state aid control in 
some Member States, therefore it is beneficial to examine the enforcement 
powers of national Competition authorities of competition law and conclude 
on whether their practice can be extended in state aid enforcement as well.  
5.4.1 Comparisons between the status of national competition 
authorities that enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the status of 
state aid national authorities.  
The enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by Member States’ 
authorities is provided for in the Treaty: Article 104 TFEU granted powers 
to competent national authorities to apply Articles 101(1) TFEU and 102 
TFEU, until the necessary implementing Regulation where adopted by the 
Council. However, even after the adoption of the implementing Regulations 
the Member States’ authorities powers to enforce Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU still remain: Council Regulation (EC) no 1/2003 clearly abolishes the 
notification system which would lead to exemption of the application of 
Articles 101 of the Treaty, previously set up by Regulation 17 of 6 February 
1962, which was the first implementing Regulation of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.
165
  
Ever since the entry into force of the Regulation 1/2003 the national 
competition authorities and the national courts have been granted powers to 
directly apply Articles 101(1) and 102 and also 101(3) TFEU, which leads 
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to exemption from application of the prohibition imposed on agreements by 
Article 101(1) TFEU. The enforcement system of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU is clearly a decentralised system of enforcement, where the 
Commission and the national authorities share powers and competence, 
which of course should not be overlapping one another’s competences.166 
This is achieved by setting up timeframes, which dictate when each one can 
act and by ensuring the supremacy of EU over national competition law. 
Those reforms that were introduced in antitrust were a ‘source of 
inspiration’167 for the reforms that are being implemented in state aid 
control, which is why the comparison is necessary. Also, others believed 
that the reforms of state aid control may have involved the decentralisation 
powers that have been adopted in the procedures of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU,
168
 which is another reason why the comparisons between the two 
reforms need to be analysed here.  
In the state aid field the status of national authorities is not so clear 
or uniform as the analysis of Member States’ practices indicates. Some 
national competition authorities have powers to control state aid, but not all 
of them, and the legal basis of their powers is not clear, but does exist into 
national laws or accession agreements. The EU legislation for state aid is 
still highly centralised with regard to enforcement of the rules. The Treaty 
reserves for the Commission the primary role in state aid, both in legislation 
and enforcement. Letting aside national courts, whose role in enforcing state 
aid law is clearer and will be examined in the following chapter, there seems 
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to be two different approaches towards the role of national state aid 
authorities among Member States, depending on their time of accession.   
5.4.2 Different types of national state aid authorities in the European 
Union.  
Starting from the SAAP of 2005
169
 the Commission has considered 
that it may be useful to expand the application of the Notice on Cooperation 
with national Judges to other national bodies, as well. The Commission did 
not clarify its intentions on that matter, nor has the Commission acted on 
this declaration, since the adoption of the SAAP. The amended Notice of 
2009
170
 only refers to national courts and did not include other national 
authorities in its scope of application.   
Public enforcement of state aid law is performed by national 
competition authorities in some Member States that have set up divisions 
within them to monitor national state aid measures. The Member States that 
acceded to the union after the expansion of 2004
171
 were under an obligation 
to establish national state aid authorities, before accession to the Union. 
After all, most applicant countries do not usually have detailed national 
provisions for state aid in their legal systems, since state aid control exists to 
safeguard the internal market, which those countries are applying for 
membership of. This obligation was included in the Association 
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Partnerships agreements, signed by applicant countries and the EU Member 
States.
172
  
Those new types of agreements were introduced for the first time, in 
order to help acceding countries to fulfil their obligations to adopt the 
acquis communautaire, the eighth chapter of which included competition 
law. The Association Agreements contain a similar provision, calling for 
candidate countries to ‘further reinforce the administrative capacity (both 
with respect to antitrust and state aid control); ensure enforcement of the 
rules in antitrust and state aid; maintain a comprehensive state aid inventory 
and annual report’.173   There is no specific obligation to establish an 
independent state aid authority and some countries chose to include 
divisions within their newly established competition authorities.  
The competences of those national authorities include coordinating, 
advising and monitoring powers. Mainly, they have the obligation under 
national laws to coordinate the different public authorities that are involved 
in the granting of aid, and advise them on how to draft the notification 
forms, according to the Commission’s requirements. The competition 
authorities send the notification documents to the Commission and also, 
national authorities should keep a register of all existing aid. The experience 
of those national authorities was successful and proves that a mixed system 
of state aid control is feasible.
174
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5.4.3 Powers of national authorities that perform state aid 
enforcement.  
The extent of the powers of the national competition authorities 
entrusted with state aid control varies slightly in some Member States: the 
Czech Office for the Protection of Competition has the power to impose 
fines to both granting authorities and beneficiaries of aid for not submitting 
to the office the requested documents concerning an aid measure.
175
 Similar 
powers to impose fines, for not complying with requests for appropriate 
information, are featured in the competences of the Polish Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection.
176
 In Denmark, the Competition 
Council may order the termination or repayment of aid that is unlawful or 
distorts competition, after a decision on the lawfulness made by the relevant 
minister.
177
  
Some national Competition authorities include detailed data for aid 
granted by public authorities in their annual reports to the Commission, with 
information about the volume of aid and the specific sectors that received 
higher amounts of aid each year.
178
 Finally, some national competition 
authorities have been entrusted with the power to carry out the necessary 
procedures according to national laws for repayment of illegal aid.
179
 
However, two Member States have chosen to establish independent state aid 
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authorities, in order to fulfil their obligation to comply with the state aid 
acquis. Those are Cyprus and Malta, which established respectively the 
Office of the Commissioner for State Aid Control and the State Aid 
Monitoring Board. Their competences extend to the point where the 
authority has powers to pass binding opinions on the application or not of 
the General Block Exemption Regulation, for any national measures that fall 
into its criteria, and also non-binding opinions on the compatibility of all 
other measures with the EU state aid rules. 
 
 
5.5 ARE SPECIALISED NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITIES FOR STATE AID NEEDED IN ALL MEMBER STATES 
OF THE EU? 
Firstly, and before this thesis critically analyses the benefits of a 
decentralised national system for the control of state aid, there needs to be a 
distinction between the competences of the national state aid authorities, 
before any candidate country’s accession to the EU, and the competences it 
eventually has after accession.
180
  
5.5.1 Powers of national authorities at the pre-accession stage.  
During the pre-accession stage, the state aid national authorities in 
candidate states play the role that the Commission has for the Union’s 
Member States, with regard to the control of subsidies. It has been said that 
                                                 
180
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establishing independent national state aid authorities at this stage because 
such authorities are probably ‘better suited’ than Ministries to implement 
state aid control, since they could resist political pressure.
181
 Their primary 
competence is to make sure that all the requirements that the EU 
Commission had set for the closing of the Chapter on Competition were 
satisfied and secondly, the national authorities had the competence to assess 
existing and new aid and to decide whether it was compatible with their 
national state aid laws and subsequently with the Treaty of Rome provisions 
on state aid.
182
 It is evident that the national authorities were replacing the 
duties of the EU Commission for as long as it had no competence in 
candidate countries.  
5.5.2 Powers of national state aid authorities after accession to the 
Union. 
Following accession the Treaty fully applies and is incorporated into 
national law, which has as a consequence that the powers and competences 
of the national authorities need to be adjusted to the new conditions. Thus, 
the national authorities, regardless of whether they are in the form of a 
competition authority or an independent state aid authority, they lose the 
ability to declare aid compatible with the internal market. That is because 
Article 107(1) TFEU is not directly applicable to the Member States. The 
Article, though, that is directly applicable in the national legal order is 108 
(3) TFEU, which provides for the standstill obligation. The standstill 
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obligation is still observed by national state aid authorities (and national 
courts), even after accession.     
 
5.6 BENEFITS OF THE DECENTRALISED IMPLEMENTATION OF 
STATE AID CONTROL BY NATIONAL STATE AID AUTHORITIES. 
Having analysed the state of play with regard to competences of the 
national authorities, the thesis will now examine the benefits that a 
decentralised implementation of state aid control can bring to the European 
wide target of less and better targeted state aid; in other words, can the 
national authorities implement state aid policy effectively, and what should 
their position be in the future?  
5.6.1 The modernisation of state aid control in relation to national 
state aid authorities.  
According to the Commission the State Aid Modernisation aims to 
exclude more types of aid from the notification obligation, namely: making 
good the damage caused by natural disasters; social aid for transport for 
residents of remote regions; certain broadband infrastructure; innovation; 
culture and heritage conservation; sports and multifunctional 
infrastructure.
183
 Also, the Commission proposes
184
 to establish a national 
de minimis state aid register in every member state, which will include aid 
measures that fall under the thresholds of the de minimis Regulation.
185
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Therefore, the responsibilities of Member States for ensuring the effective 
implementation of state aid control have increased.
186
  
Before the State Aid Modernisation of 2012, the proposal to 
establish national state aid authorities was part of the State Aid Action Plan 
of 2005 and the consultation with the stakeholders that followed the 
adoption of the SAAP document.
187
 The Commission also summarised the 
results of the consultation in a document published online, which gives a 
clear view of how both Member States and private stakeholders consider the 
possibility of the Commission pressing for the establishment of independent 
state aid authorities.
188
 The conclusion though is that the Commission was 
not able to eliminate differences between Member States in this matter and 
it did not succeed in achieving support for the creation of a network of state 
aid national authorities similar to the European Competition Network of 
national antitrust authorities.
189
 State aid seems to be an unsuitable ground 
form harmonisation among Member States.
190
 
Before analysing the views of the stakeholders, it is necessary to 
mention that the Member States enjoy the principle of institutional 
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autonomy.
191
 This means that the Commission cannot impose its views to 
the Member States’ institutions and authorities, and that Member States’ 
national institutions do not have to follow the Commission’s views on how 
national administration should be performed. They are obligated however, 
to follow and to fully apply EU law, due to the supremacy of EU law over 
national law, if there is contradiction.  
The consultation produced a highly negative result towards national 
state aid authorities. Most of the respondents disapprove of the creation of 
such authorities, or at least require more information and clarification from 
the Commission about it.
192
 Only 15 respondents support the idea, whereas, 
28 respondents do not support it. What is really interesting from the results 
presented by the Commission is that the private sector generally favours the 
creation of independent national state aid authorities, whereas, the public 
sector does not endorse the idea.
193
  
Obviously, Member States’ governments and public bodies that 
grant state aid do not want another level of control between the granting of 
aid and the control already performed by the Commission and the Courts, 
whether national or Union courts. The reason behind this rejection of 
independent national authorities could be that they want to use state aid to 
promote their policies, according to the analysis in the second chapter of the 
thesis. Independent authorities might create obstacles in the realisation of 
                                                 
191
 The Principle of the Member States institutional autonomy derives from the old Article 
249 TEC, which has now been replaced by Article 291 TFEU.  
192
 Ibid 26. 
193
 For example the OFT Response to the Action Plan suggests that any national state aid 
authorities should only be in the form of providing support or advice to the government 
departments that provide subsidies. See OFT response to the Commission’s Action Plan 
para3.2 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_saap/index.html 
> accessed on 15–11-2011.  
278 
 
government policies. This fact alone should be an argument in favour of 
creating some type of independent national state aid authorities. The 
discussion ever since this consultation in 2006 has been stalled, and this 
thesis aims at contributing to this debate and reviving the debate, if possible, 
by providing for the benefits of such a move, in contrast with the problems 
that may occur also. 
5.6.2 National state aid authorities can enhance compliance with 
state aid control.  
The number of notifications after the reforms of state aid is still high 
because ‘the thresholds for de minimis aid are fairly low.’194 However, at 
the same time, Member States’ fail to notify all measures that should have 
been notified to the Commission before implementation, which makes the 
aid unlawful. According to the Scoreboard
195
 the Commission took 986 
Decisions from 2000 to 2012 for unlawful aid and took negative Decisions 
on their compatibility in 224 cases (about 23%). National state aid 
authorities could have made an economic analysis of the impact of the 
measure and could have delivered an opinion about the notification 
necessity of each measure.
196
 National state aid authorities can help deliver 
more efficient state aid control, at the national level, in many ways. Possible 
areas where they could have competence, without jeopardising the 
Commission’s exclusive competence to deliver Decisions on the 
compatibility of measures with the internal market are the areas that the 
                                                 
194
 Thibaut Kleiner, ‘Modernization of state aid policy’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed), Research 
Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 20 
195
 Commission staff working document Facts and figures on State aid in the EU Member 
States 2012 Update SEC(2012)443 final para 5.1 
196
 Phedon Nicolaides, ‘Decentralised State Aid Control in an Enlarged European Union: 
Feasible, Necessary or Both?’ (2003) 26(2) World Competition 263, 274 
279 
 
national state aid authorities that do exist, have competence.
197
 Some 
argue,
198
 in fact, that there is no specific need for granting the control of 
subsidies to a supranational authority from an economic point of view. Even 
if specialised state aid authorities are not established, national authorities 
like Courts of Auditors could act as the controllers of aid. What is important 
for the national controllers of aid, whatever their form, is the need for 
sufficient independence from national political pressures.
199
 
5.6.3 Better implementation of the control of measures that are 
already exempted from notification. 
The reason behind the adoption of a General Block Exemption 
Regulation and the de minimis aid, which exempts certain aid from 
notification to the Commission, is to relieve the Commission from 
examining certain measures.
200
 Those measures are the ones that will 
probably have limited effects on competition and intra-community trade, 
because of either their amount and scale, or their overall benefits towards 
the accomplishment of a common European policy, like the promotion of 
environmental projects. With the prospect of having even more areas of aid 
exempted from notification, in the future, and losing the a priori control, it 
would be useful, if a national authority had the competence to examine the 
facts of the measure and pass a binding opinion over the compliance of the 
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measure with those mentioned regulations, namely the Block Exemption 
Regulation
201
 and the de minimis Regulation.
202
  
5.6.4 National state aid authorities can assist state aid granting 
bodies more directly than the Commission.  
The other possible area where there is potential scope for national 
authorities to implement state aid control is the advisory services to 
Ministries and bodies that plan and design aid measures. Having a national 
contact point where each national and regional authority can turn to for 
information, concerning the law and the procedures around state aid 
implementation could be very beneficial, as it would domesticate state aid 
law in a sense.
203
 Especially, since, sometimes, national granting bodies 
would not be familiar with specialised knowledge about economic notions 
that the Commission uses during its investigations of measures.  
It will be further discussed in the seventh chapter that a refined 
economic analysis has been introduced in the examination of state aid 
measures, analysis that requires specialised economic knowledge; this kind 
of knowledge will not be available to every single civil servant that drafts 
aid measures on behalf of its employer. A national coordination authority 
will help deliver better drafted notifications that will save time and make the 
overall notification obligation more effective.    
5.6.5 In what way can information gathering help adopt more pro-
efficient aid measures?  
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The national state aid authorities can work more closely with the 
local beneficiaries in any subsidy, and make the assessments that are needed 
without the beneficiary being able to withhold information as easily as it 
would be to do so against the Commission.
204
 For the Commission to 
perform the economic analysis of the impact of the measure on competition 
it relies on data concerning the market involved, the market shares of the 
undertakings involved, the market prices for the service that will be 
subsidised and the eventual effects on competition within that market.  
National state aid authorities can provide information through 
cooperation channels with the Commission and help it deliver robust 
economic analysis, which will in turn result in stronger decisions by the 
Commission, on the compatibility of aid. More efficient control of subsidies 
can come from the sharing of information, both ways.
205
 A former deputy 
Director General of the DG for Competition has acknowledged the need for 
cooperation in saying that the Commission and the Member States are 
‘partners in a learning by doing process’,206 and that there is no 
‘Commission monopoly’ in implementing ‘the refined economic analysis in 
schemes and cases.’ 
The communication and exchange of information between the 
Commission and the Member States’ authorities will ultimately lead to the 
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creation of a ‘common state aid culture’207 for all Member States, even for 
those that do not traditionally have the culture of controlling state funds in 
the Union. In comparison with antitrust where the exchange of information 
after the adoption of the new regulation in 2003 is more enhanced, 
cooperation between national authorities and the supranational authorities is 
still underdeveloped.    
5.6.6 Can the reduction of the overload that the supranational 
authority faces result in the control of more distortive aid measures?   
The most positive effect of having national authorities in each 
Member State to deal with the ex-ante control of aid measures is the relief 
of the Commission workload, of having to deal with measures that will not 
eventually harm competition. The Commission’s focus should be placed on 
larger projects that can have effects in intra-community trade, and provide 
advantages for undertakings that will ultimately distort completion and harm 
consumers. Having a level of control before the measure is examined by the 
Commission, or even better exempting measures according to the EU rules 
from Commission control, will lead to better and faster enforcement of state 
aid law.
208
 The a priori control of subsidies at the national level can help 
national authorities plan better designed national measures and stop the 
implementation of harmful subsidies like rescue aid and redirect the aid that 
Member States grant to projects that can produce positive outcomes, like 
innovation and research and development. 
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  Moreover, national granting bodies often lack experience, 
knowledge about the latest EU rules and resources into designing 
appropriate and benefit producing measures. According to a writer the 
Member States are not ignoring state aid law, but the law ‘is not 
understandable and its procedures are cumbersome.’209 National authorities 
can help them deliver exactly that, by being an advisory body at the 
planning stage as well, not only having powers at the enforcement stage.   
The Commission, on its own, cannot be effective and timely in its 
decisions to prevent distortions of competition, unless it bends the rules, as 
it happened with the crisis package for the fast track examination of 
measures for credit institutions. Instead of bending or altering the rules, in 
each crisis, it would be more efficient and transparent to allow the 
Commission’s resources to focus on what is really harmful and leave less 
harmful measures to be controlled by national authorities. This partially 
decentralised state aid control will be more judicious and efficient.     
5.6.7 Provide for transparent and straightforward recovery 
procedures at the national level.  
The most important competence that national state aid authorities 
could be completely entrusted with has to do with securing the repayment of 
unlawful and misused amounts of aid. In other words, they could perform 
the enforcement of Commission recovery decisions.  Different laws in all 
Member States have hindered the repayment of illegal aid, because of 
complex and diverse national laws and procedures that are involved in 
recovery. Having a central agency that can coordinate procedures, according 
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to national laws that would have to be applied and coordinating granting 
bodies, the recipient and possible national court procedures can lead to 
greater success of repayment being made on time.  
To further enhance the repayment process, national state aid 
authorities could be entrusted with the power to impose fines for those that 
stall the repayment process, which in turn provide for the incentive or the 
coercion factor needed into pursuing recovery more vigorously in the future. 
The provision to impose fines to both the granting body and the beneficiary 
undertakings has already been adopted by the Czech national competition 
authority with regard to the violation of obligation to provide the office with 
information. The Czech Office in 2010 has already imposed fines for 
violations of the de minimis rules in 23 out of 29 decisions taken.
210
  This 
best practice could be copied in other Member States for enforcing 
compliance with a number of state aid rules including the obligation to 
recover aid after a decision from the Commission.   
This last possible competence to impose fines exposes one negative 
aspect of not having an independent authority and instead relying on the 
hard shell of the national administration to secure the recovery. Only having 
ministries involved in state aid control, at the national level, means that the 
same authority that might design the measure, should also grant the aid and 
at the end have to apply the enforcement rules on repayment.
211
 This is 
certainly not going to lead to an efficient outcome, since the controller is 
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actually the one being controlled by itself or by others in the same level of 
administration.  
 
5.7 NEGATIVE EFFECTS FROM THE CREATION OF INDEPENDENT 
NATIONAL STATE AID AUTHORITIES. 
It is true that the creation of national state aid authorities has met 
opposition more than favourable advocacy. This is because such a step in 
state aid law can create problems and not only solutions. The possible 
negative aspects of creating independent national state aid authoritative in 
all Member States where highlighted by the respondents of the consultation 
on the objectives set out by the SAAP. Next the thesis will analyse those 
negative effects and propose ways that might help overcome the problems. 
5.7.1 Conflict of interests and competences. Roles and powers.  
Having another level of control alongside the competences of the 
commission, the Court of Justice and the national courts of the Member 
States, whose role will be analysed in the following chapter of this thesis, 
may create conflicts of interest and conflict of competences between all 
those bodies. National administrative authorities that could perform some 
powers of enforcement at the national level might be susceptible to political 
and economic pressure by national governments and markets to promote 
their interests. Another concern is that national competition authorities in 
the state aid field would have to go against their own governments, because 
of the government granting the aid, whereas in merger control the 
286 
 
government involvement in little if none at all.
212
 For the efficient 
enforcement of state aid rules the independence of those new national 
bodies would have to be secured.  
Also, secondary legislation at Union level should distinguish the 
allocation of competences between the Commission and the national courts 
and also the precedence rules among the decisions made by the different 
bodies, at different levels. If national authorities adopt decisions for state aid 
measures, it should be clearly defined in Union legislation that one should 
hold judgment for the other authority to decide first, in case both the 
national and the supranational authorities examine the same measure at the 
same time. Because of the exclusive competence of the Commission, the 
national authorities should be obligated by the legislation to hold judgment 
in such a case for the Commission to decide first.   
Lastly, another issue that probably makes the establishment of 
national authorities problematic is the cost of running such an authority. 
Member states have to keep the costs relating to public administration in 
control. Consequently, a cost-benefit analysis should be performed before 
deciding to establish any new independent body. However, the outcome of 
such an analysis depends on what will be considered as a benefit. The cost 
certainly includes the staffing and operational expenses. If having efficient 
measures is the result of the establishment of national authorities, then the 
benefits will overcome the costs, because the consequences of illegal aid, 
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such as recovery and possibly penalties, will not be such a big problem 
anymore.    
5.7.2 Concerns about the legal basis for the establishment of national 
state aid authorities 
Due to the fact that the Treaty rules do not provide for a legal basis 
to establish such national authorities, there needs to be a legal basis that will 
secure the transparency and independence of their establishment and 
competence. Consequently, their establishment should be legally enacted by 
way of secondary Union legislation or better yet, by way of national laws.  
However, due to the principle of institutional independence the 
Union cannot force the Member States to establish any national authority. 
Union legislation though,
213
 has allowed the Member States to create the 
National Competition Authorities and this example can be used to resolve 
the issue of the legal basis for state aid authorities. Furthermore, it is true 
that the existence of national state aid authorities in the Member States that 
chose to maintain them after membership relies on national state aid laws
214
 
and there does not appear to be any conflict with the Treaties, although their 
powers now are more limited than before accession.  
5.7.3 Concerns about jeopardising the uniform enforcement of state 
aid law 
A major concern of most participants in the consultation was the fear 
that establishing authorities and granting them more powers to enforce state 
aid at the national level could lead to more confusion, bureaucracy and 
                                                 
213
 Namely Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
214
 Law 30(I) of 2001 of the Republic of Cyprus as amended by law 108(1) of 2009 
concerning the control of state aid. Also, Article 57 of the Business Promotion Act 
established the Maltese State Aid Monitoring Board.  
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‘uneven application of state aid control’ across the Union.215 There has been 
criticism that the complexity of the state aid rules may lead to some 
authorities to implement rules ‘erroneously’.216 Or even that national 
authorities might ‘chose not to notify aid measures to test the limits of state 
aid rules’.217  
All of those issues of uneven application are possible, but they are 
also true currently, since every single Member State chooses to enforce the 
same rules on state aid control with different bodies, different procedures, 
their own national procedures and at a different level and quality of 
implementation, since this thesis has shown the disparities between 
successes and failures to different aspects of state aid enforcement in 
different Member States.  
Furthermore, any issues of uneven application were successfully 
overcome by applicant Member States that enforced state aid rules, prior to 
their accession, with the help and supervision by the Commission. Lastly, 
lessons could be learnt from the enforcement of antitrust at the national 
level, and a Network of state aid authorities could be established among 
Member States, similar to the European Competition Network, which will 
become a forum of exchange of ideas and best practices that can help all 
members to implement state aid control more efficiently.
218
  
                                                 
215
 European Commission, Results of the consultation on the state aid action plan (SAAP) - 
detailed summary (09-02-2006) 27 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_saap/saap.pdf > accessed 
on 15-11-2011. 
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5.8 POSSIBLE DISRUPTION TO THE FUTURE DECENTRALISATION 
AND MODERNISATION OF THE STATE AID POLICY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
In the current economic and political climate, though, is it really 
possible to achieve efficient levels of decentralised state aid control? The 
current on-going financial crisis, which started as a banking  crisis in 2008, 
and has turned to a sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards in the Union 
has caused many to argue that more centralised control is needed in the 
European Union and more particularly in the 17 member strong 
Eurozone.
219
  
The faithful of a more centralised governance in the Eurozone call 
for the Union’s institutions, such as the European Central Bank to be given 
more powers in relation to the implementation of the fiscal policies of 
Member States that currently enjoy independent fiscal and taxation policies. 
Even stronger centralised fiscal policy means that the Union’s institutions 
will have more control over national budgets, which in turn means that the 
Union’s institutions might acquire more powers, in relation to government 
spending; of course, part of that government spending is state aid, since aid 
must come from the state or state resources, which means the state budget. 
This is contrary to the calls made by the Commission itself for a more 
decentralised implementation of competition policy and enforcement.  
Currently, it is not possible for the Treaties, namely the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty for the European 
                                                 
219
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Union to be amended, due to lack of agreement between the EU Member 
States. Instead, the Member States opted for an intergovernmental Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (TSCG),
220
 which is open to all EU Member States, not just the ones 
that use the Euro. This Treaty did not amend state aid policy, which is 
provided for in the TFEU. The discussion for the amendment of the 
Treaties, though, has started among the Member States, because of the 
harmful effects of the sovereign debt crisis to the Union’s economy. Next, 
the thesis will examine the principles that grant distinct competences to the 
Commission and the Member States’ authorities. 
The State Aid Modernisation
221
 has made changes that allow the 
Commission to focus on more distortive measures but puts more 
responsibilities to Member States. The Commission expresses its 
expectations of better coordination from Member States in terms of quality 
and timely notification information but makes little changes to the 
notification procedures that might assist Member States. Instead, the State 
Aid Modernisation forces Member States to create a Register for de minimis 
aid that according to most Member States responses to the Commission’s 
consultation creates an unwelcome bureaucratic burden that will entail 
significant costs for its set up and establishment.
222
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 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
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221
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
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negative for the creation of the central Register at 
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5.9 CONCLUSION 
The Commission has competence to adopt rules relating to the 
implementation of the state aid policy within the European Union and its 
Member States. Additionally, Member States have already been entrusted 
with certain aspects of state aid control and enforcement of state aid rules at 
the national level, such as notification and recovery procedures. The two 
actors in the state aid field, the national and the supranational authorities 
have had successful cooperation during the last two enlargement 
procedures, with the first performing efficient state aid control, supervised 
by the Commission. However, the monitoring data show that there is non-
compliance from Member States with their obligations to observe state aid 
rules before the adoption of state aid measures, as well as observance of 
conditions that accompany Commission Decisions for the authorisation of 
aid. 
For the purpose of achieving better compliance, this research has 
indicated the benefits of creating independent state aid authorities in all 
Member States and contrasted them with the problems that might arise from 
such a shift in the status of powers and competences of state aid 
enforcement. The debate has been going on since the adoption of the SAAP 
but there has been no clear path as to which should be the way forward. This 
thesis advocates that there certainly is space for more enforcement powers 
to be given to national state aid authorities that will work alongside the 
Commission in implementing state aid policy. This chapter has presented 
other possible action, such as imposition of fines for non – compliance, 
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training of national administrators in the same context as national Judges are 
being trained and finally a system of external certifications of national 
authorities that might be available as solutions to the problem, in the current 
state aid context.  
This chapter of the thesis applied the first research criterion, which 
questions the speed and applicability of state aid procedures. The criterion 
was applied on the national procedures of the Member States that relate to 
state aid control. The test has proven that there is an uneven European wide 
level field, with each Member State having a different institutional approach 
towards the control of subsidies at the national level, mainly affected by the 
time of accession. The establishment of national state aid authorities may be 
controversial. However, as the Commission pushes more and more 
measures into the exemption from notification, either by way of expanding 
the General Block Exemption Regulation,
223
 or by raising the thresholds of 
de minimis aid
224
 the a priori control of subsidies is in jeopardy. National 
authorities can replace that control and the research has presented the 
benefits that can come from establishing state aid authorities at the national 
level. Next, the thesis will examine the powers of the other actors in state 
aid enforcement at the national level, which are the national courts of the 
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Union’s Member States and their contribution to efficient state aid 
enforcement.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
HOW EFFICIENT IS THE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AID 
RULES IN NATIONAL COURTS? 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are other significant ways to achieve decentralisation of the 
state aid policy, besides establishing national state aid authorities. 
Decentralisation or rather partial decentralisation of the European Union’s 
state aid control can also be achieved by enforcement of state aid rules in 
the national courts of the Member States. Enforcement in national courts 
can have two forms. One is actions taken by Member States against, for 
example, the recipient of aid; the other form is a classical private 
enforcement initiated by individuals.
1
 Private enforcement has been the 
major reform attempt of the Commission’s competition policy in the 1990s, 
in contrast with the ‘administrative centralised enforcement’ by the 
Commission, whose powers to control anticompetitive agreements and 
abuses of dominant position were absolute, before the reform.
2
 For state aid 
policy though, this reform started later, in 2005 and is not completed yet.  
The efficient enforcement in national courts of state aid decisions is 
the main analysis of this chapter. The analysis will be performed by 
applying the third research criterion, which seeks to test the robustness of 
the enforcement of state aid. In this chapter the criterion will be applied to 
the enforcement powers and procedures of national courts that relate to state 
                                                 
1
 Martin Köhler, ‘Private Enforcement of State Aid Law – Problems of Guaranteeing EU 
Rights by means of National (Procedural) Law’ [2012] 3 EStAL 369, 370. 
2
 B Rodger and A McCulloch, Competition law and policy (Routledge, 2009) 83. 
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aid control. The analysis is not limited to private enforcement, but will 
include all possible actions before national courts. The main issues that will 
be addressed in this chapter of the thesis are: the research will identify the 
cases that the national courts have competence to judge and the way that 
their competence is shared with the Union’s institutions. Also, the analysis 
examines the legal bases that are available to individuals in order for them 
to enjoy the protection of the national courts. Another research question will 
concern the laws that national courts apply when they judge cases of state 
aid. Finally, the procedural issues that have arisen, so far, from private 
litigation in national courts will be examined and also the benefits and 
problems from promoting private enforcement.  
All of those questions will be answered by reviewing the current 
legal framework, concerning the enforcement in national courts. The 
Commission sought to promote private litigation before national courts, as a 
means of achieving ‘full respect of state aid rules’, in the SAAP.3 Private 
enforcement occurs, when an action for infringement of the law is brought 
before the competent court, by a private individual,
4
 who alleges that his 
rights have been breached by the infringer.  The Commission’s view was 
that private litigation could support the need for better effectiveness and 
credibility of state aid control. This could only be achieved by proper 
enforcement, in areas, where there were problems identified before, such as 
the enforcement of recovery decisions at the national level, and the 
protection of rights of interested parties. If all of those goals are achieved, 
                                                 
3
 State Aid action Plan: Less and better targeted State Aid: a roadmap for State Aid reform 
2005-2009, COM(2005) 107 final.  
4
 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law text cases and materials (5
th
 ed OUP, 2011) 181  
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the greater goal of less and better targeted aid would be better achieved 
according to the Commission.  
However, enforcement in the national courts was first introduced 
before the adoption of the SAAP in 2005. The first attempt to settle the 
competence of national courts was the adoption of the Notice on 
cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the state aid 
field in 1995.
5
 Moreover, another turning point in the area of litigation 
before Member States courts’, concerning state aid, was the 2006 study on 
enforcement at national level, which was updated in 2009;
6
 this study 
resulted in the adoption of the 2009 Notice on the enforcement of state aid 
law by national courts.
7
 All of those legal documents, together with the 
Treaty Articles on state aid, comprise the legal framework for the 
enforcement in national courts and will be analysed next.  
6.2 BENEFITS FROM ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AID RULES IN 
NATIONAL COURTS  
6.2.1 Award of damages in national courts 
The first and most important benefit that comes from private 
enforcement of state aid law is that the Commission, which initiates the 
public enforcement of state aid, cannot award damages. The competitor or 
                                                 
5
 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the state aid field 
[1995] OJ C312/8. 
6
 The 2009 version of the study on enforcement of state aid rules at national level was 
commissioned by the Commission to a private law firm and it does not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Commission. It is a tool though for the Commission to draft its legal 
documents and it is available online < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/enforcement_study_2009.pd
f > accessed on 22-11-2011.  
7
 Commission Notice on the enforcement of state aid law by national courts, [2009] OJ 
C85/01.  
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any third party, who alleges it has suffered damage from an illegal aid, 
cannot ask the Commission to award damages, because the Treaty does not 
grant such powers to the Commission.  
In addition, national laws on damages or any other state aid claim 
can be used as a legal basis by national courts to award damages, for breach 
of EU state aid law that is directly applicable in the national legal order.
8
 It 
is certainly more beneficial to have two legal bases for claim, both national 
laws and EU law and only the national court can enforce both legal systems. 
6.2.2 National courts may have better access to information 
concerning the case than the Commission    
Secondly, private enforcement of state aid law can be more 
effective, in certain cases, than public enforcement because the party that 
claims that its rights have been breached, by an illegal state aid, will 
probably hold vital information concerning the facts of the injury. Usually, 
competitors are in a position to have first-hand knowledge about the market 
in which they operate, which will probably be a national market, and the 
characteristics of the specific sector of the economy. This information 
would not be available to the Commission on a first-hand basis, and it 
would have to seek information from the parties to the case, namely the 
Member State and the beneficiary. The third party can easily use the 
information it possesses, before the national court proceedings, and prove 
the damage it claims it has suffered.  
 
                                                 
8
 More on damages claims for illegal state aid in the following paragraphs of this chapter.   
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6.2.3 Litigation in national courts can promote social welfare  
Further, private enforcement can provide for the maximisation of 
social welfare. The maximisation of social welfare occurs when the private 
enforcer initiates proceedings that will result in a court decision, which will 
correct the damage that has been caused by the illegal state aid. This 
judgment, though, has both a corrective and a deterrent effect.
9
 It will 
eventually deter the perpetrators of the damage to cause a similar harm, 
again, in the future. This way, the private enforcement produces results that 
benefit the welfare of society in general, not only the injured individual in a 
specific case. The benefits that the individual can achieve from private 
enforcement will be higher than the ones it will achieve by public 
enforcement, by the Commission or national competition authorities. There 
could be breaches of state aid law that the Commission and national state 
aid authorities might not act against, for example, for reasons of limited 
information or resources.
10
 Consequently, the damage to competition in this 
case will remain, unless a private enforcer decided to initiate private 
proceedings.  
Accordingly, the benefits that will be achieved through private 
litigation include the award of damages, for harm caused to a competitor, 
usually through the grant of illegal state aid, and the subsequent distortion of 
the market, in which both were competing against each other and against all 
other competitors. Thus the outcome of private enforcement can provide 
                                                 
9
 R Mashall, M Meurer, JF Richard, ‘Litigation settlement and Collusion’ [1994] 109(1) The 
quarterly Journal of Economics 211.   
10
 European Commissioner Mario Monti, ‘Private litigation as a key complement to public 
enforcement of competition rules and the first conclusions on the implementation of the 
new merger regulation’ Speech/04/403 2.  
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more substantial benefits for the individual company that will seek action 
before national courts, against illegal state aid.  
6.2.4 Litigation in national courts will lead to better compliance with 
the state aid rules at the national level.  
Moreover, private enforcement and the possibility of having to 
compensate for granting illegal state aid if ordered by the national court will 
eventually lead to a better level of compliance with the rules.
11
 It is often 
being said that it is not enough to have good rules on any aspect of the law; 
it is also necessary for every legal order to have proper enforcement 
mechanisms that will create deterrent effects to possible infringers of those 
good rules. This is certainly true for state aid control as well. National courts 
are seen in the Modernisation as a way of achieving compliance with state 
aid rules: effective private enforcement in national courts can ensure that the 
exempted measures from the ex ante notification requirement are being 
observed.
12
 
Competitors of the original infringer are more likely to follow court 
judgments from their national courts, rather than the judgments of the 
European Courts. Those individual judgments on state aid cases, if held 
consistently, will become case law and everyone involved in state aid law at 
the national level will be more familiar with national case law that will lead 
to better compliance with the state aid framework. Apart, from benefits, 
                                                 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - EU State 
Aid Modernisation (SAM), Brussels 8.5.2012 COM(2012) 209 final, para 21 
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enforcement of state aid law in national courts has produced some problems, 
which will be examined next.  
6.3 THE DOCTRINE OF DIRECT EFFECT OF UNION LAW AND 
WHICH STATE AID RULES HAVE DIRECT EFFECT 
In brief, all Union legislation, primary, which is the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and secondary, which is Decisions and Regulations can in principle have 
direct effect. The meaning of private enforcement and direct effect was 
established by the Court’s case law: in Van Gend en Loos13 the Court 
interpreted the Treaty and held that it did not forbid the possibility of private 
enforcement, even though the Treaty explicitly refers to public enforcement 
of Union law, by the Commission in Article 258 TFEU (then Articles 169 
and 170 of the EC Treaty). Consequently, it was this judgment that first 
established the legitimacy of private enforcement of EU law in general, 
because of the broad interpretation of the Treaty by the Court:  It held that 
‘the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law’ [...] ‘and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals’.14  
  Additionally, the Court established the principle of direct effect: 
first, it means that a Union provision that has direct effect can be invoked by 
individuals before national courts and secondly, in its broader interpretation, 
direct effect confers a right to individuals that can be enforced before 
                                                 
13
 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 13. 
14
 Ibid.  
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national courts.
15
 Later, the Court in its case law clarified the conditions, 
under which direct effect is to be given to a Treaty Article or secondary 
legislation; the conditions are that the provision must be clear and 
unconditional.
16
 It must be pointed that the Treaty does not refer to direct 
effect, rather it is a doctrine created by the Court, and direct effect is granted 
to Treaty Articles and secondary legislation if the conditions are fulfilled by 
the Court in a case by case basis. 
Specifically, state aid provisions that have direct effect are the 
Article 108 (3) TFEU, which provides for the standstill obligation and the 
notification obligation,
17
 which, if not followed, can be considered a breach 
of EU law, which can be invoked before national courts by individuals. In a 
case before the national courts of Romania the Romanian court confirmed 
for the first time in the Romanian legal order
18
 that based in the direct effect 
of Article 108(3) TFEU the national court has competence to draw all 
effects with regard illegal aid, including the power to annul the measure that 
granted illegal aid, even though there were no national laws to serve as a 
legal basis for the annulment.
19
  
However, there are national laws in some Member States that require 
local national authorities to notify aid to the national central government. 
Nevertheless, this obligation is derived from national law and is not an 
obligation of EU law. Consequently, national courts have held that the 
                                                 
15
 Ibid: ‘It follows from the foregoing considerations that, according to the spirit, the 
general scheme and the wording of the Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as 
producing direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect.’ 
16
 See P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law text cases and materials (5
th
 ed OUP, 2011)186. 
17
 More about the standstill obligation in chapter three (3.3.3) of the thesis.  
18
 Anca Ioana Jurcovan, ‘State Aid Private Enforcement – Beginning of a New Era’ [2013] 1 
EStAL 34.  
19
 Decision of Piteşti Court of Appeal dated 14 November 2012, no. 1735/30/2011, (NYR). 
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national laws on implementation of state aid were applicable, and not the 
Treaty provisions on notification to the Commission.
20
 
On the contrary, Article 107 (1) TFEU, which provides for the 
conditions, under which a measure can be considered state aid,
21
 does not 
have direct effect. The decision on the compatibility of aid with the Treaty 
criteria remains an exclusive competence of the Commission. This is what 
distinguishes the powers of the two actors of state aid control, the 
Commission and the national courts, and provides for distinct, yet, 
complimentary competences. 
The other legal provision that has direct effect and therefore the 
national courts are expected to apply it, when they judge cases concerning 
the correct application of state aid rules is the General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER) of 2008.
22
 Furthermore, all the Block exemption 
regulations that were replaced by the GBER had direct effect in the past. 
Consequently, if the conditions concerning the exemption of notification of 
aid measures that are exempted by way of the application of the GBER are 
to be found to have been breached, by the national court, the individuals that 
have been harmed, by this breach, can ask for reparation by the national 
court. The legal basis for the reparation would be the breach of the GBER 
                                                 
20
 Judgment of the Swedish Administrative Court, ‘Regeringsratten’, of 10 December 2010, 
Case 2597/09, AA v Arjangs kommun in Ida Otken Eriksson, ‘Two new state aid rulings 
from the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court’ [2011] ESTAL 2, 203 
21
 For the conditions see the first chapter of the thesis.  
22
 Regulation No 800/2008 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty declaring 
certain categories of aid compatible with the common market (General Block Exemption 
Regulation) [2008] OJ L214/3. 
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provisions. The national court cannot assess the compatibility of a measure 
with the GBER; that remains a competence of the Commission.
23
    
6.4 WHO HAS POWER TO INTERPRET 107(1) TFEU 
It follows from the Court’s case law that Article 107 (1) TFEU does 
not have direct effect. But does that mean that the national courts cannot 
apply the criteria about the definition of aid. And if that was true, then how 
could they overcome the obstacle of deciding for the first time for new aid 
measures, for example, whether any specific measure constitutes aid 
according to the Treaty? Wisely, the Court provided for a solution to the 
problems that the lack of direct effect of Article 107(1) TFEU could cause 
and hinder the enforcement at the national level. 
 In Steinike & Weinlig
24
 the Court held that the national courts can 
interpret and apply the concept of aid, in order to determine, whether a 
measure can be classified as state aid within the Treaty, but refrain from 
deciding on the compatibility of the measure with the internal market. This 
judgment allows national courts to apply the concept of aid and if they 
decide that there is aid according to the notion of the Treaty, they should 
then decide if that aid measure has been properly notified or not and from 
then on take the appropriate action. The national court’s power to apply the 
concept of aid does not extend to the compatibility of that aid with the 
internal market, which is the exclusive competence of the Commission.  
                                                 
23
 Article 16 of the Commission Notice on the enforcement of state aid law by national 
courts, [2009] OJ C85/01. 
24
 Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig [1977] ECR 595, para 14; and from then on constant case 
law, for example see Case C-143 Adria - Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I – 8365, para 29. Also 
this case law has been transferred as a legal rule in Article 10 of the Notice on 
enforcement.  
304 
 
In a German case
25
 the national court correctly applied the elements 
of aid in the particular measure that was brought before it. The national 
court was called, by a competitor, to judge whether an agreement between a 
German airport and Ryanair that allowed Ryanair to pay less tariffs than 
other airlines constituted unlawful aid and to order recovery. The national 
court reached the conclusion that the agreement constituted aid because the 
Ryanair agreement granted a selective advantage against competitors 
operating in the market and it involved state resources because the airport 
was operated by a public body.
26
 Therefore, the national court held that the 
competitor was entitled to request recovery of the unlawful aid and claim 
damages, which the national court can order according to the case law.
27
 
This judgment was not endorsed by the national regional court that was 
called to assess the same benefits granted to Ryanair. The Court rejected the 
previous judgment and held that only the European Commission can decide 
that aid is unlawful and order recovery.
28
 This analysis proves the confusion 
that exists between national courts of the same legal order, at different levels 
about the lengths of their jurisdiction when state aid cases are concerned.      
In another case
29
 the UK Court of Appeal referred to the Steinike
30
 
judgment. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether a fiscal measure, such 
as the 1982 Finance Act, created a favourable fiscal regime for BP, ESSO 
                                                 
25
 Kiel District Court ("Landgericht Kiel 1. Kammer für Handelssachen"), 27.07.2006, 14 O 
Kart. 176/04, "Ryanair 1" 
26
 Ibid paras 85-86. 
27
 Case C-199/06, CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, [2008] ECR I-
469 paras 45-46. 
28
 Coblence Higher Regional Court ("Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, 2. Zivilkammer"), 
25/02/2009, 4 U759/07, "Ryanair 4" 
29
 R v Attorney General, ex parte ICI plc ([1987] 1 CMLR 72 (Court of Appeal)) 
30
 Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinlig [1977] ECR 595 
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and SHELL for the production of ethylene in the UK against their 
competitor ICI. The Court of Appeal held that there was no aid; even though 
such a fiscal Act could well be state aid in other cases and went on to say 
that it is for the Commission to say whether a measure is compatible with 
the internal market.
31
  
This case law concerning the national courts’ power and obligation 
even to ‘interpret and apply’ the concept of aid, but refrain from making 
decisions on compatibility, can cause problems in its application by national 
courts. For example, the Greek Council of State, which is the Supreme 
Administrative Court in Greece and has regularly judged state aid cases, has 
consistently held that Article 107 is not directly applicable in national 
procedures and thus has refused to examine the substantive elements of each 
case, since its view is that it cannot decide on the concept of aid.
32
 
6.5 THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL COURTS IN STATE AID 
ENFORCEMENT 
The 1995 Notice
33
 gave guidance on cooperation between the 
Commission and the national courts. The new Notice of 2009
34
 is much 
broader and provides for the specific role that the national courts have in 
state aid enforcement. This role has been established in the Court’s case 
law, which will be included in the analysis that follows. The national courts 
                                                 
31
 R v Attorney General, ex parte ICI plc ([1987] 1 CMLR 72 (Court of Appeal)) para 102. 
32
 See cases 1093/1987, 3905/1998 and 3910/1988 of the Greek Council of State.  
33
 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the state aid 
field [1995] OJ C312/8 
34
 Commission Notice on the enforcement of state aid law by national courts, [2009] OJ 
C85/01. 
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can be called to judge on a number of types of cases that would involve 
enforcement of state aid rules.  
Those types of cases have been grouped in categories: first category 
is when the national court has to enforce recovery of illegal aid; the 
proceedings can either be initiated by the Member State’s authorities or by a 
competitor, or even the beneficiary. Second, the national court may be 
called to judge on a discriminatory imposition of tax that has state aid 
elements. Third, the national court may have to decide on public 
procurement cases with state aid involvement. Fourth, the national court 
may be called to decide on actions for damages, initiated by competitors. 
Finally, the national court may be called to resolve disputes between 
national authorities; either central government against local authorities or 
the opposite; in the last case it would not be private enforcement, but public 
since proceedings would be between two administrative bodies.
35
  
The national court can adopt the following remedies to redress the 
claimants. Certainly, the remedy that will be decided by the court depends 
on the type of claim that the claimant makes. For the types of cases that 
have been presented in the previous paragraph the available remedies, 
according to Article 26 of the Notice on enforcement
36
 are the following: 
the court can prevent the payment of aid that is found to be unlawful; the 
                                                 
35
 European Commission – DG Competition, ‘Study on the enforcement of state aid law at 
national level available online < http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-
bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-
Start?PublicationKey=KD7506493> accessed on 30-7-2012 39. 
36
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court can order the recovery of illegal aid;
37
 the court can award damages 
and finally can adopt interim measures until the final decision on the aid 
measure.  
 The most important issues of those categories will be addressed in 
the following paragraphs of the thesis. The chapter is limited to an 
examination of state aid enforcement at national courts in a European-wide 
context. Issues concerning the application of specific national laws, such as 
rules on procedure are excluded from the scope of the thesis.    
6.5.1 Enforcement of Commission Decisions in national courts 
The primary role that national courts can play in state aid 
enforcement could be that Member States’ authorities can ask for the 
national court to enforce a negative Commission decision for unlawful or 
misused aid. The consequence of such a decision is of course an order by 
the Commission for the Member State to recover aid, as it was analysed in 
the third chapter of the thesis. The recovery must take place according to 
national procedures, and the Court held that the national provisions are not 
to be applied, if recovery is rendered to be impossible because of a national 
law.
38
    
The 2009 update of the enforcement study
39
 has found that the 
actions against unlawful aid are increasing. The remedy for unlawful aid is 
                                                 
37
 Case C-199/06, CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, [2008] ECR I-
469 paras 45-46. 
38
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39
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level’ available online < 
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either recovery or interim measures by the national court. The main issues in 
recovery cases have to do with the action that the national courts should 
take, in case there is a Commission procedure pending. The national court 
can order recovery;
40
 as long as the Commission has not yet taken a decision 
that the aid is compatible with the internal market. After such as decision, 
the national court cannot order recovery. If there is a pending Commission 
procedure, though, the national court that has been asked to rule on recovery 
should not leave the interests of the claimant unprotected; Article 62 of the 
Notice advises that the national court can order interim measures that will 
be in-place, until the final decision by the Commission on compatibility.  
In a German case, the German Federal Court of Justice
41
 held that 
the requirement to fulfill a Commission recovery Decision supersedes any 
national laws that may impede the full compliance with that Commission 
Decision. In particular, the German insolvency laws classify Member States 
authorities that have to recover aid after the recipient has become insolvent 
as subordinate creditors. This provision of the national law was held by the 
German court to be insufficient to achieve full recovery in insolvency 
proceedings.
42
 Therefore, the court recalled the member state’s obligation to 
take all measures necessary to implement the recovery Decision without 
                                                 
40
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delay
43
 and ruled that the provision in the German insolvency law does not 
satisfy that obligation. As a consequence, the member state had to be 
classified as a preferred creditor, so that its claim in the proceeds of the 
insolvency procedure would be satisfied first and thus recovery would be 
achieved.    
6.5.2 Public procurement rules as an example of new rules for the 
enforcement of state aid control before national courts. 
The Directive
44
 on procurement for the award of contracts on public 
works, supply and services recognises the interaction between public 
procurement and state aid and Article 34 TFEU, which is applied by the 
Court of Justice in public procurement cases, is directly applicable before 
national courts.
45
 There is an undisputable presumption derived from the 
Commission’s practice and the case law that compliance with the EU Public 
Procurement Directive in the tendering of a contract presumes compliance 
with state aid rules about compatibility.
46
 This way, public procurement 
rules can ‘cure’ otherwise illegal state aid. This presumption can only be 
disproved if the tenderer received an unjustified economic advantage due to 
the contractual term not reflecting normal market conditions.
47
 This is 
established by applying the market economy buyer principle, which is 
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applied similarly to the market economy investor principle in competition 
cases. 
Article 55 (3) of the Directive provides that when a tender from a 
candidate for a public contract is abnormally low, then the contracting 
authority must exclude that tender from the procurement procedure on the 
ground that there is illegal state aid, unless the tenderer can prove that the 
aid is legal only after negotiations with the tenderer. Also, the authority 
must notify the Commission to take further steps. However, in 2011 the 
Commission has proposed an amendment to the Procurement Directive that 
aims to simplify the procedures and introduce direct negotiations with 
tenderers before the award of contracts.
48
 According to specialised research, 
the new negotiations will shift policy from the ‘very restrictive approach to 
negotiations that has dominated the EU public procurement rules from their 
inception’.49 This could significantly affect the assessment of state aid in 
abnormally low tenders, which would need more detailed criteria for the 
application of the market economy buyer concept that leads to the 
compatibility of the contract with Article 107(1) TFEU.
 50
  
It is true that the enforcement of public procurement contracts has 
independent procedural rules, from the enforcement of state aid rules; the 
procurement rules are enforced through the Remedies Directive
51
 that aims 
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to harmonise the review of national procedures of procurement contracts. It 
is an example of the EU intervening at the national level to harmonise 
national laws, by securing that national laws respect the requirements it sets 
for specific remedies, in cases of breach of procurement rules.
52
 
The Remedies Directive for procurement procedures has introduced 
national review bodies, responsible with the enforcement of public 
procurement rules.
53
 The status of those bodies, which have been introduced 
into Member States, as independent public authorities and not courts, may 
cause problems, when they are called to enforce state aid rules. When they 
have to decide, if there is state aid in an abnormally low bid, will they be 
able to ask for the Commission of an opinion, according to the Notice on 
Enforcement? The Notice only refers to Courts and not bodies that have that 
ability. One solution could be that the term ‘courts’ in the Notice on 
Enforcement includes national review bodies for procurement contracts. 
Therefore, they can apply the Notice, and ask for a Commission opinion 
concerning the existence of aid.
54
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This paragraph of the thesis adopts the view that the Remedies 
Directive can be used as an example of harmonising national laws or 
administrative procedures. Consequently, the comparisons are made on the 
particular topic of enforcement of state aid cases before national courts and 
the enforcement of procurement contracts from national bodies in the 
Remedies Directive. Such a type of EU legislation could be introduced into 
state aid enforcement at the national level to harmonise remedies available 
at national courts for state aid cases. Such legislation respects the 
enforcement of EU rules from national authorities, such as courts or national 
independent bodies, and harmonises national rules, by applying the 
standards that national legislation and procedures must respect, so that the 
enforcement of EU rules is efficient. The Enforcement Study
55
 proposes the 
adoption of a Remedies Directive for the enforcement of state aid rules. The 
benefit would be that it would harmonise the available remedies for breach 
of state aid rules in national legal orders; in addition, it would enhance 
private enforcement in the state aid field.
56
 This paragraph, based on 
specific literature
57
 and the Enforcement study, proposes a legal transplant 
from the Remedies Directive to be used in State Aid control.  
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6.5.3 Legal problems in tax cases involving state aid before national 
courts 
The enforcement study
58
 has found that the majority of cases where 
private parties try to enforce state aid rules in national courts involve the 
imposition of a tax burden on them. The table 9 in the Appendix shows that 
50% of cases of enforcement before national courts deal with discrimination 
in the imposition of a tax burden, which the claimants allege it involves 
state aid to one of their competitors.
59
  
The cases involve, either the imposition of a tax burden on one 
company, whereas others in the same class are exempted, or a tax benefit for 
some companies, but not others. The claimant, usually the competitors, may 
ask for the benefit or burden to be lifted and the aid to be repaid. The legal 
basis for such claims is the selective nature of the measure, which makes it 
incompatible state aid. Such was the case brought before the Constitutional 
Court of Italy:
60
 the national Constitutional Court submitted a preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice asking it whether tax legislation adopted by 
regional authority that imposed tax only on vessels that made stopovers in 
Sardinia but were domiciled outside of the Sardinia region constituted state 
aid, because it exempted regional vessels and thus granting them an 
advantage. The Court of Justice held that tax legislation in this case 
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constitutes state aid because it favours undertakings established in the area 
of Sardinia.
61
 
However, in one national case
62
 the competitor asked for the benefit 
to be granted to all competitors in the same class. In that case, the national 
court of Austria has accepted that the extension of the benefit solves the 
problem of the existence of aid, and no repayment had to be made.
63
 
Nevertheless, the Notice on Enforcement makes clear that ‘extending an 
illegal tax exemption to the claimant is no appropriate remedy for breaches 
of Article 88(3) of the Treaty’ (now Article 108(3) TFEU);64 thus, this 
national ruling would go against the Notice and the Court of Justice’s case 
law, since it was its judgment that the Commission adopts in its Notice on 
enforcement.
65
 
There are however, other issues as well, that have to do with the 
ability to claim repayment of taxes in state aid cases before national courts. 
The Court has declared that a third party (any tax payer) can only ask for the 
repayment of a tax imposed on them, if the tax revenue that he paid was 
used to fund the illegal aid.
66
 It will be very difficult to prove standing in 
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such cases, because ‘the national authorities enjoy discretion as to the 
allocation of taxes to various purposes’.67   
6.5.4 Problems concerning claims for damages in national courts 
It must be rather disappointing for the Commission that the 2009 
update of the enforcement study
68
 concluded that actions for damages 
before the national courts of the Union are still very limited in numbers. 
Furthermore, the most disappointing finding of the study is that there still 
has been no case, which actually resulted in a competitor being awarded 
monetary compensation. This is a drawback for the future decentralisation 
and modernisation of state aid control. After all, the Commission has 
declared that it believes that private enforcement actions can bring benefits 
to state aid control.  
6.5.4.1 Who can be held liable for damages from unlawful aid? 
The Court of Justice has also held that the national courts have the 
power to hold judgment for damages claims, when competitors and third 
parties have suffered loss by unlawful state aid.
69
 The acknowledgement of 
liability for damage to competitors, by unlawful aid, was first held at the 
SFEI and others
70
 case; the authority that granted the aid can be held liable, 
according to the judgment. The same judgment did not find a legal basis in 
Community law to bring actions against the beneficiary, but it did not 
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preclude national law as the basis. In subsequent judgments, the Court 
reaffirmed the SFEI judgment. Additionally, in the CELF judgment the 
Court held that ‘it may be required to uphold damages claims’ against the 
beneficiary as well.
71
 However, there are identified problems in relation 
with the actual application of those judgments before national courts. 
6.5.4.2 Lack of legal basis 
The first and foremost drawback is the lack of a clear legal basis in 
national laws for claimants to base their claim. The Court has established 
that the basis for such claim could be national laws on non-contractual 
liability
72
: which is tort laws. The Commission also adopts this solution in 
its Notice on Enforcement.
73
   
The basis for actions for damages from Union law is the standstill 
obligation of Article 108(3) TFEU, which is directly applicable. The breach 
of directly applicable EU rules can be the basis for damages, according to 
the Francovich judgment of the Court of Justice.
74
 This is the guidance of 
the Commission to national courts in its Notice on Enforcement, as well. 
6.5.4.3 Difficulty in proving causation and calculation of damages 
The Francovich
75
 case requires that there must be serious breach and 
that there should be direct causal link between the Member State’s breach 
of the obligation not to grant aid before it is declared compatible and the 
damage suffered. The 2009 Notice on enforcement advises that the serious 
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breach criterion can be met in state aid cases, because Member State 
authorities are under an obligation to notify a measure according to Article 
108(3) TFEU and not to implement it, before the Commission has reached a 
decision on its compatibility. If they do not abide, they are in serious breach 
for not conforming to their obligations.
76
 It is more difficult, though, to 
prove the direct link between the breach of the standstill obligation and the 
damage to competitors or third parties. Also, problems may arise with the 
calculation of the loss suffered in order to award damages. 
6.5.4.4 Possible solutions to the problems concerning damages 
claims  
The possible solutions to the calculation problems for actions for 
damages before national courts can be overcome: national legislation can be 
used by the national court to quantify the damages, according to ‘reasonable 
estimates’, instead of actual quantification.77 The reasonable award does not 
have to be based on the actual loss suffered; it is rather based on what the 
injured party would have received, if there was an agreement between the 
parties.
78
 However, the damages have to be paid by national governments, 
and it would be unlikely that Member States’ governments would introduce 
laws that would allow the use of reasonably estimated damages to be 
awarded in state aid cases, in order to overcome problems.     
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It is, therefore, necessary for the Commission to either adopt new 
legislation that will specifically address the issues that have been described 
for damages in state aid cases, similar to the White paper on damages in 
antitrust cases.
79
 Also, the Commission has adopted a draft Guidance paper 
on the quantification of harm in actions for damages based on Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. The draft paper is not going to be binding on national courts 
and it is purely informative, due to the lack of Union legislation in the 
context of damages. It does, however, point towards the direction of 
quantifying damages in antitrust cases, according to market prices,
80
 which 
is similar to the call for ‘reasonable estimates’, instead of actual losses in 
state aid damages cases. Again the example of the development of antitrust 
rules can be adjusted to fit the modernisation of state aid control.  
 
6.6 PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE FROM CROSS-BORDER 
DISPUTES CONCERNING STATE AID AMONG PRIVATE PARTIES.  
It is evident, from the data provided, that private enforcement of 
state aid rules and especially claims for damages from individuals caused by 
illegal aid has not yet reached satisfactory levels. Neither has national 
litigation been endorsed equally by all Member States of the Union. Some 
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Member States are more proactive in this respect than others.  However, it is 
possible to have a dispute that concerns the application of EU state aid law 
between parties that compete in different Member States. That would create 
a cross-border dispute, and there are a number of issues that arise from the 
application of private law, in several jurisdictions.  
It was already mentioned in this chapter that enforcement before 
national courts can be initiated when a competitor, company or individual, 
but certainly a private party files an action, against the beneficiary of alleged 
illegal aid. The competitor can either claim damages from the beneficiary, 
or interim relief. The number of actual cases that have been brought before 
Member States courts’ is small;81 however, a number of issues might arise 
from such disputes.   
Due to the lack of uniform substantial EU private law, two things 
need to be determined, before any proceedings are initiated: first, the 
claimant must determine the jurisdiction that is competent to hear the case 
and secondly, the court must decide on which substantive law will be 
applied, to resolve the cross-border dispute that is based on state aid law. 
The answers to questions of applicable jurisdiction and law are given by 
national private international laws, whenever the cross-border dispute 
involves members and non-members of the European Union.  
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For the purpose of resolving conflict of laws in private cross-border 
disputes between Member States, the EU has adopted a specific package of 
rules that apply. Those are the Brussels I,
82
 the Rome I
83
 and Rome II
84
 
Regulations, which are only applicable to relations between private parties 
and not state bodies and individuals. Next, this chapter will analyse the 
possible issues that might arise in state aid cross border disputes between 
individuals and also the possible solutions.    
6.6.1 The legal framework to determine jurisdiction 
The following consideration must be made by the national court to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a cross-border state aid case:  If 
the claimant and the accused are domiciled in different Member States, then 
the court that has jurisdiction to hear the claim will be determined by the 
Brussels I Regulation, Article 2.
85
 According to it, jurisdiction will have the 
court of the place, where the accused is domiciled. If, however, the legal 
basis for a claim against the beneficiary in state aid cases is a tort, since 
there are no contractual obligations in state aid cases, then the more special 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation would have to be applied. Thus, 
according to Article 5(3) the court where the harmful event took place will 
have jurisdiction to hear the case; that place will most likely be the place 
where the illegal aid was granted.    
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6.6.2 The legal framework that determines the substantive law which 
will be applied 
After having determined the court that has jurisdiction to hear a 
cross-border case, concerning the application of state aid rules among 
private parties, the court needs to determine next, the law that will be used 
to review the facts of the case. The answer to this problem is given in the 
EU context by the Rome II Regulation.
86
 Because there could be no 
contractual obligations in state aid disputes before national courts, the Rome 
II regulation could only be applicable and not the Rome I Regulation,
87
 
which is used to determine substantive law in contractual relations in cross-
border disputes.  
The legal basis for the action against the competitor in an illegally 
granted aid would probably be unfair competition laws; that being a tort 
means that Article 6 of the Rome II regulation would be applied. According 
to Article 6(2) of the Rome II Regulation the law of the country in which the 
damage occurs will be applicable as the substantive law that would be used 
to decide the claim against the competitor that received illegal state aid.    
6.6.3 Problems with cross-border litigation in state aid cases before 
national courts 
Some national courts however, are reluctant to apply the legal basis 
of their national tort laws, whenever a competitor seeks reparation from the 
beneficiary of illegal aid. In Betws Anthracite Ltd v DSK Anthrazit 
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Ibbenburen GmbH
88
 the claimant, which was a UK company brought an 
action for damages against a German competitor, which had received aid 
that the Commission declared illegal before the High Court of London. The 
basis for the claim in this cross-border case was the anti-competitive 
behaviour of the German company.  
However, the UK court held that there was ‘no applicable 
Community law tort’ and dismissed the action. It also stated that the 
European Court of Justice
89
 should rule, first, on the issue of which law was 
applicable. The High Court, though, could have applied the Brussels 
Regulation to determine its jurisdiction, because the loss occurred in the 
UK, where the UK company was established and competed with the 
German competitor. Further, even if the Rome II regulation was not in 
effect in 2003, which was the year that the case was heard (since it was 
adopted in 2007), the English court could have applied the English conflict 
of laws rules and determine whether the English or German law on torts was 
applicable. Thus, the decision would be reached according to the applicable 
law.
90
  
6.6.4 The solution to the problem of applicable law in state aid cases 
against the beneficiary 
Ever since the 2003 High Court judgment
91
, the Commission 
adopted the Notice on Enforcement, which has clarified the issue. Because 
                                                 
88
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of the lack of Union Tort law, Article 55 of the Notice
92
 clearly advises the 
national courts to base actions against beneficiaries of illegal aid to national 
laws. Also, the Notice advises them that they should apply the Rome II 
Regulation
93
 for non-contractual liability, when it is necessary to determine 
which national law would be applicable. This is important whenever the 
parties of the conflict come from different Member States.  
6.7 IS IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE FORUM SHOPPING IN STATE AID 
CASES?  
Even after the adoption of the Regulations that resolve conflict of 
laws issues in private law cases, is it possible to have forum shopping in 
cross-border state aid cases? There are two conflicting interests involved in 
this matter. One is the interests of the competitor and its legal advisers that 
will seek to secure their breached rights with as much benefit as possible. 
The other is the interests of the Union and the Commission as the Union’s 
executive body that aim to restrict forum shopping strategies. This is why 
the Union has adopted the Brussels I and Rome I and II Regulations, and 
specifically, in state aid cases, the Notice on Enforcement instructs that the 
Rome II Regulation should decide the applicable law issue. This instruction 
is given in order to limit, slightly, the choice of jurisdictions. However, 
when there are damages involved, the claimant and its advisers will always 
look into the possibility of choosing the jurisdiction that treats them most 
                                                 
92
 Commission Notice on the enforcement of state aid law by national courts, [2009] OJ 
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favourably.
94
  Consequently, the answer is that in theory at least it is 
possible to have forum shopping strategies in state aid cases.   
6.8 PRINCIPLES THAT THE NATIONAL COURT MUST APPLY 
Article 22 of the Notice on enforcement dictates that the national 
courts must take full account of the effectiveness of the direct effect of 
Article 108(3) TFEU. What is the consequence of this Article then, and 
what does effectiveness mean in this case? The principle of effectiveness 
means that national courts must balance the effectiveness of national rules 
that could undermine the application of EU rules on state aid and the rights 
of individuals given to them by Article 108(3) TFEU.
95
 The national laws 
and procedures must not render impossible or excessively difficult in 
practice the exercise of those rights. The principle of equivalence that the 
national courts must also follow, means that procedures and laws in national 
courts that apply the EU law of Article 108 (3) TFEU must secure that the 
remedies will not be less favourable, than the remedies that would be given 
to restore rights attached to breaches of national laws.   
The national court has an obligation to secure the examination of all 
possible remedies that the direct effect should produce. If the validity of the 
measure is found to be broken by the national court, then the court must 
ensure that the individual, whose rights have been breached by the 
                                                 
94
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invalidity, must be able to secure recovery of the illegal aid and interim 
measures, until the final reparation for the damage suffered.
96
  
However, the obligation of the national courts to secure the 
effectiveness of a EU rule, the direct effect of the Article 108(3), could be 
seen as jeopardising the independence of the national courts. The Notice on 
enforcement clearly states that its aim is to assist the national courts with the 
application of state aid rules. It is not affecting their independence.
97
 
However, some believe that the procedural autonomy of the Member States 
has been ‘superseded’ by the case law and the Notice on enforcement, 
because it specifies the remedies in Articles 24 to 62.
98
 The Notice, though, 
is only for guidance, and it is not directly applicable before national courts.  
6.9 PROBLEMS WITH COOPERATION BETWEEN THE 
COMMISSION AND THE NATIONAL COURTS 
By this point of the thesis the roles of the Commission and the 
national authorities have been critically analysed, and the overall conclusion 
is that their powers and competences are distinct but supplementary. The 
one is not there to replace the other, but they need to work together to 
achieve a more efficient enforcement of state aid rules. Therefore, to 
achieve that, there needs to be close cooperation between them. It is, 
nonetheless, an obligation of the Commission to support the national courts; 
a principle of sincere cooperation is provisioned in Article 4 of the TEU 
(former Article 10 EC), according to which the Union institutions and the 
                                                 
96
 Case C-39/94 SFEI and others v La Poste and others  [1996] ECR I-3547 para 40.  
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Member States have an obligation to assist each other to fulfil their tasks.
99
 
Moreover, the case law of the Court of Justice has also adopted this 
obligation: the Commission must assist the national courts, when they apply 
any Union laws.
100
  
The Notice on Enforcement certainly provides for the support that 
the Commission must provide to the national courts, when they ask for its 
assistance, in applying state aid law. This option, of asking for assistance, 
was already in force from the time of the adoption of the Notice on 
cooperation, but has not been used considerably. Thus, the Commission has 
clarified the procedure in its current Notice on enforcement. It is interesting 
that the Commission revealed that the current form of available cooperation 
is inspired from the Cooperation Notice with the national courts in the field 
of antitrust.
101
 Borrowing best practices from the modernisation of antitrust 
that could be used as an example for the modernisation of state aid is 
something that this thesis adopts as the way forward to decentralise state aid 
control.
102
 The lessons from the decentralisation process of antitrust 
enforcement are valuable to the most extent, if decentralisation is the way 
forward for more efficient state aid enforcement, at both the supranational 
and the national levels. 
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Returning to the topic of cooperation, the Commission can assist 
national courts in two ways; but only after they ask for its assistance in both 
situations: firstly, the national court may ask for information about the 
Commission’s procedures concerning an aid measure and secondly, the 
national court may ask the Commission for an opinion on a case it is 
investigating. Before the adoption of the Notice on Enforcement in 2009, 
the possibility for a Commission opinion was not available. Therefore, the 
option of requesting information has not been used much by the national 
courts. This is rather unfortunate, because if the national courts had this 
opportunity, issues about the concept of aid might have been clarified in 
specific aid cases; cases that the national courts have decided not to engage 
with, as it was examined in previous parts of this chapter.
103
  
In a national case
104
 the court decided to take advantage of the 
provision and ask the Commission for guidance on the particular issue of 
whether a UK Government Department’s assumption of environmental 
costs concerning the regeneration of an area in Northern Ireland, where a 
private company was developing a shopping centre, constituted aid. The 
Commission replied to the Northern Irish High Court that in its view general 
infrastructure measures that did not benefit end users do not constitute aid, 
but it did not want to prejudge on the effect on trade between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The national court applied the four 
cumulative criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU and dismissed the application 
for judicial review because the criteria were not met. It held that there was 
                                                 
103
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no advantage given from the regeneration and that trade between the 
Republic and Northern Ireland could not have been affected by the 
infrastructure works that allowed better access to the area for citizens of the 
Republic. This case is an example of how the Commission can cooperate 
with national judges effectively.  
One explanation, for the reluctance of the national courts to engage 
in information sharing with the Commission, might be that they want to 
appear that they are in command of Union law, as they should be, but 
another reason has been pointed out. Before the adoption of Notice on 
Enforcement, the national courts could only ask, and the Commission could 
only provide information about the procedure that it is following concerning 
a specific state aid case and not about the substance.
105
    
This is likely to change in the future, because the national courts, 
ever since 2009 and the adoption of the Notice on enforcement have the 
option of asking for a Commission opinion. Still, the national courts cannot 
ask for the Commission to give opinions on the compatibility of an aid 
measure, because this lies in the exclusive competence of the 
Commission.
106
 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
The value of effective enforcement before national courts has been 
acknowledged by the Commission and the Court of Justice, in its extensive 
case law over the years. Effective enforcement of state aid decisions at the 
                                                 
105
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national level is what the third research criterion is trying to establish in this 
chapter of the thesis. Enforcement of state aid rules before national courts is 
an important part in the decentralisation and modernisation of state aid 
control.  
There are distinct yet complimentary competences given to the 
Commission and the national courts. Neither can replace the other. 
However, both actors are necessary in state aid control, because they have 
exclusive powers. The Commission has exclusive competence to examine 
the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market according to 
Article 107 TFEU, whereas the national courts cannot judge on 
compatibility. The national aspect of enforcement was put to the test in this 
chapter, in line with the application of the third research criterion and the 
conclusion is that there are problems that drive interested parties away from 
seeking enforcement of state aid decisions in national courts: problems such 
as the interpretation of Article 107(1) TEU, the availability of remedies in 
national law and the lack of a legal basis to claim damages for infirngement 
of state aid decisions. There are benefits that can be drawn from further 
enhancement of the powers of the national courts. It is in the Commission’s 
initiative to identify the problems that have occurred over the years, ever 
since the first Notice on cooperation with the national courts had been 
adopted, and provide for the adequate solutions.  
Some solutions have been suggested in this chapter, influenced by 
comparisons with other competition law rules and procedures. For example, 
a useful loan from the antitrust enforcement could be the adoption of 
guidance on the quantification of damages in state aid cases, similar to the 
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Paper for antitrust cases, which solves a lot of issues concerning claims for 
damages before national courts. The latest Notice on enforcement has 
clarified some issues, but still more changes are necessary, in order for 
enforcement before national courts to become more effective and produce 
more positive results.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE REFORM AND MODERNISATION OF EU STATE AID 
CONTROL 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Throughout the previous chapters of this thesis, the research 
revealed the problems that occur during the implementation of the 
Commission’s state aid control and the enforcement of state aid rules before 
European and national courts. Although, implementation of the state aid 
policy has been in the Commission’s competence ever since the adoption of 
the original Treaties in the 1950’s, enforcement of the state aid control rules 
has been lagging. The Commission as the guardian of the Treaties has 
acknowledged this on many occasions, and has attempted many times to 
introduce reforms into the state aid regime of the European Union. Those 
reforms have been rather fragmentary, and were not entirely successful in 
promoting more effective procedures and enforcement of state aid control. 
 The main reforms of the state aid policy that are more recent will be 
critically examined in this chapter, with emphasis placed on the 
justifications and effects that each one of them has generated. Namely, those 
reforms, will be the 2005 State Aid Action Plan reform (henceforward 
SAAP), the 2011 reform of state aid rules for Services of General Economic 
Interest (henceforward SGEI) and the State Aid Modernisation (SAM) of 
2012. 
 The aim of this chapter is to enhance the idea that there are still 
elements of state aid control that need to change, but also to propose that the 
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future of state aid control does not lie on one actor, that is either the 
Commission or the national authorities or one enforcement procedure, either 
public or private, or at the European or national Courts; it rather lies in the 
cooperation of all actors; cooperation which will benefit from partial 
decentralisation and overall modernisation of enforcement competencies 
and procedures.    
 
7.2 THE REFORM OF STATE AID UNDER THE STATE AID ACTION 
PLAN OF 2005 
The SAAP started a reform process of the European Union’s state 
aid framework. It was introduced by the Commission in 2005, as a 
consultation document, presenting a roadmap for the changes that would be 
introduced in state aid until 2009. The main feature of those changes was an 
introduction of an economics focused state aid policy by the Commission. 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes, at the time, recognised that economic analysis 
was lacking in state aid in comparison to other competition law areas.
1
 In 
the SAAP, the Commission sets the objectives of the reform as follows: 
there should be less and better targeted aid, a refined economic analysis 
should be used by the Commission, and finally, better enforcement, more 
effective procedures and predictability will improve transparency.  
 
Economic analysis of state aid was included in the Commission’s 
assessment of measures, even before the SAAP.
2
 The former Commissioner 
                                                 
1
 Commissioner N. Kroes, ‘The State Aid action plan – delivering less and better targeted 
aid’, Speech at the UK Presidency seminar, London 14 July 2005, SPEECH/05/440. 
2
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in charge of DG Competition, Neelie Kroes, has said that ‘economics did 
not suddenly drop out of the sky [...] economics have always been there’.3 
Economics have been there, either in the form of a balancing of the positive 
and negative effects of a measure, when assessing its compatibility with the 
internal market, even though not formulated into a test.  
7.2.1 The balancing test  
  The main novelty that the new refined economic approach brought 
in the appreciation of state aid was the adoption of the balancing test. It is 
also the core of the new efficiency based approach.
4
 The Commission 
applies the balancing test only in the second stage of its assessment of state 
aid measures: the examination of compatibility of the measure with the 
provisions of Article 107 (3) TFEU. It has even been introduced in some of 
its Guidelines for the assessment of specific types of aid.
5
 According to the 
SAAP, it is used to establish if a measure constitutes aid but ‘in particular to 
determine when state aid can be declared compatible with the Treaty’. From 
this part some writers assume that the test is not to be used in the evaluation 
of the measure’s effect on trade and distortion of competition, under Article 
107(1) TFEU.
6
 Also, others have noted that there is no ‘rule of reason’ or 
concept of ‘objective justification’ in the interpretation of Article 87(1)’, 
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now Article 107(1) TFEU.
7
 A more refined economic approach might be 
well needed in the first part of the Commission’s assessment of the aid 
measure as well. 
 The Court has accepted that it is not enough for the Commission to 
rely on declarations that an aid measure affects trade and distorts 
competition. It is not enough to simply demonstrate that the receiving 
undertaking is active in inter-community trade. The Commission should: 
‘have carried out a more detailed analysis of the potential consequences of 
the aid at issue on intra-Community trade and on competition and should 
have given additional information’.8 The balancing test, as it has been 
incorporated in Commission decisions includes the assessment of the 
following points:  
First question that needs to be answered is if the aid measure aimed 
at a well-defined objective of common interest; namely, if the proposed aid 
addresses a market failure or other objective? Second question is if the aid is 
well-designed to deliver the objective of common interest? In particular: 
(a) Is the aid measure an appropriate instrument, which means are there 
other, better placed instruments? 
(b) Is there an incentive effect, for example, does the aid change the 
behaviour of firms? 
(c) Is the aid measure proportional, for example, could the same change in 
behaviour be obtained with less aid? 
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And finally, the third question that needs to be answered is if the distortions 
of competition and the effect on trade are limited, so that the overall balance 
is positive?
9
   
 The questions were introduced by the Commission for the first time 
in a document,
10
 published after the adoption of the SAAP, and they were 
subsequently included in its later decision-making practice. The test is 
useful for the Commission to evaluate the benefits of aid in relation to its 
costs. This is the analysis that is based on the effects of the measure, rather 
than its form, envisaged in the SAAP.       
  
7.2.2 The role of market failures in the refined economic approach 
The analysis of market failures will be placed in the centre of the 
Commission’s assessment of state aid measures, according to the SAAP. A 
market failure is another purely economic term adopted by the Commission. 
It is contrasted with the term efficiency. Efficiency is the goal of every 
market as a situation where welfare is optimal. A market failure occurs 
when the market does not achieve the optimal outcome; in other words, the 
market does not achieve efficiency.
11
 Thus, by this the Commission 
introduces efficiency, as an objective of state aid control. 
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  A market failure is defined in the SAAP as ‘a situation where the 
market does not lead to an economically efficient outcome’.12 State aid can 
have positive effects for objectives of common interest, such as the 
horizontal objectives presented in chapter two.
13
 Additionally, state aid can 
produce positive effects whenever is used to ‘correct market failures, 
thereby improving the functioning of markets and enhancing European 
competitiveness’.14 The positive effects on objectives of common interest, 
such as social and regional cohesion, sustainable development and cultural 
diversity can appear irrespective of the correction of market failures.
15
 Also, 
the Commission in the same document identifies the most important forms 
of market failures that it will analyse.  
Firstly, a market failure can occur in the form of externalities. They 
appear when the market players do not take into account the effects of their 
actions. Externalities can be negative and positive, according to the outcome 
of the action on society. Secondly, the market is not interested in providing 
certain forms of services and goods, such as defence and basic education to 
all, without discrimination. This can lead to a failure of the market to 
provide the so-called public goods. Thirdly, the Commission identifies 
imperfect information as a market failure. Imperfect information occur 
when one of the counterparties in a market transaction does not have all the 
necessary information needed to make a decision, which leads to the wrong 
decision being made, or no decision being made at all, to the harm of the 
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other party.  Fourthly, there may be coordination problems between players 
in the market and finally, the existence of market power can lead to a 
failure, since there will be no efficient outcome for the market.
16
  
The list of market failures is much broader, though, in economic 
literature of market failures, which might include unemployment.
17
 
Apparently, this limitation of ‘eligible’ types of market failures to be 
corrected by state aid was intentional according to a writer, who draws the 
conclusion from a statement of the Chief Economist at the time of the 
adoption of the SAAP, who wrote that: ‘State aid control should however 
concentrate on a small set of well-defined market failures.’18  
In a recent relevant case the Commission had the opportunity to 
clarify on the issue of the use of market failures, as general public interests 
that justify the granting of state aid. In a case concerning the switchover to 
digital TV broadcasting in the region of Berlin in Germany, the Commission 
accepted that a number of market failures could be considered general 
public interests that justify public intervention:
19
 those include coordination 
problems, the need to produce positive externalities, the strengthening of 
competition between competitors of one sector, and the promotion of 
innovation. The existence of those criteria has been extensively examined in 
the Commission’s Decision, and the Commission’s assessment examined in 
particular, if there were true market failures, and if the aid measure was 
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appropriate to remedy the market failures. In that case, the aid was 
considered incompatible and the General Court dismissed actions for 
annulment of that decision, accepting the Commission’s extensive economic 
assessment.
20
 
Market failures can occur in various sectors in the economy, and the 
most common ones are the financial services, the SMEs, R&D and activities 
with environmental concerns. The Commission, though, acknowledges what 
some writers indicate, which is that state aid has to be the second choice for 
correcting a market failure, when it has been identified.
21
 Consequently, the 
first step in economic analysis is to identify, if a market failure exists.  
At this point it is important to examine if the definition of the 
relevant market is necessary in state aid control. Fingleton, Ruane and Ryan 
have demonstrated the differences in the definition of the market in state aid 
as opposed to antitrust analysis.
22
 On this issue, the Court has rejected pleas 
from defendants that the Commission has not defined the relevant market, 
which makes the decision inadequately reasoned. Furthermore, the Court 
accepted that economic analysis is part of the Commission’s wide 
discretionary powers,
23
 which means that the Commission can decide on the 
use of the economic analysis in each specific case. 
In the SAAP though, the Commission accepts that state aid might 
not be the most appropriate way to correct a market failure and this is where 
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the balancing of positive with negative effects has an important role to play 
in the overall economic assessment of an aid measure. Thus, if the existence 
of a market failure has been established, state aid has to be the second 
solution.
24
Member states should not use state aid in the first instance to 
correct a market failure, if there is no positive outcome from the balancing 
exercise. For example, whenever there are two or more types of market 
failure that need to be addressed in the same industry, state aid may resolve 
one of them but it will not be the first-best solution for the other, thus the 
overall balance of effects will not be positive. In another situation, national 
aid measures may create cross-border externalities and a similar state aid 
measure in another Member State.
25
 Thus, state aid will actually affect trade 
between Member States, when it was supposed to correct a market failure. 
This is why the analysis of effect on trade and competition is still important, 
even if there is an identified market failure to correct.      
What needs to be considered in order to make this decision about the 
suitability of aid to remedy the particular failure each time are the 
following: other more appropriate measures have to be considered before 
implementing state aid. Such measures are the usual tools in a government’s 
disposal, namely legislation and tax measures.
26
 The granting Member State 
has the burden to prove to the Commission that it has taken into account the 
previous consideration and to demonstrate that the aid measure is the most 
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suitable instrument to tackle the inefficiency of the market.
27
 Secondly, the 
amounts of aid to be granted should remain limited according to the call for 
‘less (and better targeted) state aid’. To this goal, the Commission has 
adopted secondary legislation that aims to maintain levels of aid to the 
minimum required, such as the de minimis rules,
28
 the Block exemption 
regulations,
29
 and other Guidelines. All of those legislative instruments help 
to identify aid amounts that do not regularly harm competition. 
 Finally, it is true that the form in which the aid measure is 
implemented is not important for the aid to be considered incompatible with 
the internal market. Some writers, though, believe that the form of aid to be 
chosen is important, in deciding which measure to use for correcting a 
market failure. Some measures might prove more effective than others in 
different types of market failures. For example, subsidising loans for SMEs 
can correct a market failure in the lending shortage those companies might 
face from the credit market.
30
 However, SMEs have not benefited much 
from direct recapitalisation of financial institutions.   
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7.3 IS A MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH NEEDED IN THE 
ASSESSMENT OF STATE AID MEASURES? 
 The adoption of those new objectives for state aid in the form of 
efficiencies and the new test to help with the refined economic assessment 
of state aid measures by the Commission triggered a reform process of state 
aid secondary legislation. By the end of this process, a number of new 
documents were introduced in the state aid framework that incorporate the 
new methods and approaches: the General Block exemption,
31
 the 
simplification package of procedures,
32
 the Best Practices Code,
33
 and the 
Notice on the enforcement in national courts.
34
 All those are instruments to 
achieve efficient enforcement of state aid, because they aim to speed up and 
streamline procedures. 
Firstly, it is true that the Commission has broad discretionary powers 
when it comes to state aid regulation; a power given to it by the Treaty, and 
acknowledged by the Court. The Commission decided to use the 
achievement of efficiency as a justification for aid. The Treaty itself though, 
does not contain such criteria. Article 107 (3) (c) TFEU justifies aid based 
on its common policy objectives, not efficiency. An aid measure might have 
positive social effects in a region. Would they always correspond to positive 
efficiency outcomes? And if they do not, which ones would go first, the 
social effects or the efficiency objectives? The balance between the different 
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effects of the measure is a difficult task that needs experienced staff. And 
the Commission might be well staffed, or not, but what about Member 
States authorities and national judges that would have to work out complex 
economic terms? 
Secondly, the effects based approach has a target of ‘less aid’? 
Again, one might argue that the Commission has discretion in decision 
making but does that discretion reach political decisions of how much aid is 
permissible by Member States or is that a decision for them to make? 
Certainly, some writers do believe that there should be a fine line between 
what the Commission should be protecting, which is competition and what 
the Member States can decide for themselves, which is how to spend their 
budgets.
35
 This discussion is particularly important after the financial crisis 
that started in 2008, which saw the amounts of aid rising, instead of 
declining. Furthermore, if state aid will correct a market failure, how much 
aid will be suitable to correct the specific failure will be decided from the 
particular assessment of that market failure.  
Finally, is state aid a political or an economic tool, or both? National 
governments make the decisions to grant aid based on political and social 
considerations, not on economic theories. The economics have some role to 
play, though, in this supranational regime that has been created, because of 
the existence of the internal market. In other words, effects - based analysis 
has some positive consequences that need to be considered. 
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7.4 THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VERSUS A FORM 
BASED APPROACH IN STATE AID CONTROL. 
 The refined economic approach has brought something that was 
lacking in state aid control and that is clarity of the rules. After all, both the 
Member States and the undertakings that have been the beneficiaries of such 
measures, have been asking for more transparency, which is a benefit that 
the economic approach can bring.
36
 Economic analysis has the advantage of 
not being affected by policy considerations and is much more tangible than 
an assessment of pure legal notions that can be quite unclear and 
ambiguous; legal notions can have two or more interpretations. This is not 
true about economic analysis.   
 Furthermore, the analysis of state aid measures that focuses on the 
effects of the measure, rather than its form, is more effective to distinguish 
between aid that produces more benefits and aid that is more distortive.  The 
more refined economic analysis of aid measures can explain more clearly 
the effects of the aid through the balancing test analysis. The negatives and 
the positives will be clearer for both the Commission and the Member 
State.
37
 This analysis of positives and negatives can help establish, whether 
the specific measure is effective to remedy the market failure and if it is 
affordable to the national economy according to the expected benefits. The 
‘revelation’ of the exact cost of the aid can make Member States rethink 
about granting vast amounts of aid, and help achieve the goal set by the 
Commission for less and better targeted state aid.    
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7.5 THE REFORM OF STATE AID RULES FOR SERVICES OF 
GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST 
 Another critical step towards modernisation of the state aid control 
was the reform of the SGEI framework. In 2011 the previous package of 
rules for state aid granted to SGEI
38
 expired and thus had to be amended. 
Whether that reform was successful will be better decided in its future 
application; however, there is some criticism that can be applied to the 
newly adopted rules.  
In this chapter, the focus will be placed on the justification of the 
recent reform and a critique to the newly adopted legislation, by the 
Commission. In absence of a definition of what is a SGEI in the Treaty, the 
Member States have wide discretion in defining services as SGEI,
39
 and the 
Commission is limited in examining whether there is not a manifest error in 
the definition of a SGEI.
40
 
The case law provides some examples of what has been accepted as 
a manifest error in the Member States’ definition of certain services as 
public services. The loading and unloading of shipments, as well as storage 
within ports, cannot be considered that it has special characteristics that can 
attribute to them the character of a service of general interest; the court held 
that there was a manifest error in the Member State’s definition of port 
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operations as a SGEI.
41
 Also, the commercial and advertising uses within 
the audiovisual public service, like sponsoring and the use of premium call 
numbers in television programs ‘is a manifest error of assessment of what is 
a SGEI from the Member States’.42 
 7.5.1 The Altmark package of rules for state aid granted to SGEI. 
 Initially and before the adoption of any legislation it was the Court 
that clarified the conditions under which the aid granted to operators as 
compensation for the operation of public services will be considered 
compatible with the internal market in its Altmark judgment.
43
 Those 
cumulative conditions are:  
the public service obligations should be clearly defined;  
the details of the compensation are objective, transparent and established 
in advance;  
the compensation must not exceed the costs incurred in the exercise of 
the public service obligations, plus a reasonable profit;  
If the company has not been chosen through public tender procedure, the 
company should be compensated on the basis of the costs of a typical 
well-run company. 
 The Court in the Altmark ruling departed from the compensation 
approach that was followed before. According to the compensation 
                                                 
41 Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889, para 27; 
Case C-242/95 GT-Link [1997] ECR I-4449, para 53; and Joined Cases C-34/01 to 
C38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-14243, paras 33-34. 
42 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to 
public service broadcasting, [2009] OJ C-257/1. 
43 Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR-I7747, paras 89-93. See also chapter two of 
the thesis. 
346 
 
approach there is no aid if a Member State simply compensates an 
undertaking for providing a public service.
44
 That was the approach decided 
in Ferring
45
 and followed by the Commission ever since. AG Léger
46
 
though, and subsequently the Court, in Altmark adopted the conditional 
compensation approach,
47
 they confirmed Ferring but added the 
introduction of the four criteria.  
7.5.2 Critique for Altmark 
The Altmark judgment has historical importance for the 
compensation of undertakings that provide public service obligations. The 
judgment introduces strict criteria that include the assessment of the 
efficiency of the measure and make the notification obligation of Article 
106(2) TFEU inapplicable,
48
 if the criteria are met.    
The Altmark judgment has been criticised mainly because it did 
provide an answer for how the advantage should be interpreted in SGEI but 
it created new problems in the application of this interpretation.
49
 The first 
condition requires a clear definition of the public service obligation and this 
is to the benefit of the recipient of aid as well as possibly national courts that 
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may be called to judge a challenge of the act that awards the 
compensation.
50
 Therefore the first criterion promotes transparency.
51
 The 
second criterion requests that it is established that the parameters of the 
compensations where established before in an objective and transparent 
manner. This is difficult for the national authorities and national courts to 
prove.
52
 The third criterion adds a reasonable profit to the compensation for 
the public service obligation and the criticism has been that national 
authorities may exploit the generality of the term reasonable and the lack of 
any guidance in the judgment and grant more aid than necessary.
53
 
The main problems are created by the fourth criterion: it provides for 
two solutions to determine the compensation needed. Option one is to 
organise a public procurement procedure and thus follow the EU rules on 
procurement to avoid overcompensation. It has been explained that even 
though following the public procurement rules creates a presumption of 
compatibility with state aid rules, it has been analysed in paragraph 6.5.2 of 
the thesis that unlawful state aid is not always precluded. The second option 
is to consider the costs that a well run undertaking would have incurred if it 
provided the public service and thus determine the compensation. Because 
of the nature of public service it is not easy to compare to a market investor, 
which operates in different conditions.
54
 Even more problems arise when the 
compensation is calculated based on the costs of the recipient of the aid and 
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public service operator and not based on the costs of the well run 
undertaking, which might be lower. The excess amount would have to be 
considered state aid not satisfying the Altmark criterion, but could be found 
compatible according to Article 106(2) TFEU.
55
 All those issues that may 
arise prove that the Altmark judgment created additional problems to those 
that it was supposed to solve.  
 After that landmark ruling the Commission adopted a set of rules 
applicable to aid for SGEI known as the post-Altmark package, or the 
‘Monti - Kroes’ package of July 2005, named after the names of the 
Commissioners that introduced the new legislative documents. Those 
documents consisted of a Decision
56
 and a Framework
57
, which included 
further conditions, which are also assessed in the examination of the 
compatibility of the measure with the internal market. The introduction of 
those soft law instruments has not increased legal certainty in state aid for 
SGEI.
58
 Also, it is questionable whether those soft law instruments have 
increased the effectiveness and transparency of state aid control for SGEI. 
And the following analysis may explain why.
59
  
There is a complicated compatibility system that was put in place 
after the adoption of the 2005 package, according to which the following 
situation can occur in the assessment of a measure’s compatibility: if one of 
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the four cumulative Altmark criteria is not met and the Article 107(1) TFEU 
conditions for the existence of aid are met, then there needs to be an 
examination of the conditions set in the Decision and the Framework: those 
conditions are: first, there should be an act of entrusting the public service to 
the undertaking;
60
 secondly, the compensation should only cover the costs 
for the operation of the service and a ‘reasonable profit’;61 and third, there 
should be checks after implementation to secure that the compensation does 
not exceed the amount of compensation agreed in the act of entrustment.
62
 
The measure is compatible, if all of those conditions are met.   
There is always a very complicated relationship between public 
authorities and public undertakings when it comes to their financial 
relations. Therefore, the Transparency Directive
63
 aims at helping the 
Commission with controlling the state aid that public authorities may grant 
to public undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
interest. It is doing so by requesting that public undertakings keep separate 
and distinct accounts for different activities that are performed within the 
same entity.
64
 The objective is that the Member States and the Commission 
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have detailed data about the financial and organisational structure of public 
undertakings and using the data to control state aid.
65
  
7.5.3 The justification for the reform of the state aid rules for SGEI 
The post – Altmark package was set to expire in 2011,66 so the 
Commission set forward the reform procedures, in the means of a 
consultation with the stakeholders: Member States, national authorities 
involved in the public services and competition law, legal professionals and 
the undertakings that provide public services. The Commission justified the 
reform in the necessity for public services to meet the needs of the people of 
Europe.
67
 The new rules should fulfil the following conditions: the public 
services should become ‘easier to operate at the appropriate level, adhere to 
clear financing rules, are of the highest quality and actually accessible to 
all.’68 The Monti Report found that there is room for strengthening the 
approach to compensation for the provision of public service obligation that 
was adopted in the 2005 package.
69
 The reform of the package according to 
the Monti Report should be in the direction of making rules more flexible so 
that public service operators can fulfil their mission.
70
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Another reason causing the reform necessary was the fact that 
liberalisation has been introduced in many industry sectors throughout the 
European Union, but it has been performed in different levels and different 
speeds among different Member States, according to their individual 
economic realities and needs.
71
 Those differences create problems in the 
appreciation of what can be considered a SGEI, since the inclusion of a 
service into the SGEI framework requires to determine the fact that there is 
or not an economic activity involved. As with the power to define SGEI, 
which is left to the discretion of Member States, there is no definition of 
what can be considered an economic activity in the Treaty. The new 
legislation provides a non-exhaustive list of services that could be included 
in the notion of an economic activity, for the purpose of SGEI, and those 
that are excluded, because they are considered exercise of sovereign powers, 
such as policing and the army.
72
  
There is also a fresh issue that has risen because of the current 
economic crisis. The public services are compensated from the public 
budgets, and currently many Member States have introduced cuts in public 
spending, which affects the financing of those public services.
73
 At the same 
time due to the cuts, more people are relying on public services, which make 
their performance more important than ever.
74
 The current reforms should 
be well designed to serve this double cause: to secure that public money is 
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well spent and that the public services remain efficient, even when there is 
less funding.
75
 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that there were practical issues 
that appeared during the implementation of the post - Altmark package that 
have also been raised by the participants during the consultation: those 
issues are another reason that justifies the need for reform. The main 
problem raised during the consultation was the fact that the notions 
concerning the application of state aid rules on compensation for public 
services are very complicated for national authorities to apply. Some of 
those notions are complex economic terms, such as the notion of the 
existence of economic activity and the notion of social public services that 
needed to be defined.
76
  
This problem of low awareness of the rules, which led to low 
implementation of the post -Altmark package was especially severe when 
local authorities had to apply the 2005 Decision.
77
 The Committee of the 
Regions, which has offered its opinion to the proposed reform of the 2005 
package, believes that local situations are difficult to be defined by the terms 
of the 2005 Decision.
78
The case law of the Court of Justice introduced such 
notions, in the first place, in the assessment of the compatibility of the 
compensation granted to undertakings for the provision of public services.   
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Finally, the other problem that has been identified during the public 
consultation and has to do with the comprehension of the rules is the 
interconnection of state aid rules for SGEI with public procurement rules. 
When a public tender procedure was not used to decide which undertaking 
will be awarded with the public service, the fourth Altmark criterion
79
 
provides for the calculation of the compensation. The conditions under 
which such public tender procedure would be compatible with state aid rules 
for SGEI were unclear, in the sense that, if there is a public tender, then 
does that mean that there is no aid automatically, and no need to examine 
the existence of the other three Altmark criteria?
80
 The fact is that the four 
criteria are cumulative, which means that all of them must occur and must 
be examined.  
7.5.4 Critique of the new SGEI package  
The reform consultations and procedures have resulted in the 
adoption of a new set of documents that will replace the post – Altmark 
package. The Commission adopted a new Communication,
81
 a Commission 
Decision
82
 and a new Framework,
83
 together with the revision of the 
Transparency Directive
84
 and a press release of a Frequently Asked 
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Questions document
85
 that aims at clarifying issues with the control of 
compensation for providing a public service obligation.
86
 The 
Communication attempts to clarify the key notions that are used in the 
assessment of whether the compensation for public services is state aid or 
not. Those notions include the definitions of an undertaking for competition 
law; also the definition of an economic activity; the definition of an act of 
entrustment of a public service and what is considered overcompensation, 
which leads to existence of incompatible state aid. Furthermore, the 
Communication clarifies key concepts of Article 107(1) TFEU, such as state 
resources and effect on trade. Also, the Communication reaffirms the four 
criteria adopted by the Court in its Altmark
87
 judgment, which are still in 
force during the examination of state aid measures to providers of public 
services.   
Many of those concepts and conditions, such as the Altmark criteria 
and the notion of economic activity have been ‘shaped’ by the Court of 
Justice, through its case law.
88
 Furthermore, the criteria of aid according to 
Article 107(1) TFEU can be found in the Treaty and have also been 
extensively analysed in theory and the case law of state aid. Consequently, it 
is fair to say that such secondary legislation seems more like a compilation 
of rules and case law that should be avoided, because it causes unnecessary 
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repetition and confusion in legislation. It is interesting that the reason for the 
adoption of such instruments is to provide guidance and clarification, which 
is what many of the participants in the consultation have asked for.
89
 
Nonetheless, the Commission is bound by the Treaty and its interpretation 
by the Court, consequently, it could not offer anything more in this case; the 
results, though, are probably repetition and fragmentation of state aid 
control legislation.
90
 Notions, such as the economic activity and the 
meaning of aid that apply in every type of state aid measure should not be 
repeated in every single horizontal framework. There should be one 
document that can be applied uniformly. This will make the state aid policy 
more compact and easy to follow.   
The new Decision
91
 and the Framework
92
 contain the amended 
conditions under which the compensation for providers of public service 
obligations will be compatible with the state aid rules of the TFEU. The 
scope of the Decision has been altered: compensation granted to hospitals 
and social providers in relation to social housing, emergency services, long-
term care, childcare, access to labour, and the care and social inclusion of 
vulnerable groups is exempted from notification, because of its limited 
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impact on competition and trade.
93
 This broadening of the exemption is 
positive, since it does not affect competition.  
However, for all other fields the Commission decided to lower the 
thresholds of compatible compensation for public services, which therefore 
is excluded from notification. From 30 million Euro to 15 million Euro and 
the turnover threshold has been eliminated altogether.
94
 This change in the 
thresholds has been justified as an attempt to place undertakings of different 
sizes under more equal conditions, and trying to catch subsidisation of 
multinational providers that operate in many Member States.
95
 However, the 
stricter limits mean that there will be more measures caught in the 
Commission’s control, which could dissatisfy small regional public 
authorities that grant aid to service providers locally. 
The most important change in the evaluation of the compatibility of 
the compensation for public service providers with the state aid rules has 
been the introduction of efficiency incentives over the life of the contract. 
The 2005 Decision included a provision that the calculation of the 
reasonable profit, allowed under the Altmark criteria
96
 to be included into 
the compensation, could include the gains in productive efficiency as 
incentive criteria, relating to the quality of the service.
97
 However, there was 
no obligation for the Member State to align the compatibility of the 
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compensation with the gains in efficiency for the beneficiary. An inefficient 
undertaking could well be awarded state aid for a public service as well as 
an efficient one.  
What has changed is that the new Framework
98
 includes a detailed 
mechanism for incentivising efficiency improvements over the life of the 
contract, so now the Member States have two options by which they can 
calculate efficiency gains in SGEI contracts: first, to have an upfront fixed 
compensation that includes the efficiency gains for the life of the contract, 
or the new option under which the compensation (which means the state 
aid) could increase through the life of the contract, depending on whether 
the targets in efficiency made for the beneficiary are met or not.
99
  
Consequently, the introduction of such ‘incentivised efficiency’ 
could  jeopardise the quality of the service, because the providers might be 
tempted to reach the efficiency targets by lowering the standards of the 
quality of the service provided to consumers. It is true that the Framework 
includes a provision
100
 that the efficiency gains should not be reached by 
jeopardising quality, but it is hard to see how that will be enforced in 
practice.  This introduction of incentivised efficiency might be considered as 
interfering with the Member States discretion in defining SGEI and 
organising and funding public services. The Committee of the Regions has 
raised concerns over the connection of efficiencies with the compensation 
for SGEI, because according to them there is no legal basis available for the 
Commission to legislate on the efficient allocation of Member States 
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resources.
101
 The Commission though, did not go as far as to introduce a 
new test of efficiency, which would lead to state aid granted only to 
efficient public service providers. That would be too intrusive to Member 
States’ discretion, and would impose a huge burden on the local authorities 
to prove such efficiency.
102
   
The new package includes a de minimis Regulation.
103
 Aid up to 
200,000 Euro per beneficiary, over three fiscal years, is automatically 
exempted and considered compatible with Article 107(1) TFEU. This limit 
is lower, than what was anticipated from the participants of the 
consultation.
104
 However, it does prove that the Commission wants to treat 
large scale public projects with more scrutiny, and allow small scale local 
projects that do not distort competition in the Union. This diversified 
approach is consistent with the principle of solidarity, which should be also 
taken into consideration when the costs of local social services, such as 
housing and health services are being examined.
105
 Also another problem 
would be the coexistence of the de minimis Regulation
106
 for SGEI and the 
de minimis Regulation
107
 that applies horizontally to all industries.  
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 In whole, the reform of the state aid rules for SGEI by the 
Commission has improved the legislation concerning the application of state 
aid rules to public services. It also satisfies the need for coherent legislation 
within the same horizontal sector of the economy, which in this case is 
SGEI.
108
 But the new package of 2012, which will be fully and fairly judged 
by its implementation, seems to revolve around what has previously been 
introduced by the case law; it does not go further as much as anticipated by 
the consultation.    
 
7.6 THE STATE AID MODERNISATION (SAM) 
The SAAP was the first attempt to introduce a wider modernisation 
that was not targeted to a specific sector of the economy. However, the 
SAAP was incomplete because the Commission lacks investigative powers, 
which hinders the effects-based assessment of measures.
109
 Therefore, is a 
need for a reform that will include more horizontal legislation, instead of 
legal instruments that are aimed to sectors, or even an overall modernisation 
of the state aid policy?    
  
The Commission believes so, and has initiated the State Aid 
Modernisation in 2012. In 2005 the context of the reform was the Lisbon 
Strategy; in 2012 the context for the modernisation is given by the economic 
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crisis.
110
 In his speech in the European Competition Forum of 2012 Vice-
President of the Commission Almunia made the announcement that the 
control of state aid will be modernised. This research reaches also the 
conclusion that there is a need for modernisation of the state aid policy, in 
the direction of decentralisation and streamlining the different mechanisms 
into a more effective regime with multiple actors. The Vice-President also 
revealed the rationale for the modernisation that will follow. The basic 
argument is the effects of the on-going crisis on state aid control: the 
Member States have limited resources, but the need for efficient state aid is 
greater now. As a result, state aid control should help the limited public 
spending so that it is still effective. This can be achieved only when public 
expenditure addresses genuine market failures; otherwise, public spending 
will be ineffective and wasted. Finally, the effective control of public 
spending is the goal and state aid control can have the objective of 
controlling public spending, in addition to protecting competition.
111
 
State aid modernisation has three targets: to streamline the rules and 
lead to faster decisions, to foster growth and to focus the Commission’s ex 
ante control to the most distortive measures.
112
 The SAM has revised the 
Procedural
113
 and Enabling Regulations,
114
 is currently revising the de 
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minimis Regulation
115
 and the General Block Exemption Regulation.
116
 All 
of those changes have been presented in previous chapters of the thesis. 
The modernisation focuses on reforming guidelines, some of which 
are conveniently expiring at the end of 2013, such as the Guidelines on 
national regional aid
117
 and the Framework for R&D&I.
118
 Apart from those 
two documents the Guidelines that have been included in the Modernisation 
are: the Guidelines for Rescue and Restructuring aid,
119
 the Guidelines for 
environmental aid,
120
 the Guidelines for Risk Capital,
121
 the Guidelines for 
Broadband
122
 and the Guidelines for Aviation.
123
 The main elements of state 
aid for those objectives have been examined in the second chapter of the 
thesis. Therefore, this chapter only examines, indicatively, the rationale 
behind the reform of the R&D&I Framework as an example, because of the 
significance of this horizontal objective for the future growth and 
development of the Union, and to examine the priorities of the Commission 
in the revision of Guidelines.   
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7.6.1 Justification of the need to reform the R&D&I Framework 
 The revision of the R&D&I Framewrok is underway, part of the 
reforms of the SAM. The first reason, which makes the amendment of the 
R&D&I Framework necessary, is the fact that the European Union has set 
the need to create an ‘Innovation Union’ by 2020, as one of its most 
important priorities for the future.
124
 This policy aims to fill the gap between 
the European Union’s spending for R&D&I and the US and Japan, which 
spend more for R&D&I; therefore, the Union set the target to three per cent 
of GDP to be spent on R&D&I.
125
 The main purpose of the reform is how 
Member States intervene to reach the target and what should be the role of 
state aid.
126
 As the European Union is right now concerned about promoting 
growth, which seems to be stalling, R&D&I projects could foster growth in 
the Union. But for that to happen there needs to be a comprehensive review 
of the R&D&I Framework, to make it more effective. 
However, the Commission also recognises that there is a market 
failure when it comes to private investment in R&D&I in the Union.
127
 That 
market failure, according to the analysis in the previous parts of this 
chapter,
128
 could be corrected, if there was state intervention in R&D&I. 
Nonetheless, the private sector’s investment in R&D&I is important, 
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especially now that public spending is rationalised in many Member States, 
in an attempt to cut spending and reduce debt. Therefore, the balancing test 
will prove to be an extremely helpful tool in designing R&D&I measures 
that respect the need for public spending to be efficient. Furthermore, 
private funds could be encouraged to be used for the promotion of R&D&I 
by promoting other policies, such as the employment and business policies 
of Member States. 
As a result of granting aid for R&D&I there could be issues on effect 
on trade and competition between undertakings that receive too much aid to 
R&D&I and those that do not. This assumption has to do with the negative 
effects of aid to R&D&I: apart from draining public resources aid for 
R&D&I has the potential to distort competition by distorting the 
competitors’ incentives to invest, creating market power for the recipient 
and maintaining inefficient companies in the market.
129
 Those negative 
effects of state aid to R&D&I should be more clearly addressed in the next 
Framework possibly by strengthening the use of tests that come from 
economic theory, such as the balancing test, which safeguards that the 
measure is the most effective to address the specific problems.     
Another possible reason that leads to the reform of the current 
Framework is the need, once again, for transparency and clarification of the 
rules. The current Framework includes some examples of measures that can 
be considered compatible with the internal market; however, it does not 
include the basic definitions of what can be an R&D project and what is an 
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Innovation project.
130
 This is particularly important, because the older 
version of the Framework explicitly excluded Innovation projects from its 
scope of application. Innovation was not considered eligible for state aid, 
rather it was considered to be a market activity that was fundamental for a 
company that wanted to remain competitive.
131
 That appreciation of 
Innovation, though, changed with the adoption of the 2007 Framework, and 
now there is a need for better distinction of the different measures. 
The last reason that makes the reform necessary is the strengthening 
of the economic analysis of R&D&I measures. The mid-term review 
document shows that the Commission applies the refined economic 
approach to notified R&D&I projects, which is something positive that 
needs to be further enhanced into the new Framework that will be adopted. 
However, the figures show that after the economic assessment of the 
measures most of them get finally approved, even if they have to be 
somewhat modified according to the findings of the assessment.
132
  
In conclusion, it is clear from the analysis that preceded that the 
priorities of the Commission in revising and streamlining the existing 
Guidelines are mainly the need to make public spending as efficient as 
possible and the clear identification of market failures and the potential 
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negative impact of the proposed state aid measures.
133
 The real important 
issue that needs to be strengthened in the future Guidelines is the evaluation 
of the actual existence of the market failure and the type of the failure for 
the specific innovation or research that needs state funding. If there is a real 
market failure, then the state’s intervention can produce positive outcomes 
by introducing something new and innovative. However, there needs to be 
in depth analysis of the type of failure that exists, because different types of 
state intervention create different incentive effects.
134
 
7.6.2 Critique for the State Aid Modernisation.   
The revision of such a large amount of secondary legislation and soft 
law is welcome. However, the amount of documents that are being amended 
will not evaluate the success or failure of the current Modernisation. 
Specifically, the revision of soft law instruments is out of necessity, since 
some of them are outdated or expiring. The main critical reforms include the 
identification of common principles that will be used to assess the 
compatibility of measures with the internal market. Those common 
principles should be found across different Guidelines and could clarify 
issues such as ‘the definition and assessment of genuine market failures, the 
incentive effect and the negative effects of public interventions.’135 The 
revision of the Guidelines has already concluded for some of them, and the 
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Commission included the common principles in the new Guidelines for 
Regional Aid
136
 and aid for the rapid deployment of broadband.
137
 In the 
past, the Commission has identified common principles for the economic 
assessment of the compatibility of aid under Article 107 (3) TFEU.
138
 This 
document aimed at detailing and clarifying the methodology used by the 
Commission in the assessment under the balancing test. The common 
principles apply to measures that are not covered by any particular 
Guidelines and if a measure is covered by Guidelines then the assessment 
criteria formulated in those Guidelines apply.
139
  
This time, the Commission chose to include the common principles 
in every newly adopted Guidelines under the SAM,
140
 which makes the soft 
law instruments more coherent and consistent and avoids any confusion as 
to which document applies each time. Every measure must comply with the 
following common principles in order to be declared compatible with the 
internal market: a) contribution to the achievement of objectives of common 
interest, b) absence of market delivery due to market failures or important 
inequalities, c) appropriateness of State aid as a policy instrument, d) 
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existence of incentive effect, e) aid limited to the minimum necessary, f) 
limited negative effects, g) transparency.
141
  
Also the Modernisation aims to produce a document that will clarify 
the notion of aid contained in Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission has 
indicated that this clarification will only explain how the Commission 
‘understands and applies the provisions of the Treaty, as interpreted by the 
Court of Justice’.142 This clarification can be of particular concern. The 
interpretation of legal notions and Articles of the Treaty lie in the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU, they are not a Commission 
competence. According to critics the Commission should not include in its 
clarification not yet fully settled legal positions by the Courts, or positions 
that have been contrary to previous case law.
143
  
The thesis has presented the reforms that the Procedural Regulation 
aims to bring to enforcement of state aid control by the Commission. The 
current proposal for the revision and expansion of the General Block 
Exemption Regulation will inevitably require more measures to be 
examined ex post by Member States. Concerns have been expressed as to 
the limited scope of the revision of the Procedural Regulation; it would be 
more beneficial for the reforms to be more substantial. It does not address a 
number of issues. For example, although it strengthens complaint handling, 
it does not mean that it will help diligent businessmen to address their 
reasonable doubts about measures already implemented through the GBER 
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that Member States fail to notify after implementation.
144
 This might explain 
why so many measures under the GBER are found to be problematic at the 
samples that are being ex post assessed by the Commission.    
Furthermore, the new Procedural Regulation has reinforced the 
bilateral character of state aid measures assessment between the 
Commission and the Member State involved. Other interested participants 
can only intervene in the formal investigation stage, restricted to submitting 
comments.
145
 And it has already been mentioned in previous chapters of the 
thesis that limited participation in the Commission procedure equals to 
limited access to the Court. This thesis adopts the position that expansion of 
participation rights similar to antitrust rules should have been included in 
the SAM, however, the Commission has diminished hopes early in its 
presentation of the objectives of the SAM, which would not ‘expand 
participation rights.’146 What the Regulation does do is to add to their 
obligations to provide information and for failure to do so imposes fines on 
them, which is a provision inspired by Articles 17 and 18 of Regulation 
1/2003.
147
 The Procedural Regulation singled out obligations and sanctions 
from antitrust for third parties and excluded sanctions for Member States. 
As a consequence, it has been said that the SAM has unbalanced rights and 
obligations for private participants and public authorities,
148
 which is not 
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something that is imposed by the TFEU. In conclusion, the public interest’s 
importance is heightened and justifies the imposition of legal obligations 
and financial sanctions to private participants.
149
  
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 There have been reforms of state aid control in the past. Every 
decade or so, different legal instruments of state aid control have to be 
readjusted based on the results of their implementation. Lately, though, 
there have been more comprehensive reform processes that lead to the 
introduction of new tools into the investigation of cases and the enforcement 
of decisions. The most important such reform has been the SAAP
150
 the 
reform of SGEI and the SAM.
151
  
The focus of the State Aid Action Plan was to incorporate the 
refined economic assessment into state aid control. The new rules for the 
control of aid for the provision of SGEI incorporate the case law of the 
Court and aim to address issues that arise from the economic crisis and 
Member State’s budget restraints, by only allowing aid that brings 
efficiency gains. The aims of the State Aid Modernisation were broader, and 
turned the focus into revisions of Guidelines that aim to streamline the 
procedures horizontally across sectors of the economy and foster growth 
through stricter ex ante control of most distortive state aid measures. The 
focus of state aid as a whole has been shifted from sectoral aid to address 
more horizontal objectives such as the environmental measures and the 
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R&D&I Framework, which are considered to be more beneficial for the 
purpose of driving the Union into growth and employment. 
Despite the recent efforts, the research has identified problems in 
state aid control that have yet to be resolved. even in recent reforms. The 
good elements should be preserved and strengthened; elements such as the 
refined economic assessment of measures by the Commission. However, it 
is necessary to modernise the state aid policy to make it more effective. The 
need for a more comprehensive modernisation has been acknowledged by 
the Commission, which has the power to implement it. The process is 
underway and was supposed to be completed by the end of 2013
152
 but this 
target will be missed.
153
 The documents that have been presented and those 
that have been adopted have positive signs, such as the analysis of measures 
based on their effects rather than on their form, the adoption of common 
principles in horizontal guidelines have helped in streamlining Commission 
procedures. However, issues with participation rights have not been include 
in the Commission’s revision of the Procedural Regulation, which creates 
unbalanced rights and obligations for private and public actors based on the 
need to protect the public interest. 
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Conclusion of the research 
 
This research critically analysed the implementation of the state aid 
policy and rules in the European Union, aiming to answer the main research 
question: whether optimum implementation of the state aid policy is 
achieved and if not what are the problems and solutions. The research 
identified the shortcomings and provides solutions for the optimisation of 
state aid control. To measure the effectiveness of the state aid policy’s 
implementation three basic criteria were introduced by the researcher: the 
speed and applicability of the procedures that are in place to assess state aid 
measures were tested. Secondly, the coherence of the legislation in force 
that implements state aid control was questioned. Third criterion is the need 
to accompany the state aid rules with strong enforcement mechanisms and 
procedures in both the supranational and the national levels. The criteria 
have been applied throughout the chapters of the thesis, depending on the 
relevance of the research question of each chapter to each criterion. The 
focus of each chapter did not lie in any specific criterion; it was rather on 
one of the group of actors that implements state aid control. The results of 
this analysis have been summarised in the following paragraphs of this 
concluding chapter.  
Concluding on whether state aid control is implemented effectively 
or not, would not be sufficient enough, without further action: the final 
chapter of the thesis includes proposals for the future form of state aid 
control. Those proposals, which can be the thesis’ practical application, 
were reached after the research arrived to the conclusion that there is a need 
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for modernisation of the core of state aid policy, by strengthening the 
powers of all of its actors, and not relying on the Commission as the major 
enforcer of state aid control. The research has indicated that there are two 
levels of implementation in the Union: a national and a supranational. Each 
contains a group of actors with distinct competences in state aid policy 
implementation. At the supranational level it is the Commission, the 
European Courts and with limited powers the Council. At the national level, 
it is the various forms of national authorities and the national courts. Their 
powers need to be clarified and reinforced and the procedures need to be 
streamlined and become more transparent. Other research questions that 
derive from the main question were addressed in each chapter of the thesis, 
and the answers that were given contributed to the final research conclusion. 
The research tested the first research criterion and concluded on the 
speed and applicability of the procedures, both the administrative control of 
the Commission and the powers of the other actors, such as the national 
authorities that implement state aid control in their various forms. The 
Commission’s administrative procedure is not regarded as a speedy one due 
to the two stage investigation procedure and additionally the new pre-
notification stage added by the Simplification Package. The implementing 
procedures are not streamlined enough, and furthermore at the national level 
there is confusion and different levels of administrative authorities that 
implement state aid control. The second criterion tested the coherence of the 
legislation and the finding is that the state aid framework is fragmented, due 
to the large amount of soft law documents and the lack of basic definitions 
about the concept of aid that apply horizontally to all sectors and markets. 
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The State Aid Modernisation has included common principles that are 
incorporated into Commission soft law that is being reviewed and should 
therefore allow the state aid rules to be more coherent and straightforward. 
The third research criterion tested the enforcement of state aid law in the 
European and national courts and found that the problems that start from the 
limited rights of participation for third parties, other than Member States in 
the administrative procedures affect their standing in the courts. Overall, the 
implementation of the state aid policy is too centralised and the legislation 
fragmented, which makes the objective of protecting competition and the 
internal market a difficult task for the different actors. More specialised 
findings for each one of the secondary research questions can be 
summarised in the following paragraphs.  
In the first chapter, the research presented the basic definitions about 
the subject matter of this thesis, such as the notions of state aid 
implementation, decentralisation and modernisation of the policy; also, the 
Treaty framework that is the foundation of the prohibition of state aid was 
introduced. The research concludes that the European Union’s state aid 
policy is implemented through a collection of Treaty provisions, secondary 
legislation and a large amount of soft law instruments. The adoption of soft 
law instruments has two functions: it clarifies the Commission’s 
interpretation of the rules and the way it applies them in the assessment of 
state aid measures. Soft law is not binding on the Member States although 
the Commission seeks the Member States’ acceptance by opening the 
formal investigation procedure whenever there is resistance. The effect of 
the use of soft law is that the Commission to some extent limits the 
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discretion it enjoys when assessing the compatibility of state aid measures 
with the internal market. However, the use of soft law has allowed state aid 
control to be flexible and easily adjustable to changing market conditions. It 
has not always promoted legal certainty, mainly due to the large amount of 
soft law documents that have been introduced, which is why the 
Modernisation attempts to correct the incoherencies by introducing the 
common principles that were presented in chapter seven of the thesis.    
The prohibition, though, is not absolute, which means that amounts 
of aid around 0.5% of GDP are still being granted. This is why state aid 
control is so important today, as it was in 1957, when it was first introduced, 
by the Treaty of Rome. Other factors that give the research special 
importance today were also examined, factors like the credit and financial 
crisis of 2008, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the need to sustain the 
internal market. The Member States’ have competence to decide to 
implement state aid measures. Consequently, the thesis examined the main 
reasons behind the Member States’ propensity to grant aid to their 
undertakings. There are several actors into state aid implementation and 
each has distinct powers and responsibilities concerning the control of state 
aid. The driving force behind the adoption of state aid measures are the 
Member States, and the reasons for the existence of aid where examined 
first.  
Consequently, the next research question had to do with the 
rationalisation of state aid granted by the Member States. To answer this 
question the thesis analysed the reasons that drive Member States to grant 
subsidies to their undertakings. The economic theories of liberalism and 
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protectionism were introduced first because they conflict with each other, 
since the first desires a market free of government intervention and the 
second allows some government control of the functioning of the market, 
such as state aid.  
 
Secondly, state aid is used by Member States to correct market 
failures and to promote objectives of common interest. Therefore the thesis 
examined the purpose of aid to different kinds of sectoral and horizontal aid, 
such as the benefits to Services of General Economic interest, the positive 
effects for regional coherence and the benefits on the European Economy 
that aim to counterbalance external negative influences from a globalised 
world economy. The research concluded that state aid does not come 
without negative effects and those negative effects might offset the positive 
outcomes that state aid can have. Aid is principally prohibited because of 
those negative effects that it produces. The final outcome of state aid should 
remain overall positive and this can be achieved through better 
implementation of the cost versus benefit analysis of aid measures.  
Lastly, vast amounts of state aid were granted to financial 
institutions. State aid was chosen as the most effective tool to overcome the 
financial crisis. However, the crisis also exposed that the state aid 
framework was not flexible enough to manage extreme circumstances, and 
thus had to be amended, to be more adaptable to the new crisis conditions. 
The effects of crisis aid for the financial sector were in general positive: 
state aid helped the Union and its Member States to control a general 
meltdown of the financial system, but questions remain on whether other 
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forms of competition law should also be used, to help overcome the crisis, 
such as mergers between sound and ailing financial institutions; or even 
allow failing banks to exit the market, instead of saving them at the expense 
of the public finances.  
The research also applied the financial theory of the moral hazard 
that might be created from the constant ‘bailing out’ of financial institutions 
that failed to restrain themselves into sound investments only. However, the 
application of the theory of moral hazard risks not acting at all, in pursuit of 
punishing the perpetrator of the failure, rather than making an effort. That 
would be really dangerous at a time when clearly something has to be done 
to overcome a very difficult situation, with consequences to the whole 
economy not just the perpetrator. Finally, the thesis examined the effects of 
the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone into state aid control: the 
conclusion is that state aid was chosen as the solution to the problems 
created by the debt crisis to financial institutions. Recapitalisations and 
guarantees are still in place to support banks that are affected by the lack of 
cash flow into the European banking system. Eventually, though, the 
financial institutions should be able to support themselves, because state aid 
should only remedy a market failure for a short time; otherwise, financial 
institutions might become too relied on aid and it will be impossible to 
return to normal conditions. 
State aid control is implemented at two levels: one level is the 
supranational actors; the other level contains the actors at the national level. 
The specific procedures that are used by each one of them and their 
competence to implement state aid control were critically examined in 
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chapters three to six of the thesis. The aim was to discover the possible 
shortcomings in the implementation of state aid control that make it 
ineffective.  
The first actor of state aid control is the Commission. The research 
concluded that the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties enjoys a 
special role in state aid control. The Commission’s choice to implement 
state aid policy by adopting soft law instruments, such as Notices and 
Communications has created a fragmented framework for state aid that 
creates problems for all the other implementing partners, as well. The 
adopted state aid rules thus fail at the application of the second research 
criterion, which is the need for coherent legislation. However, its role as the 
major enforcer of state aid control is hindered by the negative characteristics 
that a highly centralised supranational control mechanism has: the numbers 
of measures that the Commission needs to examine because of the current 
notification system distract it from the examination of the most distortive 
measures that might escape its control. It is necessary to establish a more 
effective system than the one currently in force.  
Apart from the quantitative negative characteristics the supranational 
regime has other limits too: it is too centralised and it does not allow other 
parties, such as beneficiaries and competitors to intervene. The 
supranational authority’s procedures need to be reformed; this can only be 
implemented if the Procedural Regulation
154
 is amended, in the direction of 
partial decentralisation that will allow the Commission to focus its control 
better. If the Procedural Regulation is to be amended there needs to be more 
                                                 
154
 Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [2013] OJ L-204/15 
378 
 
flexibility in the Commission’s administrative procedure. The system of 
notifications as the most common way of starting the state aid investigation 
is outdated, and does not allow the implementation of state aid control to be 
more targeted to the most distortive measures. The adoption of the amended 
Procedural Regulation
155
 has created more investigative powers for the 
Commission and more obligations for the interested parties to supply 
information, which is why the new Procedural Regulation has created a 
more unbalanced procedure between public and private parties in state aid 
control.    
The example that could be used for the decentralisation of the state 
aid control system is the decentralisation that was enacted in Competition 
law, after the adoption of Council Regulation 1/2003.
156
 There are some 
differences in state aid control, such as the role that the Treaty awards to the 
Commission, which is the main enforcer of state aid; however, there are 
lessons to be learnt from the decentralisation of Competition law, in 
particular from the abolition of the notification obligation.  
Furthermore, the Procedural Regulation
157
 causes other problems as 
well. In particular, the participation of the third parties in the preliminary 
investigation is still limited, if not non-existent; third parties should be 
allowed more access to the investigation process, should be allowed to 
submit comments that will help the Commission reach decisions more 
swiftly. More transparent procedures should be implemented, especially 
                                                 
155
 Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [2013] OJ L-204/15 
156
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 
157
 Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [2013] OJ L-204/15 
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concerning the rights of third parties and the handling of complaints as a 
way of starting a state aid investigation. The lack of participation of third 
parties in the preliminary examination causes the failure of the second 
research criterion, which seeks transparent legislation.  
As for the first research criterion, which seeks speedy procedures, 
the Commission may need more than eighteen months to reach a final 
decision on a state aid investigation, and that clearly is a failure. To 
overcome the problems the Commission introduced the Simplified 
procedure,
158
 which creates a new pre-notification stage that is supposed to 
resolve problems with the notification process, but in the end it adds another 
unnecessary stage at which parties, other than the Member States, cannot 
intervene.   
During the financial crisis the Commission adopted the express 
procedures of the crisis framework, which saw a radical change in the 
procedures. The positive aspect of the crisis framework is the high level of 
cooperation between the Commission and the Member States, which should 
be an example of the future form of investigations. However, negative 
effects of the crisis framework’s practice should be avoided. Third party 
rights should not be overlooked and the refined economic analysis should 
still be performed. The sound analysis should not be put aside in favour of 
extremely speedy decision making, such as the crisis decisions that were 
adopted over a weekend.  Effective procedures need to deliver decisions 
within reasonable timeframes, but speed is only one parameter of 
                                                 
158
 Commission Notice on a Simplified procedure for the treatment of certain types of 
state aid [2009] OJ C-136/3 and the Commission Notice on a best practices Code on the 
conduct of state aid control proceedings [2009] OJ C-136/13. 
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effectiveness; there needs to be transparency and effects based analysis of 
measures as well.  
To conclude on the supranational aspect of state aid control, the 
jurisdiction and case law of the Union’s Courts were critically examined in 
the fourth chapter of the thesis. A case having state aid as its subject matter 
initiates from a notification or a complaint, but is finally resolved before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. The Union Courts have introduced 
a large number of novel principles and tests that have had a positive 
influence in state aid control over the years, and they have helped clarify 
notions and shape state aid as it is today.  
The overall effects of the Union Courts in state aid enforcement are 
positive: they have jurisdiction to annul decisions in their judicial review 
process, and also assist Member States and the Commission to achieve 
better compliance with state aid rules. The third research criterion that seeks 
strong enforcement mechanisms is largely achieved at the Union Courts. 
The Court has proved to be overzealous, when it comes to sanctioning 
Member States for non-compliance with Commission decisions, and it has 
increased the penalties that the Commission has originally suggested that 
Member States should be forced to pay for not complying with its recovery 
procedures. This might not be efficient. It might seem that the Court is 
stepping into the policy aspect of state aid. The design of the state aid 
policy, though, is awarded to the Commission, not the Court.  
The main ill- effects of the Court’s enforcement mechanism have to 
do with the powers awarded to third parties, such as competitors and 
beneficiaries of aid, elements that can be easily rectified by the reform of 
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procedural rules. Also, they have to do with low numbers of some actions, 
such as damages actions, which prove that there are still some aspects of the 
state aid framework that need to be improved and clarified; those are the 
legislation over causation and the link between the aid and the damage 
caused. Overall, the performance of the Court has positive effects in state 
aid enforcement.  
Apart from the Commission, which plays central role in state aid 
control, and the Court, which enforces state aid law at the supranational 
level, national institutions of the Member States already have been given 
powers to implement and enforce state aid control. However, the data 
presented in the fifth chapter reveal that there is a problem of limited 
compliance on behalf of the Member States with state aid control. 
Furthermore the Member States’ ex ante control of exempted measures is 
going to increase as a result of the modernised General Block Exemption 
Regulation, which means that now more that ever it is necessary to seek 
ways to promote compliance at the national level. In the past the 
Commission sought compliance by streamlining rules and simplifying 
procedures but this thesis proposes the introduction of national state aid 
authorities.  
The research concluded that there is a discrepancy when it comes to 
national authorities that implement state aid control, between older Member 
States and those that acceded to the Union after 2004. The latter are required 
to establish some form of national state aid control system, which is not 
included in the acquis communautaire, because the pre-2004 Member States 
did not have this obligation. This discrepancy needs to be corrected in the 
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future modernisation of state aid control, because the research concludes 
that uniform implementation of state aid control at the national level will 
optimise the Union’s state aid policy. Consequently, at the national level, 
the first research criterion, which requests that there should be applicable 
procedures in place for the control of subsidies, fails, since there are no 
uniform procedures. The Member States’ national authorities could be given 
powers to control aid exempted from notification and more powers for the 
ex-post monitoring, thereafter.   
Finally, regardless of whether new national authorities for state aid 
are created, or powers to control subsidies are given to national competition 
authorities, there also needs to be a European Network of state aid 
authorities. The successful model of the European Competition Network 
could be the example for state aid control. The new network will act as a 
forum of exchange of information, experiences and best practices, which 
will benefit Member States. Writers
159
 believe that there is confusion of 
powers and competences among the public administration and lack of 
knowledge of state aid basic provisions that creates problematic measures. 
The network can facilitate the exchange of best practices and the better 
distribution of information; it can even serve as training facility for the 
national administration.   
 
The other aspect of the national state aid control comes from the 
powers of the national courts to enforce state aid control in their national 
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction was given to the national courts, as an attempt 
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 Thibaut Kleiner, ‘Modernization of state aid policy’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed), Research 
Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 11 
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to promote private litigation and enforcement at the national level, which is 
lagging. The research concluded that the reasons behind this are problems 
that have to do with the competence granted to national courts; competence 
that is not always clear, such as their powers to interpret Article 107(1) 
TFEU, and problems concerning causation in damages cases. Thus, the 
application of the third research criterion that seeks strong enforcement fails 
at the national courts, which have not been able to fully support the parties, 
when it comes to claiming damages and proving the link between the aid 
and the loss suffered.    
The research though concludes that enforcement at the national level 
will be, in general, beneficial for the optimisation of state aid control; 
because it promotes decentralisation and because national courts can better 
protect individual interests and rights than the supranational authority, by 
additionally granting damages for example. The Commission does not have 
the powers to award damages, and this is something that possibly forces the 
private enforcers to turn away from pursuing enforcement of state aid before 
the Court.  
Lastly, the research concluded that the recent trend in reforms of 
state aid legislation with a horizontal objective and not a sectoral approach 
is a positive trend that needs to be further strengthened in the future. The 
reforms of the SAAP that introduced the refined economic approach to state 
aid control is a positive step that fulfils the criterion set from the beginning 
of this research that effectiveness should be judged based on coherence and 
clarity of the rules. Horizontal rules apply to all sectors of the economy, and 
thus make state aid legislation more coherent. The introduction of the 
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refined economic analysis that applies horizontally to all types of measures 
should be the example of the future modernisation of the state aid policy; 
consequently, there will be fewer rules, which will be more comprehensive 
to those that need to follow them at every level.    
The research concludes that the positive aspects of the State Aid 
Modernisation that started in 2012, such as the introduction of general 
principles should be acknowledged. However, there are the negative aspects 
that preserve the bilateral character of state aid control between the Member 
State and the Commission, for the sake of public interest. This bilateral 
character does not derive from the Treaty, which simply awards the 
Commission with powers to control state aid, so the Treaty is not the 
obstacle that prevents the changes that have been suggested in the previous 
paragraphs. 
State aid law is constantly evolving. It is at the forefront of 
developments in the European Union, affected by the financial crisis and the 
need of the Member States to overcome it and at the same time preserve 
competition and the internal market. The Commission has already amended 
soft law instruments and legislation and more is to be adopted in the coming 
months. Those new rules and proposals for new version of state aid control 
will introduce the current research to new material that will need to be 
evaluated.  
Future research could include the analysis of effects of the 
application of the new Procedural Regulation, and the issues that may arise. 
Also, critical new research can be performed once a new document is 
adopted, which will endeavour to clarify the notion of aid. Finally, the new 
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horizontal guidelines that have been amended can be the focus of new 
research papers. The current research identifies problems and offers some 
proposals, which may lead to some solutions. However, the Modernisation 
offers the opportunity for further constructive critical research in the state 
aid field of competition law.         
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APPENDIX  
Table 1 
Trend in the number of recovery decisions (aid to industry and services) and amounts to 
be recovered (1) 2000-2012 (state of play: 30.06.2012) 
  Date of Decision Total 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012   
 Numb
er of 
decisi
ons 
adopt
ed 15 
19 26 10 24 13 8 10 13 7 6 12 9 172 
 Total 
aid 
know
n to 
be 
recov
ered 
(in 
mio 
€) 
358 
1602 
2120 
1131 
4983 429 256 167 
2610 76 149 198 1717 
15796 
 Amo
unts 
recov
ered 
(with
out 
intere
st, in 
mio 
€) of 
whic
h: 
352 1351 2068 997 4976 400 245 56 2057 51 120 0 847 13520 
 (a) 
Princi
pal 
reimb
ursed
/or in 
block
ed 
accou
nt 
137 1263 2000 954 4105 400 200 54 1075 51 120 0 847 11206 
 (b) 
Aid 
lost in 
bankr
uptcy 
215 88 68 43 871 0 45 2 982 0 0 0 0 2314 
 Aid 
and 
intere
st 
regist
ered 
in 
0 11 3 5 0 8 0 216 415 20 29 85 237 1029 
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bankr
uptcy 
Amou
nt 
outsta
nding 
(2) 
6 251 52 134 7 29 11 111 553 25 29 198 870 2276 
 % still 
pendi
ng to 
be 
recov
ered 
(2) 
1,70
% 
15,60
% 
2,50
% 
11,80
% 
0,10
% 
6,80
% 
4,30
% 
66,50
% 
21,20
% 
32,90
% 
19,50
% 
100,0
0% 
50,70
% 
14,40% 
 
 Notes: (1) Only 
for decisions 
for which the 
aid amount is 
known. 
 
(2) Total aid known to be recovered less principal reimbursed and aid lost in 
bankruptcy. Amount excluding interest.                      
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Pending recovery cases by Member State, 30 June 2012 
 
  
Situation 
31.12.2011 
01.01-30.06.2012 
Situation 
30.06.2012 
New 
cases  
Cases 
closed  
Italy/Italia 16     16 
Spain/España 11 1   12 
Greece/Ελλάδα 7 1   8 
France 6 1   7 
Germany/Deutschland 4 2   6 
Portugal 4   1 3 
Poland/Polska 2     2 
Netherlands/Nederland 2     2 
Austria/Österreich 1     1 
Slovakia/Slovensko 1     1 
United Kingdom 1     1 
Bulgaria/България 1     1 
Finland/Suomi 1 1   2 
Belgium/Belgique/België 0 1 1 0 
Hungary/Magyarország 0 1   1 
Sweden/Sverige 0 1   1 
TOTAL 57 9 2 64 
Source: DG Competition 
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Table 3 
Trend in the number of recovery decisions 
(aid to industry and services)* 
      Date of the Decision 
Total 
2
0
0
0 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
Num
ber 
of 
recisi
ons 
adopt
ed 
1
5 
1
9 
2
6 
1
0 
2
4 
1
3 
8 1
0 
1
3 
7 6 1
2 
9 172 
Num
ber 
of 
case
s 
close
d  
1
5 
1
3 
2
5 
9 2
2 
1
2 
6 7 9 3 3 3 1 128 
*state of play - 30.06.2012; 
Source: DG Competition 
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Table 4 
 
Source: DG Competition. 
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Table 5 
 
 
Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 
2012’ available online,  
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-
04/192685_2012_6020_cdj_ra_2012_en_proof_01.pdf > accessed on 26-06-
2013. 
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Table 6 
 
Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 
2012’ available online,  
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-
04/192685_2012_6020_cdj_ra_2012_en_proof_01.pdf > accessed on 26-06-
2013. 
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Table 7 
 
Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 
2012’ available online,  
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-
04/192685_2012_6020_cdj_ra_2012_en_proof_01.pdf> accessed on 26-06-
2013. 
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Table 8 
 
Number of state aid measures notified by Member 
States; by year and all sectors included, except 
railways (2000 - 2011) 
      
  
200
0 
200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
2005 2006 
20
07 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
  
EU-27 872 819 807 636 614 663 912 
76
9 
6
4
0 
7
2
9 
5
9
5 
5
5
3 
  
Belgium 35 26 28 30 23 14 23 24 
1
1 
2
6 
1
0 
1
9 
  
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 4 9 
1
1 
5   
Czech 
Republi
c 
0 0 0 3 12 41 77 23 
2
4 
1
2 
1
9 
1
6 
  
Denmar
k 
29 25 14 18 22 18 16 18 
1
8 
1
8 
2
0 
3
0 
  
German
y 
143 143 159 112 76 64 96 98 
1
1
1 
1
2
0 
7
6 
6
7 
  
Estonia 0 0 0 0 1 11 7 11 6 3 9 0   
Ireland 47 24 9 8 15 10 13 19 
1
3 
2
0 
1
7 
1
9 
  
Greece 21 16 18 11 10 11 11 11 
1
3 
1
6 
1
1 
2
4 
  
Spain 159 123 122 53 52 57 76 92 
8
0 
7
8 
8
0 
4
0 
  
France 98 93 105 75 57 38 80 73 
4
5 
5
4 
4
1 
4
1 
  
Italy 150 154 139 158 184 122 167 
11
7 
9
1 
7
8 
6
5 
6
2 
  
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 1 5 11 8 4 7 4 5   
Latvia 0 0 0 0 6 15 9 18 
1
5 
2
0 
1
8 
1
0 
  
Lithuani
a 
0 0 0 0 5 14 8 20 6 9 
1
3 
7   
Luxemb
ourg 
2 3 3 1 7 0 1 1 9 8 0 7   
Hungary 0 0 0 0 3 6 20 31 
2
1 
2
0 
1
5 
2
8 
  
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 3 7 1 1   
Netherla
nds 
49 61 72 54 32 45 49 32 
2
5 
3
8 
2
7 
3
4 
  
Austria 39 37 22 11 10 17 30 27 
2
6 
3
8 
2
1 
1
9 
  
Poland 0 0 0 0 12 57 53 32 
3
7 
2
9 
4
8 
4
5 
  
Portugal 22 19 21 12 13 11 16 8 8 5 
1
3 
1
0 
  
Romani
a 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 
1
1 
1
0 
4   
Sloveni
a 
0 0 0 0 5 3 6 6 
1
2 
1
4 
1
6 
5   
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Slovakia 0 0 0 0 2 30 53 5 
1
3 
1
4 
1
1 
6   
Finland 27 15 14 12 16 5 14 11 
1
0 
2
0 
1
1 
1
3 
  
Sweden 8 9 11 10 11 15 17 10 7 
1
2 
1
3 
1
0 
  
United 
Kingdo
m 
43 71 70 68 39 54 54 47 
2
5 
4
3 
1
5 
2
6 
  
Source: DG Competition, DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development, DG Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries  
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Table 9  
 
 
Source: European Commission – DG Competition, ‘Study on the 
enforcement of state aid law at national level available online < 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-
Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-
Start?PublicationKey=KD7506493> accessed on 30-7-2012 
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Table 10  
 
 
Source: European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard Autumn 2012 
update COM (2012) 778 final 
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